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ABSTRACT
Public support for market-based education reforms persists despite evidence that
these reforms exacerbate the educational marginalization of Black and Brown students.
Even among Democrats and ostensibly equity-minded policy actors, support for reforms
like charter schools is widespread. How do people come to support racially stratifying
policies despite their supposed commitment to ethic of social justice? The purpose of this
study was to investigate the relationship between the theories of unconscious racism
(Lawrence, 1995a) and moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) in the state takeover of a
majority Black school district by a majority white state government. Methods included a
critical race analysis of Doe v. Arkansas Department of Education (2016) and a critical
discourse study of the state takeover speech of elite white policy actors. Findings
included two parallel appeals: to the legal precedent on which Lawrence based the theory
of unconscious racism, from the court in Doe v. DOE; and to the mechanisms of moral
disengagement, from white policy actors justifying the takeover. It is therefore plausible
that public support for racist education policies is a result of morally disengaging policy
rhetoric, and that these policies are protected by strict legal obstacles to discrimination
claims. Recommendations include increased political involvement on the part of school
leaders, including principals; further critical policy studies of pre-adoption policy
discourse and policy outcomes; and deeper interdisciplinary investigation of the moral
disengagement of individual policy actors and citizens in an education policy arena.
R. Davis Clement, II
Department of Education Policy, Planning, & Leadership
The College of William & Mary in Virginia
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EDUCATION REFORM AS MORAL DISENGAGEMENT:
THE RACIST SUBTEXT OF THE STATE TAKEOVER OF
LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Contemporary education reform, referred to ad nauseum as “the greatest civil
rights challenge of our time” by at least the past four American presidents (Paige &
Witty, 2010), has not only failed to produce the great equalizing education system that
Horace Mann envisioned, it has increased social inequality and entrenched a market
ideology in which those inequalities are seen as natural and acceptable (Dumas, 2013;
Payne & Knowles, 2009; Rector-Aranda, 2016). Its biggest failures are well-known:
school integration has been reversed (K. Brown, 2005; Diem & Brooks, 2013); No Child
Left Behind increased the numbers of children left behind (Hursh, 2007); and privatelyrun charter schools are draining funds from public school districts, despite showing little
to no benefit to student achievement (Buras, 2011; Payne & Knowles, 2009; Winters,
2012). When policies are known to have racially stratifying effects, policy actors may
define the issues in ways that absolve them and the public from culpability for those
effects (Adamson & Darling-Hammond, 2012; Bohrnstedt, Kitmitto, Ogut, Sherman, &
Chan, 2015; Gillborn, 2013a). These conceptualizations come to comprise the landscape
of reform as policy actors set agendas based on public consent to “commonsense”
reforms (Au & Apple, 2009; Gramsci, 1971). Theories of discourse, policy, and race
suggest an underlying structure to these contradictions of education reform.
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Discourse theory suggests that values and beliefs are developed through
communication and social interaction, and these values and beliefs may benefit some
groups and marginalize others (van Dijk, 2006b). Policies, which are constructed and
communicated through discourse, codify power relations between groups and establish
the limits of agency and restraint in society (Ball, 1994). Race itself is a “product of
social thought and relations” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, p. 8) constructed to serve the
interests of those in power; two such examples of social relations are discourse and
policy. The interrelated nature of race, discourse, and policy makes possible a study of
the formation of education reform policy that accounts for the role of ideology in
constructing race and difference. With these theoretical assertions in mind, I investigated
the language of elite white policy actors in Little Rock, Arkansas—a school district with
a well-known history of racist policy and race-based marginalization (Kirk, 2005; Shukur
& Walker, 2017)—for ways in which their discourse around the 2015 state takeover of
the school district concealed the dissonance between social justice-minded education
reforms and racially stratified educational outcomes.
Background: The Long Shadow of Central High
In studies of race and policy, the context is broader than the immediate
circumstance (Buras, 2013), meaning that whatever the specific policy question at
hand—in the current case, state takeover—there are larger social relations and power
implications at play. Conflict between local and statewide racial attitudes has influenced
the landscape of education policy and reform in Little Rock for decades. In the fall of
1957, Little Rock School Superintendent Virgil Blossom was preparing to implement the
district plan for token integration (i.e., minimal compliance) of Little Rock schools (Kirk,
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2005), in accordance with the Brown rulings, with approval from the Little Rock school
board and the Little Rock political establishment, including the local chapter of the
NAACP (Baer, 2008; Jacoway, 2007). As a self-contained policy arena, the politically
moderate city of Little Rock was reluctantly pro-integration; national NAACP attorneys
considered Little Rock to be a favorable testing ground for desegregation of Southern
schools because of its mild racial climate relative to other Southern cities (Kirk, 2005).
Little Rock’s White Citizen’s Council was disproportionately small compared to other
similarly-sized Southern cities, and Little Rock voters had recently elected two
integrationists to the school board just months prior (Baer, 2008). But the surrounding
state of Arkansas was not so moderate (K. Anderson, 2010; Wilkinson, 1979). Many
north Arkansas towns with very few Black1 citizens had already fully integrated in
response to Brown, but south Arkansas towns with larger or even majority Black
populations remained fully segregated (Kirk, 2005).
When Governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to block the
integration of Central High School, the mayor of Little Rock said Faubus was stoking
controversy to “create tensions where none existed” (Baer, 2008, p. 137) in an effort to
boost his reelection chances with voters outside the more liberal-leaning capital city. In

1

I have kept with the convention of capitalizing Black and not white for ethical reasons, which I think are
best explained by the following note from Toure’s Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness?
“I have chosen to capitalize the word ‘Black’ and lowercase ‘white’ throughout this book. I believe
‘Black’ constitutes a group, an ethnicity equivalent to African-American, Negro, or, in terms of a sense
of ethnic cohesion, Irish, Polish, or Chinese. I don’t believe that whiteness merits the same treatment.
Most American whites think of themselves as Italian-American or Jewish or otherwise relating to other
past connections that Blacks cannot make because of the familial and national disruptions of slavery.
So to me, because Black speaks to an unknown familial/national past it deserves capitalization.” (p.
vii)
I have used the same rule for Brown because I believe it also applies to other minoritized communities
(e.g., Latin, Asian, Middle Eastern, Native American) in the U.S.
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the months that followed, white opponents of integration exerted near complete control
over state and local politics for the next two years (Klarman, 2004). Moderates’ reluctant
support for integration crystallized into vehement defense of the segregated status quo.
Segregationists replaced the integrationists in the state General Assembly, on the Little
Rock city board, and on the Little Rock school board (K. Anderson, 2010; Baer, 2008;
Kirk, 2005). Passive support for Virgil Blossom’s strategy of minimum compliance was
abandoned in favor of outright defiance of the court, and a historic educational crisis was
initiated.
This is not a revisionist attempt at suggesting the Little Rock Central High crisis
of 1957 would never have happened if the will of the people of Little Rock had not been
overruled by the governor. That kind of traditional narrative has been used by white
liberals for years to either (a) shift blame from the white citizens of Little Rock to the
reactionary, demagogic policy elites (Lewis, 2008), or (b) chalk up the crisis to the
compounding failures of ineffective, but well-meaning, leaders (Kirk, 2005). Rather, this
is an illustration of the potential for political discourse to manufacture consent and
opposition by shifting narratives and redefining the issues. The Brown decision defined
integration as numeric balance and racial proportionality of student populations in service
of equality, but Faubus transformed integration into an issue of states’ rights and
(paradoxically) local control, both of which were initiating dog whistles for the massive
resistance to desegregation that would outlast the Central High crisis throughout the Deep
South (Kirk, 2005; Webb, 2005). Notwithstanding Faubus’s appeals to local (as opposed
to federal) control, the 1957 Central High Crisis was also a case of the imposition of
statewide conservative political will on local democratic governance of the school
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district. Forty years later, the introduction of state-approved charter schools in Little Rock
to compete with district schools, against the wishes of the school board and
superintendent, represented another case of voters outside Little Rock making policy for
Little Rock schools. Because of the growing Black majority in Little Rock, these
incursions precipitated increasingly strained race relations between the district and the
state board of education.
By 2015, the school-age population of the Little Rock School District (LRSD)
was 54.3% Black (NCES, 2017, but the population of students who attended district
schools was 66.6% Black (LRSD, 2015). Despite having a white population in the district
of 24% , and a white student population of less than 19% (Jordan, 2017), the school
board had been majority white up until 2006 (LRSB has first Black majority, 2006). On
January 28, 2015, the majority white Arkansas Board of Education approved by a 4-3
vote to dissolve the majority-Black Little Rock School Board and take over control of the
Little Rock School District, shifting governance of the district to newly-appointed
Education Commissioner Johnny Key (Brantley, 2016b), who would serve as the singular
new (white) district board. The state board cited the continued failure of six schools (out
of 48 total in the district) to achieve accreditation by No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
standards. Less than a decade after achieving a Black majority, the board was dissolved
by a majority white state board of education, with the white state education commissioner
installed as its singular new board, and a newly appointed white superintendent as its
executive.
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Problem: The Paradox of Reform
The history of Little Rock is important to its current racial climate (Bonilla-Silva,
2014; Buras, 2013), and that historical context is an important element of discourse
study; but reform discourse is very much a tool of the present and should be investigated
and interrogated as an assertion of contemporary racial ideology, not past policy
shortcomings. Continued racial disparities in educational outcomes are not inherited
relics of a previous age, and viewing them as such leaves no one with the imperative to
resolve them (Leonardo, 2013). Current inequalities must be connected to current acts,
because social justice will only come from contemporary action. Dissolving the
democratically-elected and majority Black school board is overtly antidemocratic; but
convincing the general public to support that dissolution requires persuasive feats of
social-psychological finesse. The case of state takeover in Little Rock is important to
study because of the audacity of these initial actions and the banality of the market
reforms that policymakers attempted to implement under state control.
Education reforms have frequently been explicitly presented as urgent moral
imperatives by policy actors at the highest levels (Gillborn, 2001; Hernández, 2016;
Mulderrig, 2003; Stovall, 2013; Windle & Stratton, 2013). But most reforms, both
nationally and locally, have not enabled strides toward social justice and educational
equity. To the contrary, they have perpetuated, and in most instances intensified, racial
inequality in schools (Adamson & Darling-Hammond, 2012; Buras, 2011; Connell, 2013;
Crocco & Costigan, 2007; Gillborn, 2008, 2017; Hursh, 2005, 2007). Education in Little
Rock is increasingly stratified by race. Achievement gaps between Black students and
white students on statewide annual assessments have nearly doubled in the past five years
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(see Table 1). The implementation dips, or expected drops in performance in the year
after the beginning of a new test, have disproportionately affected Black students. The
state withdrew from the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers
(PARCC) after one year of implementation in 2014, switching to the ACT Aspire in
2015, which meant implementation dips in two consecutive years. Performance decreases
were much more dramatic for Black students than for white students. In the middle of this
switch, when achievement differences between Black and white students were
heightened, the state used poor achievement to rationalize dissolution of the school board
and takeover of the district (Brantley, 2016b).
Table 1
Percent of LRSD Students Scoring Proficient or Advanced on State Assessment, by Race

Grade 8

Grade 3
Math
2013
2014
2015
2016

Black

White

Literacy
Black
White

Math
Black

White

Literacy
Black
White

68.13

95.23

62.85

92.04

33.36

80.22

59.80

86.94

69.00
16.84
37.74

95.30
62.29
81.38

58.10
24.57
22.38

90.07
69.36
69.33

37.72
6.70
16.07

83.40
28.86
61.50

58.60
23.73
33.33

90.50
69.51
72.36

Note. Adapted from Little Rock School District Report Card by Arkansas Department of Education, 2016e, Little
Rock School District: District report card 2015-2016. Retrieved from
https://adesrc.arkansas.gov/ReportCard/View?lea=6001000&schoolYear=2016)

Schools in Little Rock have re-segregated as a result of two policy directions—the
expansion of charter school enrollment and the construction of new district schools in
white neighborhoods. Charter school attendance in Little Rock does not proportionally
reflect the racial distribution of the district (see Table 2). Schools where Black students
are overrepresented underperform relative to the district (in terms of schoolwide means),
and schools where white students are overrepresented either mirror or exaggerate district
disparities between white and Black student achievement (Brantley, 2016a). Interestingly,
Black students in predominantly Black charter schools that have been in existence for
8

more than five years outperform, on average, Black students in the district and the state
(Arkansas Department of Education, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). Yet charter schools
with disproportionately high white student enrollment are awarded additional seats,
paralleling another disturbing trend—the construction of new schools in predominantly
white and affluent sections of the district instead of in predominantly Black, Brown, and
poor sections, where most students are and where existing school buildings are crumbling
and in need of replacement (Shukur & Walker, 2017). Only 30% of the school-age
population of Little Rock, and less than 19% of students enrolled in LRSD, are white
(Arkansas Department of Education, 2016e; United States Census Bureau, 2017), yet
policies are designed to increase white enrollment instead of improving dilapidated
conditions for Black students already enrolled. These policies—charter authorization and
enrollment increases to majority white charters, and construction of new schools to entice
Table 2
Student Demographics of LRSD Compared to Little Rock Charter Schools

LRSD

AP

Quest
MS

eStem

LiSA

CK

Premier
HS

CCL
Acad.

LR
Prep.
Acad.

Race
Black
White

65.1%
17.5

14.4%
74.2

19.5%
63.2

45.0%
42.8

36.9%
32.1

57.3%
0.6

84.5%
12.1

91.9%
1.7

Low SES

88.6%
0.7

74.9
21.0
11.0
31.6
40.9
98.0
63.0
76.0
100%
Note. Percentages based on 2015-2016 enrollment as reported in the Arkansas Times by Brantley, M., 2016a,
March 10, Charter schools v. Little Rock School District by the numbers. Arkansas Times, and by Arkansas
Department of Education, 2016a, Covenant Keepers Charter: School report card 2015-2016; and Arkansas
Department of Education, 2016e, Little Rock School District: District report card 2015-2016; LRSD = Little
Rock School District; SES = socioeconomic status, as determined by eligibility for free/reduced-price lunch; AP
= Academics Plus charter school; MS = Middle School; CK = Covenant Keepers charter school; HS = High
School; CCL = Capital City Lighthouse.

white families into the district—are current actions, not inherited conditions.
Contemporary individual and collective agents, therefore, are to blame for these
inequalities. But who are those agents?
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By pursuing state takeover of a district, state leaders seem to suggest district
administrators are to blame. Mayoral control and state takeover are two common districtlevel reform strategies in which the problem is defined as poor local governance, and in
which imposed governance of a district is the conduit for reforms that were
democratically unpopular when the district was self-governed. In cases of mayoral
control, city voters and school district voters are the same (Wong & Shen, 2003), but in
cases of state control, there is greater potential for incongruence between the political
values of the school district voters and those of the statewide electorate. State takeovers
are anti-democratic when the voters of a city district have a different, even oppositional,
political culture from voters in the state at large (May, 2016; Rogers & Pole, 2010). In
cities like Memphis, New Orleans, and Little Rock, state takeover of the schools equates
to red state control of blue city citizens. More significantly, differences in the racial
composition of city and state electorates can mean disfranchisement of majority-Black
school district voters (Morel, 2016; Oluwole & Green, 2009).
Typically, the first changes made in a district takeover are school closures and
charter-ization (R. L. Green & Carl, 2000; Rogers, 2012), and so it has been in Little
Rock. For example, the first takeover superintendent, Baker Kurrus, contracted with
Teach For America and proposed the closure of schools (all in predominantly Black or
Latino neighborhoods), and approved the construction of a new school in predominantly
white West Little Rock; and the state board has approved charter school enrollment
expansion by 5,000 students (Brantley, 2016b; Hardy, 2017). Even Kurrus, the new
white, state-appointed superintendent, advocated against the expansion and addition of
more charters in the city. Authorization of new and expanding charter networks is a
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power of the state board of education, not the school district, but most of these policies
would not have been possible with the democratically-elected school board in control.
Without the school board, however, they have become law. This disfranchisement of
local Black voters via control by the statewide electoral majority mirrors other similar
efforts in cities and districts, and its persistent appeal to policymakers warrants
investigation.
Purpose
The reforms in Little Rock are not unique to Little Rock, nor are they especially
baffling examples of asserted educational values (i.e., equality, equity, integration)
conflicting with actual educational outcomes (i.e., disparity, dominance, segregation).
The case of Little Rock is important to me personally, because I am from Little Rock. I
taught there, in a little charter school across the street from Central High School. The
year I began this study was the sixtieth anniversary of the Central High crisis, so there
was a flurry of programming and celebration of “progress” in race relations in the city. So
Little Rock has personal significance for me, and there is interesting historical
congruence between the 1957 and 2015 incursions of state political will into local school
governance. But the people of Little Rock are typical, and the leaders in Little Rock are
typical, and the reforms in Little Rock are typical, and the race issues in Little Rock are
typical. That is why Little Rock is where I have situated this study: its typicality. I
undertake a deeper discussion of my positionality as a white researcher in Chapter 3.
It is possible to construe persistent inequality in education or the “gaps” in
achievement between Black students and white students as a large-scale manifestation of
white privilege. This white privilege thesis allows individuals to acknowledge that “the
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system” marginalizes Black people while avoiding personal culpability for that
marginalization. The passive language of privilege protects white people from blame for
the effects of racism, instead shifting blame to racist whites from the past or to deplorable
whites in the present (Leonardo, 2016). Even the term institutional racism separates the
violence of racist acts from any particular person or group, essentially excusing present
actors from accountability for the continued potency of structures and behaviors that
maintain white supremacy (Leonardo, 2016). The purpose of this study was to propose
and describe a framework through which institutionalized racism could be understood as
the effect of individuals’ actions justified through policy discourse.
Any time people communicate, they build social structures—relationships
between each other, representations of themselves, and narratives through which groups
make meaning of their context (Gee, 2014). As a social process through which these
social structures (i.e., relationships, representations, and narratives) are built, discourse is
a social action that transmits social norms, values, and expectations between individuals
and among groups (N. Fairclough, 2010, 2015; van Dijk, 2008). In these social
exchanges, the norms and values of some groups and individuals are favored, while the
norms and values of others are marginalized (Gee, 2014; van Dijk, 2008). These are
usually implicit actions, accomplished with specific terminology, rhetorical cues, and
linguistic devices that appeal to the biases and attitudes of a person or group. Values like
social justice and antiracism can be communicated through such exchanges. So can
support for or opposition to education reform initiatives and policies.
It may be intuitive to conceive of policy as a struggle for power, since policy is
frequently played out in an openly competitive political arena. But policy, like discourse,

12

has different meanings. Policy can be understood as both text and as discourse. Policy as
text is fixed in a specific historical context, and may bear little resemblance to reality
(Ball, 1994; Diem & Young, 2015; Taylor, 1997). After a policy text is produced, it is
interpreted and implemented by many different local actors in diverse contexts, and the
material realities it initiates are just as diverse (Ball, 1994). So studying the text of a
policy may not yield an accurate description of the social structures (i.e., relationships,
representations, and narratives) that resulted from a policy. Policy as discourse, however,
is more dynamic and representative of those contexts and social structures.
Policy as discourse encompasses all the speeches, media coverage, official
proceedings and documents that convey both advocacy in support of and opposition to
the policy, as well as accounts of its implementation and effects (Ball, 1994; Taylor,
1997). Just like discourse, policy is conditioned by and constructs its context (N.
Fairclough, 2015). Thus all the speeches, media coverage, and other policy talk are a
product of the social structures from which they sprang, but they also alter and transform
those social structures—reshaping understandings; broadening or narrowing
conceptualizations, favoring some relationships, punishing some representations, and
altering narratives. Elite policy actors use discursive mechanisms to define issues and
contexts through relationships, representations, and narratives that protect their interests
(Gillborn, 2013b).
Elite policy actors are participants who heavily influence the policy process by
virtue of their governmental authority, their expertise, their political power, or their
proximity to people in any of those groups. In discourse studies, politicians, journalists,
scholars, writers, and bureaucrats are generally regarded as elites, and their discourse is
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important to study because it has outsized influence over public thought (van Dijk, 2008).
Elite policy actors construct narratives of the problem that set up their own perspective as
neutral, intuitive, or self-evident. Through policy discourse, they select and define the
features of a policy problem, then categorize those features, “selecting some things as
relevant or important and discarding, backgrounding or ignoring others, occluding other
ways of seeing (and acting), and thereby silencing them in policy discourse and ensuing
action” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 99). This is why studying policy discourse, not just
policy outcomes, is important to study and understand.
Conceptual Framework
The model of critical discourse study van Dijk (2016) proposes for studying
racism is a triangular sociocognitive conceptualization of the complex web of interactions
that translate words into meaning, meanings into beliefs, and beliefs into actions.
Discourse influences social microstructures, or personal interaction and communication,
by constructing the mental models individuals use to make meaning of interactions with
their environment. These meanings (i.e., knowledge) contribute to the formation of
ideologies, or shared systems of beliefs and attitudes. Those ideologies are acted out and
instantiated in social macrostructures (e.g., organizations, laws, traditions) that legitimize
some ways of being (i.e., beliefs, values, behaviors) and marginalize other ways of being
(van Dijk, 2008, 2016).
The social situation in which discourse is produced and understood, or the milieu
of interactions and influences that occur around the triangular framework above, is the
context, and from any given perspective it is experienced or asserted as a context model
(van Dijk, 1990). Broadly, people with similar worldviews are situated in similar context
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models (macro); on a smaller scale, people in the same room listening to the same speech
are using a similar context model (micro), but even these models differ based on
individuals’ experiences and perspective. For van Dijk, a critical discourse study is an
analysis of the context model of a particular situation for a particular person or group of
people. For this study, I propose a context model of racial dissonance comprised of social
structures of white dominance in education (i.e., discriminatory policies that marginalize
and disfranchise Black and Brown people) and discursive structures of unconscious
racism (expressed belief in democratic and antiracist ideals), reconciled by the cognitive
structures of moral disengagement. Unconscious racism is a theory of human action and
legal principle in which discriminatory intent is implicit in the discourse and interactions
of individuals in the United States (Lawrence, 1995a). Moral disengagement is a
framework of psychological mechanisms through which individuals dissociate from the
outcomes of their actions when they know their actions to be immoral by even their own
standards (Bandura, 1999). These two theories have not been applied together to studies
of education policy, and almost never synthesized as complementary frameworks even in
legal scholarship influenced by social psychology. By studying both frameworks in the
context of the takeover of LRSD, this study does both.
This analysis is more than a description of rhetorical themes, or of cognitive
processes, or of social structures. For social structures to be maintained, they must be
internalized in the mental models and knowledge of individuals, then reproduced as
actions or speech aligned with the attitudes and beliefs that arose from that knowledge
(van Dijk, 1995b). This critical discourse study conceptualizes the elements of the
context model from the standpoint of the following respective frameworks: (a) the social
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structures that uphold racial hierarchies and white supremacy from the perspective of
Critical Race Theory, (b) the ideologies that support those social structures from the
perspective of unconscious racism, and (c) the cognitive processes that undergird that
ideology from the perspective of moral disengagement. Below, I pose the research
questions for this study.
Research Questions
Research on specific urban cases of state takeover, mayoral control, and districtwide charter-ization is a burgeoning field (Gillborn, 2016; Lubienski, 2003; Payne &
Knowles, 2009). However, there is a paucity of such research on contemporary education
politics in Little Rock. Education reformers in Little Rock have, for decades, described
their agenda in the language of civil rights and racial equality, yet the policies that have
accompanied these appeals have, for decades, produced increasingly stratified results
along racial lines. Policy actors select, name, and categorize parts of a policy situation to
suit their interests. Critical discourse analysis is necessary to describe the linguistic and
narrative mechanisms policy actors use to do that (N. Fairclough, 2010; Rogers, 2011;
van Dijk, 2008; Woodside-Jiron, 2011). If white policy talk in education demonstrates
the discursive mechanisms of detachment from the moral consequences of their policies,
then the social justice aims of education reformists’ agendas are compromised. The
presence of moral disengagement strategies suggests policy actors’ tacit acceptance of the
racist effects of reforms like school choice and state takeover.
Discourse both reveals and constructs social norms, values, and activities; and
policies are constructed through discourse. Policies therefore both reflect and affect social
norms, values, and activities. Analyses of discourse are critical when they focus on

16

dominance from the perspective of the dominated group, show how dominant discourse
is illegitimate, or show how alternative discourses will better represent the interests of the
dominated group (van Dijk, 2008). I used a critical policy analysis approach (Diem,
Young, Welton, Mansfield, & Lee, 2014; Taylor, 1997; Woodside-Jiron, 2011) in a study
of education policy in Little Rock to answer the following questions:
1. To what extent is Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement applicable in
cases implicated by Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism?
a. How is the case of the state takeover of Little Rock School District a
case of unconscious racism?
b. What mechanisms of moral disengagement are evident in the
discourse of the takeover?
Definitions of Terms
Aversive racism: A preemptive abdication of moral decision-making responsibility, also
situational and reflexive (Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout,
1994).
Color-blind racism: A sociological framework of race-neutral explanations and
justifications for differences between people of different races, including
liberalism, cultural racism, naturalization of separation, and minimization of harm
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014)
Context model: The social situation in which discourse is produced and understood; the
milieu of interactions and influences that occur in a policy arena from any given
perspective (van Dijk, 1995)
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Dog whistle: A coded reference to a racist idea that does not appear racist on the surface
(I. H. López, 2015)
Elites: “Members of dominant groups and organizations have a special role in planning,
decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the enactment of
power…such elites also have special access to discourse: they are literally the
ones who have most to say” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 255)
Ideology: A shared system of fundamental beliefs that influences action and controls
other shared beliefs (van Dijk, 2006b)
Implicit bias: A behavioral-level reflexive tendency studied via reaction times to
pictures and words (Kang, 2010).
Institutional racism: An understanding of racism in which racial oppression is the
outcome of established social structures and institutions, not of individual actions
(Leonardo, 2016)
Moral disengagement: A social psychological framework that focuses on the role of
individual agency in maintaining a system of social values in contradiction with
the societal circumstances those values bring about (Bandura, 1999)
Policy discourse: speeches, media coverage, official proceedings and documents,
advocacy in support and opposition to the policy, as well as accounts of its
implementation and effects (Ball, 1994; Taylor, 1997)
Unconscious racism: A theory of discriminatory intent in which individuals
subconsciously detach from awareness of the racist effects of their actions,
because those actions are contrary to their ethical system (Lawrence, 1995a)
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White privilege thesis: A perspective of institutional racism in which white
marginalization of Black and Brown people is an inherited and fixed state of
being with no culpable agents, rather than an active state of being that all white
individuals are culpable for continually reconstructing (Leonardo, 2016)
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
The purpose of this review of the literature is to review relevant critical race
studies of education policy, social psychological studies of racism, and critical race
analyses of court opinions applicable to the takeover of Little Rock School District
(LRSD). This was a study of the extent to which moral disengagement, a social
psychological framework of self-exoneration for immoral behavior, was manifest in the
discourse of white policy actors in the Little Rock education policy arena. It was also a
study of the extent to which such a framework was applicable or complementary to a
critical race analysis of the takeover, specifically the opinion of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, that the takeover was not a
racially discriminatory state action. I reviewed three bodies of literature: (1) critical
studies of education reform policy narratives, (2) social psychological studies of racism,
and (3) critical race studies of education policy. Through this broad review, I establish a
general context model for the takeover that is inclusive of education reform discourse,
social cognition in politics, and legal structures that protect white supremacy.
A general context model of urban education reform allows for the analysis of
human agency in the process of racial stratification, rather than leaving it to agentless
conceptions of institutionalized racism, by explaining the contradiction between racist
acts and antiracist beliefs as an outcome of individual cognition of political discourse.
Leonardo (2016) asserts that resisting white supremacy requires first acknowledging that
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white supremacy is not passively inherited, but actively reconstructed. This is an
ontological assertion locating the source of current white dominance in contemporary
human activity, not remnants of past regimes. The human activity under investigation in
this study is the construction of policy discourse of white policy actors.
The Landscape of Racism and Reform: A Context Model
Since the Civil Rights Movement, racism in the U.S. has (perhaps until recently)
been of a more “covert” (Bonilla-Silva, 2014, p. 26), under-the-radar, or implied nature.
This is true of education reform, where policies may seem to apply to all schools and
students, but actually only affect communities of color. Where enacted, market-based
reforms like school choice, charter-ization, magnet schools, Teach For America, and state
takeover, have the effect of dispossessing communities of color of their spaces and
resources, displacing governance of schools that serve these communities, and
dominating education and policy discourse (Lipman, 2011). This last effect, the
dominance of discourse, is the focus of this study; but the first two, dispossession and
displacement, are the material effects of education reform that dominant discourse
excuses.
Many studies connecting the discourse of market reforms to neoliberalism focus
on the terminology of crisis, choice, managerialism, and accountability (Lipman, 2015;
Stovall, 2013). The objective of neoliberal discourse is to persuade people to act against
their own self-interest. According to Marxist, neoMarxist, and critical pedagogical
perspectives, discourse generates common sense that makes neoliberal policy approaches
seem intuitive, as if there is no other legitimate alternative (McLaren, 2003). The
foremost concern from these perspectives is class difference, and how those in power

21

convince the majority to consent to their own domination. What this perspective cannot
explain is how the majority consents to dominate and marginalize a minority group, even
as they profess ideals of equality and social justice. Because of this relative silence on
intraclass dominance, critical pedagogy and other Marxist perspectives on neoliberal
reform do not sufficiently account for the racial stratification in American education.
Discourse theory. Since this study was of policy discourse, it is necessary to
understand why discourse is worth studying. In policy formation, the discourse of issue
definition and agenda formation is known as framing (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008).
Policy framing is the use of deliberate orders of discourse to define a policy problem such
that a solution is not only favorable to the framer’s interests, but also apparently selfevident to the framer’s audience, the public (Aukes, Lulofs, & Bressers, 2017;
Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008). It is a hegemonic exercise, because it not only seeks to
define the problem, but to eliminate alternative definitions of the problem and to
construct a policy scenario in which their own position seems objectively obvious (van
Dijk, 2006a). Policy actors select particular aspects of a policy problem using discursive
mechanisms (N. Fairclough, 2015; Gee, 2014). For instance, they foreground, or
emphasize, their values and perspectives in their narratives and explanations; the
corollary of this is that they, consciously or unconsciously, background or marginalize
other aspects of the problem. Policy actors may name these selected elements using
familiar metaphors, and categorize them in ways that heighten difference, so that their
interpretations of the policy situation are easily digested by consumers. Relationships
between the elements as categorized make certain policy solutions self-evident and other
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policy alternatives seem irrelevant, ineffectual, or unconscionable (van Hulst & Yanow,
2016).
Discursive mechanisms and influence. These terms, cues, and devices may be
understood as discursive mechanisms. They communicate relationships among people,
ideas, and the world in many different ways, from grammatical choices and vocal
intonation at the micro level (N. Fairclough, 2010; Gee, 2014), to rhetorical devices and
narrative structures at the meso level (I. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; van Dijk,
1995a), to performance and design at the macro level (Hodge & Kress, 1988, 1993).
Choosing which of these ways to study varies based on the school of discourse studies
from which one’s approach chiefly borrows. These schools are not mutually exclusive;
discourse scholars value multidisciplinarity and “methodological hybridity” (Rogers,
2011, p. 11). But they do reflect usefully distinct approaches to discourse; further
consideration of these distinctions will be given in Chapter 3. The mechanisms under
investigation in this study will be meso-level persuasive strategies and rhetoric (van Dijk,
2008).
Discursive mechanisms influence thought by limiting our communication to
familiar words and concepts, thereby restricting our conceptualizations of social
structures (i.e., relationships, representations, and narratives) to already-existing schema
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). A schema is an easily accessible model for understanding
new things, like a template into which new information and stimuli can be put for faster
processing (N. Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2008). We draw on existing terminology,
rules, and classifications simply because we already know them, or because they are
familiar to our audience. This precludes our thinking beyond the familiar to terms, rules,
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and systems that we do not know about or that have yet to be created. It is not willful
ignorance, but rather an inherent bias for the cognitively familiar. It may not necessarily
merit blame or guilt, but nonetheless can result in the perpetuation of ideas and values
that are blameworthy.
Hegemony and tools of thought. In societies organized around popular consent,
power is exercised through hegemony, or what might be called common sense, instead of
physical force (Gross, 2011; McLaren, 2003). Leaders generate popular consent by
influencing, manipulating, and controlling public opinion; hegemony is the extent to
which this consent is considered automatic or intuitive for the led. The peril of hegemony
is that it can be, and frequently is, used by those in power to generate support for
ideologies that sustain that power while perpetuating the oppression of the consenting
populace. Ideologies are systems of values based on hegemonic ideas and assumptions
about the world. Under the influence of some ideologies, large groups of people will
support power systems that act against their own interests, or even against their own
moral systems (N. Fairclough, 2015; van Dijk, 2006a). This is the nature of hegemony, to
implicitly marginalize some individuals, groups, thoughts, or behaviors, often beyond the
comprehension of those making the marginalizing assumption.
Where existing tools of thought are in use, the use of other tools is non-intuitive.
Once a concept, such as a political issue, has been defined, it is unlikely to be redefined
without innovation or radical reconceptualization. Derrick Bell (1995) put it in legal
terms, comparing it to the strict constructionist principle of stare decisis in constitutional
law, in which jurists rely on precedent and consequently never create new categories of
rights. Issue definition is a stage in the policy process in which policy actors respond to a
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confluence of political events and opportunities (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). After
policy issues are defined one way, it is difficult to think about them in a different way,
which is why issue definition is arguably the most important step in the policy process
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). By establishing a schema for thinking about a policy
problem, those policy actors who succeed at defining the issues control the discussion
and consequently set the policy agenda. One such schema is the policy narrative.
Policy Narratives of Education Reform
It is important to review studies of education reform discourse in order to
establish the context model in which current reforms take place. In an extensive review of
the literature, I found no studies of unconscious racism and education policy, nor of
moral disengagement and education policy. Therefore, in order to account for the state of
the literature on the discourse of education reform, I reviewed two bodies of research:
studies of education reform narratives, and critical race discourse analyses of education
reforms. Importantly, though both present policy discourse that marginalizes Black
students and communities, and discourse in support of policies with racially stratifying
outcomes, none of these studies attempted to explain the appeal of such discourse to
voters. What accounts for the success of racist discourse and the persistence of racist
policies when social values are increasingly anti-racist and social justice-focused
(Gillborn, 2008, 2016)?
The preponderance of narratives I reviewed portray an education system in crisis,
with helpless Black and Brown students as the victims of an outdated system that restricts
their parents’ abilities to choose better schools for them. The villains in this narrative are
bad teachers and the unions that protect them. I identified three general plotlines with
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three distinct morals, although they are certainly not mutually exclusive. The first is the
market story, in which education problems are framed as the result of complacent schools
and districts who are not accountable for their outcomes because parents are frequently
not allowed to choose other options. The second is the measurement story, in which the
root of education problems is the failure to properly measure the quality of classroom
teaching and, with that knowledge, reward, punish, or replace teachers accordingly. And
the third is the mindset story, in which educational decline is the result of teachers who
either do not work hard enough or long enough for the miraculous achievement gains that
are possible with persistence and grit.
Some studies also collected counternarratives. For instance, Golden’s (2017)
study of the personal narrative of “Elijah” showed two stories: one to explain his inschool world and the other to explain his out-of-school world. The two narratives are
nearly contradictory, as Elijah attributed his out-of-school challenges to social and
structural causes, but attributed his in-school challenges to personal shortcomings or
group deficiencies. His narrative of his home and neighborhood life is consistent with
critical and social justice narratives of structural inequity, but his narrative of school buys
into meritocracy, individualism, and cultural deficits. Similarly, in Gerstl-Pepin’s (2015)
analysis of the narratives put forth in The Wire and Waiting for Superman, the narrative
from The Wire is a counternarrative similar to Elijah’s out-of-school narrative, juxtaposed
with the dominant “choice is the solution to failing schools” narrative presented in
Waiting for Superman. The importance of these counternarratives lies in their contrast
with the preponderance of the other narratives in this review. However, in keeping with
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the parameters of the current study (i.e., of the policy discourse of white policy elites),
the following is a consideration of dominant narratives from the literature.
Setting. The setting of a policy narrative is “the environment which situates
objects and characters; more specifically, the environment in which characters move or
live” (Gautreaux & Delgado, 2016, p. 7). In the education policy narratives of elite policy
actors, the setting is bleak. Of the 20 studies reviewed here, 6 identified specific
constructions of setting that relied on the imagery of crisis and the language of survival
(e.g., security, resuscitation, recovery), or on appeals to frontier entrepreneurialism (e.g.,
growth, opportunity, scalability). In the setting of the dominant education policy
narrative, the U.S. is beset by increasing economic competition from around the world,
where the results of globalization have been the incubation of a new generation of
international competitors against which the U.S. is now ill-equipped to compete (G. L.
Anderson, 1998). Two major themes in these settings aligned with Stone’s (2011) broad
policy stories: decline and recovery. Stories of decline hearken to a bygone period of
superiority or prosperity, and are utilized by policy actors to set the stage for stories of
recovery, which set forth proposals for returning to that superior state again (Stone,
2011). Both are justifications of policy that, if analyzed with a moral disengagement
(Bandura, 1999) framework, might yield interesting conclusions about the intent of
policymakers deploying these narratives, as well as the susceptibility of their audiences to
the logic of their justifications. The authors made no such connection in the studies I
reviewed.
State of decline. These policy narratives position education as the engine of
economic growth and, thus, as the solution to declining international dominance and
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threatened economic survival (G. L. Anderson, 1998; Mansfield & Thachik, 2016). The
notion of decline implies a past ideal state or a lost strength, both of which call for
restoration or rejuvenation, so in this sense a setting of crisis-induced decline beckons
action of some kind. In a study of rhetoric used in think tank reports and advocacy briefs
in support of participation in the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), Auld and Morris (2016) found crisis rhetoric pitting nations against an abstract,
but fierce, inertia:
Rapid globalization and modernization are posing new and demanding challenges
to individuals and societies alike… The world is indifferent to tradition and past
reputations, unforgiving of frailty and ignorant of custom or practice. Success will
go to those individuals and countries which are swift to adapt, slow to complain,
and open to change. (p. 208)
This rhetoric of competition calls for actors with bold plans and equates the status quo
with continued stagnation and further decline. It is noteworthy that the above excerpt
from a report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
mentions both individual and collective actors, because the emergencies evoked have
consequences at both levels. While nations compete for dominance or at least a sizeable
share of the global economy, individual children and families are also “at risk and in need
of saving by aggressive policy reforms” (Kee, 2015, p. 253). Despite such dire
circumstances, communities have nowhere to turn but to the crumbling education
system—a “stolid bureaucracy with unresponsive leaders” (Ertas, 2015, p. 435). This
lack of options at the family level, ultimately, created a space for opportunity in the
disaster scenario (G. L. Anderson & Donchick, 2016). In the decline setting, the
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education system has been acted upon by some destructive force (usually teachers’
unions or policymakers, portrayed as antagonistic or apathetic), but in the recovery
setting, which follows from opportunity, the education system has the potential to be
acted upon by a constructive force.
Potential for recovery. Settings cannot be so desolate that they are beyond hope.
To propose a solution, there must be a germ of potential to act upon. In a study of the
language of model bills produced and disseminated by the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), G. L. Anderson and Donchik (2016) saw the education
landscape portrayed as “an industry poised for explosive growth” (p. 335) with the
potential for billions to be made by private contractors with niche markets like
technology, maintenance, foodservice, and transportation. ALEC produces legislation
templates that state legislators all over the country then customize for enactment in their
own contexts. Curiously, these services are all already offered by public school districts,
and their growth is not reliant upon the academic potency of the school system; it is
reliant upon contracts with districts and (more likely) education management
organizations (G. L. Anderson & Donchik, 2016).
Kee’s (2015) critical race analysis of the “themes and interpretive frames” (p.
252) of pre- and post-Katrina policy narratives in New Orleans revealed a localized
instance of ALEC’s verdant frontier. In newspaper articles, government policy briefs, and
interest group advocacy texts, she found the education system represented as “a blank
slate” (p. 253), a “breeding ground for innovation” (p. 254), and a “proving ground” (p.
255) for experimental reforms. The governor of Louisiana explicitly referred to the
“washing away” (p. 254) of the old system as the “opportunity of a lifetime” (p. 254).
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This theme of “rebirth” (p. 254) and the Recovery School District was similar to, but not
quite the same as, Mansfield and Thachik’s (2016) notion of “resuscitation” (p. 10),
which implies an escape from death rather than a renaissance.
The paradox in this construction of setting is that these descriptions of the
education system—represented in microcosm by the “marginalized school” (Gautreaux &
Delgado, 2016, p. 7), a decaying urban institution serving predominantly Black and
Brown children—portray issues like national security and economic growth as dependent
on the success of those institutions. The implication is that white schools are doing fine,
but that national security depends on improving the Black and Brown schools. From the
beginning, then, education reform is racialized. In her interviews with Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan and another anonymous elite policy actor, Hernández (2016)
observed the “presentation of South L.A. as a pathologized, racialized space” (p. 15), and
reform presented as one approach to improving decayed urban environments and
“helpless…desperate” (p. 7) communities. Duncan specifically appealed to whites to “get
off the sidelines” (p. 19) to do something about the ills that the education system had
perpetuated on Black and Brown communities. These appeals to social justice are
important aspects of dominant policy narratives, because they have resonance with leftleaning audiences who are not moved by the international economic dominance and
public sector privatization appeals (G. L. Anderson & Donchik, 2016). The setting of the
dominant education policy narrative situates characters like students, teachers, and
parents such that they either need to be saved (victims), need to be stopped (villains), or
need to be empowered (heroes). The crisis setting sets the audience up for a rescue story,
which beckons a hero.
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Character. Characterization is achieved through discourse that conveys motive,
causation, and conflict. In the dominant narratives reviewed here, victims are identified
as agentless passive recipients of structural, cultural, or educational actions that have put
them in their current condition. The use of victim and villain imagery in the following
studies is a potentially rich trove of moral disengagement strategies such as victim
blaming, dehumanization, and displacement of responsibility. Villains are blamed for the
victims’ plight, and heroes represent the policy solution. Notably, although the structural
explanations of inequality that are frequently deployed to explain broad inequality
implicate policymakers, the villains and potential heroes in these narratives are always
teachers, which could be considered displacement of responsibility for education
outcomes. No discussions of why teachers are an acceptable villain were broached by the
authors. By not critiquing the narratives in their analysis, these authors risk reifying, or
making concrete, the underlying assumptions of the policy actors under study.
Victims. In the common narrative of education reform, the victims of the status
quo are usually Black children. Fourteen of the 20 studies reviewed here found explicit
references to Black children, usually boys, as recipients structural, cultural, or selfinflicted damage and therefore deficient in some way. Much “common sense” (e.g., the
body of assumptions and biases on which many political beliefs and values are based)
about education and education reform in the U.S. is rooted in colorblindness, and furthers
a deficit-based crisis narrative around the education of Black students. Deficit-based
explanations of inequality fall into two main categories: structural and cultural. The
structural perspective is that social structures and policies create material deficits for
people of color and people in poverty; the cultural perspective is that families and
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communities of color have cultural values that are at odds with the norms and
expectations of achievement and success in America (Bertrand, Perez, & Rogers, 2015).
Structurally deficient. Much like the helpless and desperate people of color
represented in Hernandez’s study, Black families are typically represented as agentless
actors in education reform narratives. They are unable to choose other options besides the
bad public schools in their neighborhoods (G. L. Anderson & Donchick, 2016), but they
also seek refuge from their neighborhoods at school (Gerstl-Pepin, 2006). Their parents
are “distraught, noninfluential” (Ertas, 2015, p. 435), powerless to help their “suffering
children” (p. 435). In a narrative policy analysis of legislation, print and video news
coverage, and government documents related to the No Child Left Behind Act, GerstlPepin (2006) found students portrayed as helpless. In a representative summation, one
teacher interviewed for the study said,
They don’t want school to end. They are scared. School is a stable, safe place for
them. This is where they get food; they don’t eat at home; they come to school
dirty…our students come with a lot more to work on. (p. 152)
Culturally deficient. Portrayals of Black and Brown families as not valuing
education, or not knowing how to effectively participate in their children’s schooling, or
not understanding the norms of academic learning, are referred to as cultural deficit
discourse (Clycq, Ward Nouwen, & Vandenbroucke, 2014). This is one of the primary
ways in which Black and Brown students are presented as victims in education policy
narratives (Bertrand et al., 2015). In a critical race analysis of Supreme Court
desegregation decisions, the Coleman Report, popular literature on the achievement gap,
and Obama Administration policy documents, Aggarwal (2016) identified narratives in
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which poverty had created cultural deficits within Black communities. The language of
the Coleman Report
reframed the problem of inequality in education as being rooted in the ‘initial
deficiency’ that poor students of color start out with: namely the ways that
poverty affects the ‘cultures’—defined as the practices, attitudes, and values—of
their families (Aggarwal, 2016, p. 136).
But the Brown decision asserted that the deficit was the result of segregation, not of
poverty. The Brown narrative of victimization was of an internal injury caused by
physical separation from whites—a part of the mentality of students instead of an effect
of material conditions (Aggarwal, 2016). Integration with whites followed as the solution
to the injury, which “pathologized the plaintiff instead of addressing the underlying
pathology—white supremacy” (Aggarwal, 2016, p. 134, quoting Ladson-Billings).
Decades later, the Obama-era Bridging the Word Gap program (designed to increase
exposure of Black and Brown children to more words in early childhood) communicated
to nonwhite parents that “the way they parent and care for their children is circumspect
[against a white standard] and in need of reform if their children are to academically
succeed” (Aggarwal, 2016, p. 143).
Villains. In the 11 studies that mentioned teachers at all in their policy narratives,
teachers were the problem in each. There is a taxonomy of problem teachers, ranging
from the inadvertently bad teacher who is just a product of a terrible system (Harrison &
Cohen-Vogel, 2012), to the exploitatively bad teacher who takes full advantage of a
terrible system (Gerstl-Pepin, 2006). Policy narratives that focus on the teacher pipeline,
such as studies of TFA (Ahmann, 2015; Gautreaux & Delgado, 2016), tended to portray
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teachers as incompetent, negligent, or lazy (Harrison & Cohen-Vogel, 2012). But policy
narratives that focus on tenure reform or union-busting use much more severe
descriptors, from “selfish” (Goldstein, 2011, p. 553) all the way to, in the words of
former Secretary of Education Rod Paige, “enemies against hope” (p. 557).
The elite policymakers in Harrison and Cohen-Vogel’s (2012) narrative trace
education problems back to the bad teachers who are getting paid the same as the most
effective teachers. In transcripts of legislative committee meetings and floor proceedings,
as well as direct quotes from newspapers, teachers are portrayed as lazy and negligent.
Said one legislator, “I don’t want a teacher remaining in the classroom because she has
tenure, and she’s sleeping half the time” (Harrison & Cohen-Vogel, 2012, p. 527). In this
narrative, the nature of instructional practice is not questioned, but teacher competence is.
Instruction is not working because the wrong people are teaching, and effective reform is
“simply a function of putting the right people in front of students, and policies like payfor-performance would get them there” (Harrison & Cohen-Vogel, p. 525).
Goldstein (2011) conducted a frame analysis of articles about teachers’ unions
that appeared in the New York Times and Time Magazine between 2001 and 2008. She
found teachers’ unions portrayed as, at best, a special interest group in favor of the status
quo, and worst, a terrorist group and “threat to the American public” (Goldstein, 2011, p.
557). The conventional villain is the union as “establishment organization” (G. L.
Anderson & Donchik, 2016, p. 336) steeped in bureaucratic inefficiency and cumbersome
regulations that protect bad teachers. Allies of the unions are enemies of reform based on
“stubborn loyalty” (Kee, 2015, p. 255) to the old system, from which control must be
wrestled in order to fix education. A more sinister villain is the union as bully.
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Conservative columnist George Will was quoted calling the National Education
Association “a national menace” (Goldstein, 2011, p. 513). The language used to vilify
teachers in these narratives was severe, which set up a description of the hero teacher
that, by contrast, was just as extreme—the savior and the superhero.
Heroes. The hero teacher is described in policy narratives in such a way that also
denigrates the current teacher corps, since the insinuation is that reform is needed to
attract the hero teacher to the profession. Other heroes are represented, such as parents
who take it upon themselves to exercise their choice and leave a school (Harrison &
Cohen-Vogel, 2012), newspapers who publish student achievement results by teacher to
protest the absence of a value-added teacher evaluation system (Gabriel & Lester, 2013),
and education industry giants who swoop in to provide operational services for startups
and growing charter networks (G. L. Anderson & Donchik, 2016). More often, however,
the hero is one of two kinds of classroom-level actor: (a) a sacrificial white savior, or (b)
an obligated Black superhero.
Teaching, in these narratives, is about rescuing children at risk of succumbing to
social, emotional, and cultural depravity. The call to arms is specifically for “empathetic,
benevolent” (Hernández, 2016, p. 19) white people, who, in former Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan’s words, “HAVE to get off the sidelines” (p. 19). The notion of
sacrifice and mission drive distinguishes the hero teacher from one that is merely
competent. One teacher from Gerstl-Pepin’s (2006) study of NCLB discourse represented
teachers’ work at a high-poverty elementary school as a kind of sacrificial self-denial:
“All of the teachers were given the opportunity to leave with no strings attached and to
transfer to other schools but they decided to stay. So to me, working in this school
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requires a huge commitment and personal sacrifice” (p. 154). In her study of narratives in
Teach For America (TFA) and Teach For All, Ahmann (2015) detailed a multi-faceted
profile of an idealized teacher from the perspectives of TFA leadership and corps
members. The cliché of the hero teacher/TFA teacher is a well-known pop culture trope,
and Ahmann (2015) identifies it in her data as well:
An idealistic young person…confronts extraordinary obstacles—here, a
measurable set of academic deficits…[who, in] a moment of realization, a kind of
conversion to the cause…realizes he has to be the one to ‘stop the cycle,’ and is
filled with a ‘sense of urgency’…Through hard work, personal sacrifice, and
relentless pursuit of excellence…his students achieve ambitious goals. (p. 13)
This is a complete narrative that gives a sense of the idealized teacher as hero that TFA
has effectively constructed.
Black role models (A. L. Brown & Donnor, 2011) overcome the inherent cultural
deficits that channel most Black kids toward deviance and pathological behavior, and are
then in a position to help other Black students do the same. In a critical ethnography of an
after-school program that served Black students from low-SES backgrounds, staff
members specifically identified hero narratives as a warning sign they look for in
prospective staff members (Baldridge, 2017). They reported wanting to weed out
applicants with this hero mindset that “Black youth need to be saved” (Baldridge, 2017,
p. 9), as well as having to fight back against requests for stories of redemption from
potential funders and journalists, who wanted “stories of jumping over trash cans and
dodging crack, you know from crack dealers” (p. 9). The most sought-after story was
“The Myth of the Supernegro”:
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You know, kind of the “Black man makes it out of the ghetto; goes to prestigious
universities and reaches back to help his community kind of thing.” So everything
the organization does is based on that premise, you know. It’s only capable, it’s
only possible because of this Supernegro man, this guy can come back and can
reach back and save the day for all the kids he left behind when he split, right.
(Baldridge, 2017, p. 10)
In this case, the leader’s hero narrative was cited as the chief draw for both media
coverage and philanthropic support, especially when the leader had credibility from “the
mean streets” (Baldridge, 2017, p. 11)—or was in some way “reformed and lucky to have
escaped the perils of their communities” thanks to the “goodness and graciousness of
philanthropy” (pp. 11–12). Black leaders, especially Black women leaders, are not valued
in this narrative. Importantly, Black superheroes are portrayed as fulfilling an obligation
(Baldridge, 2017), unlike white saviors, who are sacrificing better careers to work in “atrisk” schools (Ahmann, 2015). Narrative elements are difficult to discuss in isolation,
since the nature of a narrative is for them all to interact. Just as a well-crafted setting
situates relationships between characters and other elements such that the intended lesson
is self-evident (Gautreaux & Delgado, 2016), well-created characters preordain the plot
of a narrative.
In this review of the literature on the discourse of elite policy actors, I found
cohesive narratives of education reform that justified harmful reforms in the name of
economic growth and social stability (G. L. Anderson, 1998; Mansfield & Thachik,
2016), euphemized those reforms to appear consistent with social justice aims (Ahmann,
2015; Cann, 2013), and juxtaposed them with hyperbolic descriptions of decay and blight
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(Gautreaux & Delgado, 2016). I found narratives in which responsibility is displaced onto
teachers unions (Goldstein, 2011; Kee, 2015) or onto teachers themselves (Harrison &
Cohen-Vogel, 2012), and in which the outcomes of market-based reforms are dismissed
because they do not comport with political ideology (Gabriel & Lester, 2013). None of
these studies framed such narratives as escapes from culpability on the part of policy
actors. I found narratives in which Black students and families were blamed for the
failure of schools (Aggarwal, 2016; Clycq et al., 2014; Ertas, 2015) and dehumanized as
manifestations of pathological culture (G. L. Anderson & Donchik, 2016), yet none of
these discourse studies allude to potentially disastrous consequences of such moral
disengagement from whole communities.
The examples above touch on each of the mechanisms of moral disengagement
(Bandura, 1999), but I found no discourse studies that places these narratives within a
social psychological framework that would explain their appeal to the public, much less
their appeal to left-of-center policy actors. Without such a framework, discourse studies
of education reform politics—even critical studies—remain richly descriptive, but leave
untheorized the relationship between race-neutral liberal policy discourse and racist
illiberal policy outcomes. Theorization of discriminatory and racist human behaviors has
been attempted in other approaches besides discourse and narrative analysis. I now turn
to studies utilizing two of such approaches: social psychology and critical race theory.
Race, Psychology, and Politics
In this study, I approached education policy from two perspectives—social
psychology and critical race theory—in an attempt to reconcile those perspective as parts
of a singular explanation for the persistence of racist education reforms in a supposedly
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egalitarian political culture. Below I review studies of aversive racism and moral
disengagement, two social psychological explanations for how people act in contradiction
to their ethical beliefs; and studies of unconscious racism, a critical race theoretical
explanation of discriminatory agency through supposedly egalitarian language and
policies.
Social psychology and racism. For the purposes of this study, I did not review
literature on implicit bias (Kang, 2010; Kang, Bennett, & Carbado, 2012; Lane, Kang, &
Banaji, 2007), which is extensive. Studies of implicit bias are based on participant
reaction times to rapid stimuli and do not address how people reconcile racist behaviors
with supposedly antiracist values. Theories of implicit bias present racism as an
automatic behavioral response, in which the biased do not have agency over their
judgment. The concept of implicit bias is also not tied to racial ideology, but ingroup/out-group preference. In contrast, the theory of aversive racism was developed to
explain the dissonance between racist, or biased, acts and the supposed antiracist ethic of
the actor.
Aversive racism. Dovidio, Gaertner, Ufkes, Saguy, & Pearson (2016) claim
aversive racism is distinct from “old-fashioned” (p. 12) overt, explicit, hateful racism.
Instead, aversive racism is more characterized by “discomfort, anxiety, or fear” (p. 13)
that manifest in more subtle and implicit ways than “open hostility” (p. 12). From this
perspective, the good intentions of antiracists can sometimes lead to policies and actions
that discriminate against Black and Brown people. Aversive racism is also different from
colorblind racism (which is a framework of ideas) in that it is a behavioral response
intended to avoid situations that might expose one’s biases. They acknowledge that bias
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is subtle and that it can be a sub- or unconscious influencer of individuals’ beliefs, words,
and actions; but this kind of racism is rooted in inherent psychological commitment to the
idea that group identity predisposes white people to “automatically activated” (p. 13)
racist acts. Aversive racism is an attempt to explain the dissociation between an
expressed social ethic of egalitarianism and persistent discriminatory behavior.
The concept of aversive racism arose from studies by Dovidio and Gaertner
(1981) that identified how racial bias was related to situational ambiguity. For example,
white participants in an initial study received phone calls from an anonymous man with a
recognizably raced voice asking for help fixing their car (Gaertner, 1973). In the study,
conservatives were more likely to deny assistance when the caller was Black, but liberals
were even less likely to assist a Black caller, because they ended the phone call before the
Black caller had a chance to ask for help. In describing the results of the phone call study,
Gaertner (1973) described the premature hang-ups as disengagement, a way of avoiding
having to decide whether or not to help.
Murrell and colleagues (1994) utilized survey methods to identify how people
responded to affirmative action policies at the business, university, and social level. They
found that when the policies were in support of Black people, as opposed to people with
physical disabilities or elderly people, participants were more likely to oppose the
policies without justification for their opposition. Murrell et al. (1994) concluded that
focusing on disparate outcomes to prove discrimination was problematic, but that
focusing on process also had its drawbacks, namely that both approaches would
“underrepresent the complexity” of bias and “minimize the impact of negative and subtle
forms of racism” (p. 82), such as aversive racism.
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Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) tested the development of whites’ self-reported
racial bias over 10 years by analyzing their decisions related to the hiring of Black and
white candidates. They found that self-reported prejudice increased, and that aversive
racism predicted discrimination in ambiguous situations, but less so in more explicit
situations. In other words, whites favored Black candidates over white candidates when
job descriptions were clear and candidates clearly met the qualifications. But they
favored white candidates when the candidate pool was underqualified.
In light of the theory of aversive racism, Aberson and Ettlin (2004) performed a
meta-analysis of studies of white helping behaviors toward Black people. They also
observed that whites treated Black people worse than they treated white people when
evaluative or qualification differences were not clear. Black people were treated worse
than white people for the same bad characteristics, but they benefitted more than white
people from the same positive characteristics. Researchers claimed this demonstrated a
tendency to overcorrect when there was justification for it. This study supports the
existence of something like unconscious racism, but does not theorize how individuals in
supposedly egalitarian contexts exonerate themselves from racial bias when norms are
ambiguous.
The difference between aversive racism and the kind of unconscious racism that
Lawrence (1995a) theorized is that while aversive racism may explain decision-making
behaviors of individuals, it does not explain how they convey and cultivate their system
of justifications (i.e., their ideology) to others. For the current study, this is an important
element for two reasons: (1) elite policy actors have the ear of the general public, whose
social values develop in interaction with public political discourse (van Dijk, 1990); and
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(2) if discriminatory intent is to be found, even implicitly, it will be found in the
discourse of public policy actors.
The body of work produced by and in response to Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, and
Hodson’s (2005) studies of aversive racism offer a strong social psychological
explanation for why supposedly non-racist people do racist things: “nearly unavoidable
racial biases” (p. 377). This pat explanation implies that implicit or unconscious racism is
a matter of in-group/out-group categorization. But the withdrawal from a situation before
having to make a decision—to hang up early, as it were—is a choice, not a reflex. The
motivation on the part of white liberals in these studies seems to be to create ambiguity,
in order to establish plausible deniability. “Concerns about wrongdoing may increase
anxiety that, in turn, may motivate avoidance or premature withdrawal from the
interaction” (Gaertner et al., 2005, p. 391). I believe there is agency in the withdrawal
from responsibility, and there is a social psychological basis for this belief.
Moral disengagement. Though there is not a large literature base for connecting
issues of bias and prejudice to moral disengagement, there is enough to warrant further
exploration of the connection between Bandura’s (1999) theory of self-exoneration and
critical race theory. Human behavior is influenced by moral systems that are, in part,
socially constructed; but it is not wholly governed by them. Humans have the agency to
alter their personal moral systems, or to alter the degree to which they act in alignment
with those systems. In the case of education, there have been decades of attempts at
reform in service of social justice-focused morality; but there is evidence that those
reforms have exacerbated injustice, rather than alleviated it (Darling-Hammond, 2010;
Gillborn, 2008; Love, 2004). To morally excuse this contradiction between aims and
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outcomes requires acknowledging that either (a) social justice is not an actual aim of the
policy, or (b) the outcomes are acceptable. Either choice should perturb a coherent moral
system.
Moral disengagement is a social psychological framework that focuses on the role
of individual agency in maintaining a system of social values in contradiction with the
societal circumstances those values bring about. Bandura (1999) proposed that
individuals justify behaviors they might otherwise consider immoral through the process
of moral disengagement, a set of psychological mechanisms that allow individuals to
suspend restraint from committing immoral acts. This description of rationalization
parallels Lawrence’s theorization of unconscious racism. I propose that the ideology of
implicit and institutionalized racism is upheld through elite discourse, but reproduced and
justified by individuals through the psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement.
Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) studied comments from news websites and found that
supporters of racist behaviors utilized moral disengagement strategies to rationalize their
views in an arena where explicitly racist views were likely unwelcome. Commenters
portrayed using racist language as free speech or harmless name-calling, and compared
racist acts to more severe incidents. These behaviors correspond with euphemistic
labeling and advantageous comparison, two of Bandura’s (1999) moral disengagement
mechanisms. Commenters also displaced responsibility onto others, including the victims
of racist acts, two more mechanisms Bandura (1999) proposed by which individuals
excuse knowingly racist behavior.
Lynch and Haney (2011) studied moral disengagement through dehumanization
on juries in death penalty cases. Through the framework of moral disengagement, they
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proposed that people who are already dehumanized are “easier to punish because the
psychological barriers against hurting them have been lowered in advance” (p. 587).
Lynch and Haney’s conclusion was that a social psychological theory of racism like
moral disengagement complicated the notion of impartial juries applying the death
penalty in capital cases. “Contrary to prevailing legal wisdom, it is not solely a problem
of conscious, motivated individual actors who engage in ‘purposeful discrimination’”
(Lynch & Haney, 2011, p. 607). Haney’s previous work (1997) had relied on the first
premise that capital punishment would be impossible in a democratic society without
some form of morally disengaging ideology to rationalize it: “to ensure its viability, the
system of death sentencing in the United States depends on the creation of an
extraordinary set of psychological conditions” (p. 1447).
There is a broader body of literature on aversive racism that I opted not to review
because of Leonardo’s (2016) requirement that a theory of racism in education policy
account for the agency of the actors. The convenience of an automated racial response
like aversive racism lets white people off the hook for what is an agentic undertaking, the
reconstruction of white supremacy (Leonardo, 2016). The selected studies above are
important to studies of education policy, because they shed light on the importance of the
policy process (i.e., political discourse, issue framing), not just the outcomes of policies.
Elements of the process, most notably how a policy is framed or presented, help to
determine the level of racial animus voters allow to influence their support of a policy
whose outcomes will have a race-specific outcome, either good (i.e., affirmative action)
or bad (i.e., redlining). Interestingly in the aversive racism literature, anti-Black views
were more common when the issue was presented with race-neutral terms and
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justifications. This fact necessitates further study of supposedly race-neutral political
discourse for the ways in which it may encourage discrimination, rather than alleviate it.
The concept of moral disengagement proposes the agency and deliberation that
aversive racism, as a theory of automatic response, lacks. From Gaertner and colleagues’
(2005) research, the white liberal strategy of hanging up the phone before the Black caller
can ask for help is active disengagement of a kind, an evasion of responsibility. But all
racist acts are not instant decisions; many come after long deliberation. Haney’s work on
the death penalty, which considered the deliberations of juries, is the only application of
moral disengagement to legal scholarship that I found. From a critical race perspective, a
helpful social psychological contribution to studies of the reconstruction of racist
ideology should explain the deliberative (i.e., logical, rational), not just the reflexive.
Critical race policy analyses. Analysis of policy from the perspective of Critical
Race Theory requires locating the roots of the policy within the history and legal
structures of white supremacy (Buras, 2013). This study is rooted in the tenets of racial
realism and the critique of liberalism. Racial realism is the idea that racial inequality is a
permanent societal condition that is strengthened by attempts to alleviate it (Bell, 1995).
Though race is a social construct, the effects of that construct are materially experienced
by people of color, and the legal and political systems that uphold racial distinctions and
hierarchies will not be transcended without a truly radical upending of norms and values
(Bell, 1995; Buras, 2013). The critique of liberalism arises from this perspective and
holds that devotion to the ideals of equality, objectivity, meritocracy, and colorblindness
actually do more to legitimate racism and white supremacy than more explicit, overt
notions like white nationalism, segregation ideology, and Jim Crow laws (Crenshaw,
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1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Given these perspectives, it is the well-meaning laws
and policies, which appear to advance racial equality and civil rights, that must be
interrogated for the ways in which they may legitimate white supremacy.
Laws and policies can have predictably racist outcomes without explicit racist
intent on the part of the policymaker. Because of a psychological process by which
people “exclude racism from consciousness” (Lawrence, 1995a, p. 238), people can
“continue practices they would otherwise condemn and in which their own complicity
would be painful to admit” (p. 239). This corresponds with the perpetrator perspective
that Freeman (1995) proposed, which holds that discrimination must be purposefully
inflicted upon a victim by a particular agent in order to be classified as intentional. The
legal principle of discriminatory intent protects racist policies and laws from strict
judicial scrutiny as long as explicit discriminatory intent is not verbalized within the law
or by policymakers during its formation. In opposition to this legal principle, the
principle of unconscious racism holds that policies can arise from racist intent beyond the
awareness of the agent, and that the racist outcomes of those policies are a result of that
underlying implicit motivation (Lawrence, 1995a). Van Dijk’s sociocognitive framework
benefits from Lawrence’s and Freeman’s understandings of implicit racism, because they
propose a cause (i.e., the unconscious racism) and an outcome (i.e., discrimination), but
not a means by which the outcome is actualized. Discourse theory proposes this means.
Bell’s (1995) racial realist thesis is that racist mental models are nearly
permanent, endemic to the American psyche. No amount of empathy, guilt, or good
intention can permanently counteract the inherent racism of American social and political
structures (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Nevertheless, the traditional liberal policy
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agenda, including the original NAACP efforts in the Brown case, attempts just that. A
central assertion among Critical Race theorists is that “racism is not a series of isolated
acts, but is endemic in American life, deeply ingrained legally, culturally, and even
psychologically” (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995, p. 52). For example, the “integrationist
ideology” (Peller, 1995, p. 127) that the courts and policymakers have constructed around
civil rights and education over the last six decades holds that (a) mathematic
proportionality absolves the system of charges of racism, and (b) race-conscious laws or
policies are racist.
In a critical race discourse analysis of Mexican American superintendents’
finance policy discourse in Texas, Alemán (2006) found that Mexican American
education leaders self-disfranchised by accepting the dominant discourse frames in
support of state finance policies that disadvantaged majority Mexican American districts
(Alemán, 2007). Policies based state-based financing on district property values, and
district financing was also a matter of property tax revenue, which led to chronic
underfunding of majority Mexican American schools on a per-pupil basis (Aléman,
2007). Superintendents recognized this reality, yet they still reported support for the
funding formulas as objective and fair, believed the current situation was better than it
used to be, denied the existence of institutional racism in state policy, and blamed their
own students for underperformance (Aléman, 2006). Aléman (2006) proposed methods
of resistance to the identified self-disfranchising ideology, but did not consider why these
leaders adhered to such beliefs in the face of so much evidence to the contrary.
Other critical policy analyses have also demonstrated problematic rhetoric. Highstakes testing policies are accompanied by the rhetoric of racial equality, but have the
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effect of racializing achievement (Au, 2016). This is an example of apparently neutral
and objective language (i.e., policy) leading to racially stratified outcomes on statewide
assessments. The results of these assessments in the age of NCLB were decreased
funding and the threat of school closure, which threaten communities of color. But raceneutral language also affects individual students. Colorblind framing of policies prevents
Black students from naming racism without being accused of provocation (Chapman,
2013). Black students in majority white schools reported being discouraged from framing
their grievances and concerns in racial terms, even being chastised when they attempted
to report instances of racism without framing them in a race-neutral way (Chapman,
2013).
Yet the Supreme Court points to race-neutral language to deny the existence of
discriminatory intent in desegregation policies. Donnor (2012) identified language that
could be construed as moral disengagement efforts, including victim blaming and denial
of outcomes by diffusion of responsibility to parent choice (when choice was not an
option for many Black families), and euphemism of discrimination as neutral principles
like freedom of association, in the Brown ruling. The framing of integration in a raceneutral manner in Brown appeared to guarantee freedom of choice, but actually put the
onus on Black parents to apply for the children to attend white schools. Donnor (2012)
identified the persistence of the above precedents in the ruling in Parents v. Seattle
School District No. 1, which established that the use of race in school choice policies was
unconstitutional. The study was of legal precedent, not politics, so no discussion of the
function of social psychological mechanisms was included, despite the author’s citation
of Lawrence in an explanation of Freeman’s concept of the perpetrator perspective.
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Besides one mention from Donnor (2012), none of these critical race analyses of
education policies drew from Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism to define the
adherence to race-neutral policies and discourse as an intentional avoidance of known
racist effects, despite the concern of CRT with dismantling the ideologies that prop up
white supremacy:
Critical Race Theory (CRT) is attentive to the sobering realities of racialized
suffering and the discursive and material formations that shape and give meaning
to a stratified social structure. CRT focuses on exposing and actively dismantling
taken-for-granted, regnant racial ideologies and power relations. (Henry &
Dixson, 2016, p. 226)
However, there have been attempts in legal scholarship to use social psychology to
explain how discriminatory intent actually looks. Their conclusions are that it does not
look like anything—it is invisible. It must be inferred.
Discrimination and the plausibility standard. In light of the above insights social
psychology has provided on racism, I reviewed the legal literature concerning the
application of theories of unconscious bias and aversive racism to the legal principles of
discriminatory intent. In an analysis of legal studies of the application of implicit bias in
discrimination cases, Selmi (2018) observed that legal scholars have presented reflexive
notions of bias such as implicit bias and aversive racism as “unconscious, pervasive, and
uncontrollable” (p. 193) responses. Such approaches put discriminatory actions beyond
the scope of legal address, casting racism and discrimination as “snap judgments rather
than the more common deliberative decisions the legal system addresses” (p. 193).
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To the extent that legal scholars have relied on theories of implicit bias and
aversive racism, they have established a false dichotomy, with explicit and obviously
intentional discrimination (“animus or old-fashioned discrimination,” p. 198) on one side,
and implicit, unintentional discrimination on the other. Selmi (2018) deemed it “very
strange to claim that if discrimination is not animus-based it must be unconscious in
nature” (p. 198). Implicit bias critiques of the discriminatory intent requirement have had
the opposite of the intended effect, excusing discriminatory activity instead of indicting
it. From a social psychological perspective, legal studies of implicit bias are, themselves,
moral disengagement—diffusion of responsibility amongst the cultural and evolutionary
forces that have shaped human behavior, and displacement of responsibility onto the
reflexive reptilian brain, itself somehow a separate actor beyond our control.
Unconscious racism. Lawrence’s (1995a) theory of unconscious racism predates
the contributions of social psychology of implicit bias, aversive racism, and moral
disengagement. There is a line of legal scholarship in which legal scholars have applied
Lawrence’s theory to the legacy of Davis and Arlington and other discrimination suits.
These studies document how race-neutral discourse protects policies from culpability for
their discriminatory outcomes, and some have shown how unconscious psychological
processes influence behaviors. But what Lawrence (1995a) wanted to know was “why
does this disease continue to spread” (p. 5)?
The concept of unconscious racism is the notion that discriminatory intent is not
necessary for a law or policy to have discriminatory outcomes worthy of strict judicial
scrutiny (Freeman, 1995; Lawrence, 1995a). According to Lawrence (1995a), individuals
can take action that they know will have racist effects even if they are committed to
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equality and social justice. When there is conflict between one’s racial ethic and one’s
actions, “the mind excludes his [sic] racism from consciousness” (Lawrence, 1995a, p.
238). Opponents of the idea of unconscious racism insist that racism and/or racist acts
must have an identifiable source (i.e., a person who commits the act in question) in order
for someone to be held accountable; this is known as the perpetrator perspective
(Freeman, 1995). From the perpetrator perspective, responsibility for racist outcomes
such as discrimination is so diffuse that (a) no one is seen as personally culpable, and (b)
no group is seen as collectively culpable, for those outcomes. Without culpability, there is
neither imperative nor obligation for change (Freeman, 1995).
One CRT critique of structural determinism is that it absolves the agents of racism
from accountability for the outcomes of racist laws and policies (Delgado & Stefancic,
2012). The requirement that there be a perpetrator distracts from the systemic and
institutional ways in which racism is reproduced, but this critique must also be reconciled
with Leonardo’s (2016) demand that there be agency accounted for in theories of this
reproduction. From the perpetrator perspective, it is the explicit racism of white
nationalists and segregationists that perpetuates white dominance, but these are marginal
ideas. The most dangerous kind of racism is that which is embedded in supposedly
antiracist discourse, equity policies, and social justice movements (Matias & Newlove,
2017). The difference between the perpetrator perspective and Matias and Newlove’s
notion is that a perpetrator is a single individual or recognizable group. The source of
American racism is cultural hegemony; its regeneration is built into the ideals of equality,
liberty, and individualism at the core of American identity to which that vast majority of
Americans are committed (Matias, 2016). This explains its permanence. In other words, it
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is not a specific individual or group; it is everyone. Its regeneration is not a straying away
from the liberal ideals of equality, liberty, and individualism—it follows from them. It is
commitment to these colorblind ideals, through the naturalization of separation and
cultural attribution of normed differences, in which agency is involved.
The premise of structural determinism and the critique of liberalism in CRT are
that the “ordinary business of society” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, p. 27) is racist. Socalled race blind attempts at legal remedies and policy, then, only perpetuate structural
racism. Race-consciousness is a first premise of anti-racist policy making. In education,
the concepts of neutrality and objectivity, along with the ideology of meritocracy, are
supposedly race-blind approaches to instruction, assessment, finance, choice, and many
other issues (Ladson-Billings, 2005; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). Beginning with
Brown, equality has been paradoxically defined as numerically achievable through
proportional distribution of students, resources, and so forth (Bell, 1995), by policies that
were blind to race (Peller, 1995). Brown itself is an implicit admission that supposedly
race-neutral policies can have racially differential effects.
Arterton (2008) studied the role of unconscious bias in jury selection, and found
that discrimination suits made up 25% of the D.C. Circuit caseload, where cases
involving federal policies and federal agencies are heard. According to Arterton the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, since the 1940s, the existence of unconscious bias on
the part of jurors; but judges are prohibited from taking race into account in any decision,
from selecting a jury to issuing a judicial opinion. Bellin and Semitsu (2011) argued that
the discrimination standard for jury selection “is so specific that it may be (and has been,
extensively) evaded with ‘purportedly race-neutral’ explanations for juror strikes” (p.
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1076) during voir dire. Supreme Court justices and legal scholars alike have critiqued
how the overly rigorous intent standard allows “attorneys to mask racial stereotypes in
race- or gender-neutral rationales and thus succeed in striking jurors based on race or
gender” (p. 1106). Bellin and Semitu’s (2011) analysis noted the pervasive use of raceneutral language in the rationalization of discrimination.
Mentovich and Jost (2008) synthesized research on social cognition with
Lawrence’s (1995a) theory of unconscious racism, and asserted that racism is both a
social and a psychological phenomenon. It is both on individual beliefs and behaviors as
well as commonly held collective belief systems. The authors asserted that Lawrence’s
theory, combined with social cognition research on the influence of the subconscious on
human behavior, supported two conclusions: (a) that explicit attitudes may not tell us
what someone actually intends, and (b) that implicit attitudes may be a better indicator of
actual intent (Mentovich & Jost, 2008). A meta-analysis of implicit association (IAT)
studies showed that implicit bias was a better predictor of discriminatory behavior
(Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). These studies explain that
unintentional biases exist, but stop short of connecting reflexive biased behaviors to any
kind of belief system.
Paterson, Rapp, and Jackson (2008) identified discrimination suits in healthcare,
criminal law, sports, employment, housing, juvenile justice, child welfare, even fashion,
that did not meet the intent standard. Paterson et al. (2008), highlighting a newer trend in
which courts in employment discrimination suits had taken implicit bias and unconscious
discrimination into account, suggested these decisions were “chipping away at the
foundations of Washington v. Davis” (p. 1195). However, the article was published
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before the Twombly and Iqbal standards for plausibility (namely, that discrimination be a
plausible explanation, not merely a possible explanation) began to depress the number of
discrimination cases surviving a motion to dismiss.
Interestingly, the intent requirement is a singularly American legal doctrine;
places like Europe, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, and international human rights
conventions define discrimination more broadly and are inclusive of outcomes as
evidence of intent (Paterson et al., 2008). In the U.S., the intent requirement requires that
actors not only be aware of the potential of discriminatory impact, but that they choose a
course of action because of that impact. So the question is whether a conception of
unconscious bias can explain that policymakers acted because of, not just in spite of, the
discriminatory impact. Theories of implicit bias that rely on reflexivity do not meet this
standard, because implicit bias and aversive racism are, by definition, unintentional.
Conclusion
Our collective understanding of education reform is evident in the shared norms
of talk in urban social policy and education that we undertake (Goldstein, 2011). We
understand, to a degree, what is meant by things like accountability and school choice;
but other biases and marginalizing understandings are also wrapped up in our
conceptualizations of things like accountability and school choice. The purpose of this
section is to review how discourse has been used to maintain white dominance in
education. Elite policy actors define issues in education in ways that suit their interests,
setting the terms of education reform debates and predetermining the public reform
agenda; to divorce the outcomes of education policies from this process (thereby
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exonerating policymakers and placing blame on educators or students/families) is
illogical.
Educational outcomes in urban policy arenas are, almost without exception,
increasingly unequal, despite major reform initiatives. We can infer the implicit values of
policy elites by analyzing the language they use to persuade, explain, and defend their
policies to the public. A common narrative emerges from political rhetoric around
education reform, and this narrative communicates troubling values and beliefs
concerning education of Black children. “Contemporary policy discourse and public
responses to the young African American male crisis narrative conveys a meta-narrative,
postulating that the existing structural organization of American society is fair, equal, and
blind to race” (A. L. Brown & Donnor, 2011, p. 21, emphasis added). Common sense
about education and education reform in the U.S. is rooted in colorblindness, and furthers
a deficit-based crisis narrative around the education of Black students.
As part of this colorblind narrative, policies are written to meet the needs of “all
students,” instead of focusing the students with the greatest need (G. R. Lopez, 2003).
Blanket reforms like NCLB or RTTT are facially race-neutral, but have
disproportionately negative effects on urban schools, low SES communities, and Black
students (Gillborn, Demack, Rollock, & Warmington, 2017). If the effects of a policy are
consistently race-specific, but the language of policy appears race neutral, then the
concept of race neutrality, or colorblindness, may be problematic for both policymaking
and policy analysis (Buras, 2013; Gillborn, 2016). There are benefits for white
policymakers interested in protecting the benefits of whiteness to frame policies and
policy discussions in supposedly colorblind ways, and to express educational ideals with
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all-encompassing, inclusive, neutral language instead of targeted, race-specific language.
What remains to be seen in the research is why colorblind political strategies and raceneutral ideologies maintain such influence over education politics. Legal scholars have
demonstrated how research-based explanations of individual-level bias undermine the
legal standards for discriminatory intent, and critical race theorists have proposed how
severely rigorous plausibility requirements strengthen those standards, rather than
moving toward more flexibility in legal recognition of discrimination. This study
proposed a synthesis of Bandura’s and Lawrence’s paradigmatically distinct theorizations
for how people come to act against their own moral systems, as manifest in the discourse
of education reform.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methods
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) allows for the reframing of the social actions of
policymakers and other policy actors. The focus of CDA in policy analysis is an
“understanding of how discourses interact with the practice of policymaking” (Young &
Reynolds, 2017, p. 26). As a method that more clearly focuses on the processes of issue
definition, CDA can be used to identify how big conversations are translated into local
issues and policy agendas (N. Fairclough, 2010; Rogers, 2011; Woodside-Jiron, 2011).
The term discourse has different meanings, so it is important to define the concept as it
was understood in this study (van Dijk, 2008). Discourse can be a general body of talk
within a self-contained discipline, field, or area (e.g., feminist discourse, campaign
discourse, medical discourse). More broadly, discourse can be any social action (i.e.,
symbols, behaviors, objects, social structures). For the purpose of this study, however,
discourse was understood as “a specific communicative event, in general, and a written or
oral form of verbal interaction or language use, in particular” (van Dijk, 2008, p. 104).
Below are the procedures through which I analyzed the education reform talk of
elite white policy actors in Little Rock during the 2015 state takeover of Little Rock
School District (LRSD). First, I state my positionality. Then I discuss what a critical
discourse study is, including the specific context of this study and the sampled discourse
at its center. Next, I outline the multi-phased process by which I analyzed the data
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collected. I conclude with the measures I took to ensure the reliability of my data and the
validity of my analysis.
Positionality
As a white, cis-gendered, able-bodied gay male I am vigilant for ways in which
my dominant positionality may be influencing my work, especially to the extent that I
marginalize research from scholars of color, colonize or coopt existing theories and
frameworks from scholars of color, or uncritically follow my own assumptions and biases
in analysis (Delgado, 1984, 1992). Part of critical consciousness is foregrounding the
experiences and voices of others, and backgrounding my own experiences and voice in
order to avoid over-representing white perspectives. For this reason, counter-narrative is
a central methodological tenet for CRT-based studies of racism. The current study is not
a counter-narrative, but a critical study of white master narratives. Critical analysis of
majoritarian discourse is necessary to uncover the ways in which that discourse
reproduces white dominance and white consent to dominance (Gillborn, 2016; Tate,
1997, 1999). I discuss the ways in which I guarded against my own bias below in the
Data Validation section.
It is also important to note that I am from Little Rock, and that I was a teacher in a
public charter school there before I became a researcher. Almost all of our students were
Black, and I was one of only a few white teachers. For most of the time, senior
administrators at the school were white. I entered graduate school firmly convinced of the
goodness of that school’s mission, with major objections to its methods. As a researcher,
I have come to appreciate the larger context of charter schools in an urban district.
Additionally, I have many personal connections in Little Rock—elite and non-elite, white
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and Black, policy actor and policy actor-adjacent. They are in education, government,
journalism, advocacy, and law. I utilized some of these connections to recruit peer
debriefers and expert reviewers for the validation of my data analysis.
This study rested on some assumptions about how social values are created and
reproduced, about how power is established and maintained, and about the origin and
functions of race in American society. Social constructs like values, power, and race each
have a source, and identifying that source requires a researcher to take an ontological
(concerning being and reality), axiological (concerning morals and ethics), and
epistemological (concerning knowledge and legitimacy) stance.
The first assumption was that our reality—our identities, beliefs, and social
structures—consists of meanings that we make individually and socially. However, the
social construction of reality does not mean the material effects of these social structures
are not experienced as real and objectively identifiable (Buras, 2013; Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012). For instance, race may be a social construction, but the experience of
people who are marginalized by the ideologies that arise from race cannot simply be
ignored or imagined differently; it is real (Bell, 1995). The forces exerted on people by
imposed realities that others have socially constructed are at the heart of this dissertation.
My second and third assumptions were that (a) social values are rooted in the
social structures we create and the knowledge systems we reproduce, but that (b) we are
agents in the acquisition of knowledge and the legitimation of some knowledge over
other knowledge. Because of this, we incur culpability for the consequences of the social
structures we legitimize (Leonardo, 2016), but we also have the potential to transform
those structures by reexamining and changing the knowledge we legitimate and the social
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structures that result from it. The dialectical relationship between social structures and
individual cognition, in which social systems like discourse influence and are influenced
by individual values and beliefs, allows for the transformation of social understandings
by individuals (van Dijk, 2014). Choosing not to critically examine the effects of our
discourse reproduces power, because ignoring the effects of one’s power is actually
deployment of that power, an assumption of its legitimacy (van Dijk, 1992, 1995b, 2008).
Data Collection
I analyzed discourse produced at the individual, organizational, and institutional
levels. I sampled individual-level discourse from two Arkansas newspapers. In order to
validate my analysis of individual discourse, I triangulated sampled discourse from the
two newspapers with minutes from the proceedings of the Arkansas Board of Education,
organizational-level discourse from reports and policy briefs produced by three education
policy interest groups, and institutional-level discourse from the Arkansas Code,
Annotated, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas—
Western Division. I classified individual-level participants (elite white education policy
actors) based on van Dijk’s (1995b) categories of symbolic elites (individuals whose
status gives them outsized influence in the public sphere) in discourse: bureaucrats,
journalists/writers, elected officials, educators/academics, and special interest groups. I
analyzed discourse that concerned the takeover from 43 white individuals that I deemed
elite policy actors because of their visibility in the media or membership on a public
body. Within the general takeover discourse were several specific conversations related
to the takeover. It is important to understand the substance of these conversations in order
to validate a foundational assumption of this study: that the takeover itself was harmful to
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Black students, parents, and communities in Little Rock and will continue to be (as the
district was still under control at the time of this writing). Next, I explain these
conversations and the harmful policies and actions around which they occurred.
Texts. I collected public discourse from white policy actors in Little Rock during
the period of January 1, 2015, through June 30, 2016. I collected discourse at three levels,
for the purposes of validation of individual-level rhetoric. Individual-level discourse was
my principal focus, since my research questions concerned individual policy actors’
speech. But I also sampled and analyzed organizational-level discourse and institutionallevel discourse in order to validate individual-level use of the mechanisms of moral
disengagement. Organizational discourse is more deliberate than individual-level
discourse, since it is frequently constructed collectively and represents a group
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2010). Institutional discourse is even more deliberate, since it
is the result of either extensive collective deliberation in a representative body vulnerable
to public approval (e.g., legislation) or extensive deliberation by a judge or court
restrained by both constitutions and decades of legal precedent (I. Fairclough &
Fairclough, 2012). By triangulating individual-level discourse with organizational- and
institutional-level discourse, I reduced the likelihood that instances of moral
disengagement were misstatements or improvisations of individuals. This increases the
likelihood that they were manifestations of social values or ideology with deeper roots.
I collected individual-level discourse from elite white policy actors from the two
major newspapers in Little Rock—the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, a statewide daily
with a right-leaning editorial page; and the Arkansas Times, a statewide weekly with a
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left-leaning editorial page.2 My sample of individual-level discourse was comprised of
direct quotations from public meetings, interviews with reporters, public statements,
columns, op-eds, blog posts, and editorials, all from elite white policy actors only.
Journalists’ discourse was sampled only when in a column, blog post, or editorial (e.g., I
did not treat newspaper articles themselves as reporters’ discourse). I selected these two
newspapers because of their level of influence as the two most well-known papers in
central Arkansas. I chose newspapers, as opposed to social media or other media, as the
main source of individual-level discourse, because I wanted elites’ discourse (not
discourse from parents, community members, teachers, or students) with the widest
possible public exposure (N. Fairclough, 2010). The Democrat-Gazette (D-G) archives
were available online through a subscription at Swem Library, and my personal
subscription to the online version of the Times enabled access to those archives. An initial
search of these two archives utilizing various combinations of the terms “Little Rock
School District,” “LRSD,” “education reform,” and “takeover” yielded over 600 articles
which constituted the sample for this study. Other sources were used for triangulation
only. To triangulate this individual-level data, I also analyzed the publicly available
written minutes of state board meetings, from which many of the newspaper quotations
were drawn. The minutes were not as rich a source for direct quotations, however. A
speaker’s argument might be summarized or referred to in the minutes, whereas the
newspaper article would contain direct quotations. Other individual-level speech in
newspapers was from comments made directly to reporters or from public statements.
2

These political spectrum designations are based on my own experience of these two papers, from having
lived in Little Rock for over 30 years and read both papers for at least two decades. But I confirmed them at
the following sites: https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/arkansas-democrat-gazette/ and
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=3060
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I collected takeover-related discourse from three organizational-level actors as
well: Arkansas Learns, Forward Arkansas, and the University of Arkansas Office for
Education Policy. Arkansas Learns is an education reform advocacy and organizing
group with a pro-charter school and pro-school choice agenda. Their influence is through
a network of city-focused reform groups around the state. They disseminate research and
perspective through a newsletter and blog, both of which are frequently cited in
newspaper articles. Forward Arkansas is a public-private partnership organization
focused on statewide education planning. Their board is bipartisan and diverse,
comprised of legislators, business leaders, educators, and philanthropists. They have
released several reports on the state of education in Arkansas, but their specific agenda
was still in development during the period of this study. The Office of Education Policy
is a research center at the state’s flagship university, staffed by university faculty from
the Department of Education Reform. They release monthly newsletters on education
policy at the state level, as well as reports on policies and performance in the state. All
three of these organizations receive substantial funding from the Walton Family
Foundation, an Arkansas-based pro-charter education reform funder with a national
impact. I sampled discourse from these organizations in the form of press releases, blog
posts, public reports, policy briefs, and op-eds related to the takeover and related policies,
such as the bill to establish an Achievement School District, and the expansion of
enrollment caps at two Little Rock charter schools.
I collected institutional-level discourse from the Arkansas Code, including the
Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 2013, the definition of the powers of the State
Board of Education, and the rules on schools in academic distress; and the U.S. District

63

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas opinion in Doe v. Arkansas Department of
Education (2016), the discrimination suit filed in response to the 2015 takeover.
Table 3
Symbolic Elites
Discourse group

Composition

Journalists

Editor and columnists from the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (DG)
Editor, columnists, and blogger from Arkansas Times (AT)

Bureaucrats

Members of the Arkansas Board of Education
Administrators from the Little Rock School District
Administrators from the Arkansas Department of Education

Elected officials

Governor of Arkansas
Lieutenant governor of Arkansas
Attorney general of Arkansas
Mayor of Little Rock
Ex-members of the Little Rock School Board
Members of the Arkansas General Assembly

Advocates

Leadership of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce
Director of the Arkansas Communities Coalition
President of the Little Rock Education Association

Educators

Faculty and administrators from the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Faculty and administrators from the University of Arkansas, Little Rock
CEO of eSTEM Public Charter School
CEO of LiSA Academy

Speakers. No data were generated from active participants in this study. All data
were collected from publicly available texts. However, for a critical discourse analysis of
elite white policy actors’ reform talk, I identified specific individuals whose status in the
policy arena qualified their discourse as elite. van Dijk (1995b) identified a class of
individuals whose influence over public opinion makes their discourse especially salient.
Among these were elected officials, appointed administrators and bureaucrats, special
interest advocates, journalists, academics, and writers. Some policy actors fell into more
than one group. For instance, Jay Barth is a college professor and a State Board member;
Greg Adams was an elected School Board member but later an appointed Civic Advisory
Committee member. In these cases, I included the policy actor with the group closest to
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his or her role in the context of the sampled discourse. Barth’s influence in this case came
from his status as an appointed bureaucrat, and Adams’s influence was as the former
elected president of the School Board. There was much more crossover between groups
among the Black policy actors, including John Walker, an attorney, state legislator; Joyce
Elliott, a state senator and former educator; and Wendell Griffin, an activist and judge.
But these distinctions were not relevant to this study. Among these elite policy actors in
Little Rock, most were white, and since this was a study of white majoritarian policy
narratives, only the discourse of white participants was sampled. I knew from personal
experience the racial identities of most of the actors, but those I did not know I searched
for on Google. I then presented a roster of policy actors to one of my Little Rock expert
reviewers for confirmation of the lists of white policy actors and Black policy actors.
Since CRT is more a critique of the implicit racism of liberalism than of the explicit
white supremacy of some conservatives, I sampled from white policy actors from both
sides—liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans. All data were pooled and
examined on a case-by-case basis. No comparisons of discourse by political affiliation or
discourse group were made; I discuss how such an analysis might be useful in future
research in Chapter 5.
Data Analysis
Analysis of collected data was conducted in two cycles. The purpose of the first
cycle was to organize the data through structural analysis, a grammatical step to introduce
some initial organization to the data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Saldaña, 2016).
In this cycle, all direct quotations from policy actors were extracted from the 600
sampled articles. Each quotation was then coded by the speaker’s name and discourse
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Table 4
Analysis Methods
Element
Analysis type

First cycle: Structural coding
Provisional coding

Second cycle: Pattern coding
Concept coding

Framework in
use

N/A (coding direct quotes and
paraphrasing by individuals)

Moral disengagement (Bandura,
1999)

Purpose

Construct a corpus of discourse
from individual policy actors

Identify the descriptive elements of
the proposed framework

Validation

Context expert review (Miles,
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014)

Contrary data, surprises, outliers,
unpatterns (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2014)
Risks of Imperial Scholarship
(Delgado, 1984; 1992)

Note. References to methods and frameworks from Bandura, A., 1999, Moral disengagement in the
perpetration of inhumanities, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209; Delgado, R., 1984,
The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature, University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
132(3), 561–578; Delgado, R., 1992, The imperial scholar revisited: How to marginalize outsider writing, ten
years later, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 140(4), 1349–1372; and Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., &
Saldaña, J., 2014, Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook (3rd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

category (politician, bureaucrat, journalist, educator, advocate). Speakers were also
identified by race, since only white policy actors’ discourse was analyzed in this study.
In the second cycle, I identified evidence of the mechanisms of moral
disengagement in the sampled discourse, according to a priori concept codes I derived
from the framework of moral disengagement (Saldaña, 2016). Table 5 illustrates the
coding framework I used.
Validation Procedures
I took careful steps throughout the data collection, analysis, and writing processes
to protect the validity of my interpretations. I adhered to established protocols, outlined
below, for maintaining the fidelity of my dataset, as well as the accuracy of my
interpretations.
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Table 5
Concept Codes: Moral Disengagement
Locus
Behavior

Parent node
Moral, social, and economic
justification

Palliative comparison

Euphemistic labeling

Agency

Diffusion of responsibility

Displacement of responsibility

Sub-nodes
Defense against an opposing
power
Response to humiliation or
violence
Appeals to “true believer”
ideologies
Uplifting comparison
Lesser-of-two-evils
Ends justify means
Alternatives ineffective
Borrowed jargon
Sanitizing or convoluted
language
Passive voice
Group decision making
Division of labor
Collective action
Direct authorization of another
agent
Obliging functionaries:
Surreptitious sanctioning:

Outcome

Denial
Distortion
Disregard

Victim

Victim blaming

Dehumanization

Disputing
Forgetting
Minimization of harm
Misconstrual of effects
Ignoring
Selective inattention
Distance from action
Defense presented as
instigation
Self as victim
Victim at fault:

Subhumanization
Demonization
Animalization
Depersonalization:

Sub-node details

Duty to superior
Personal responsibility
Implicit agreements
Insulating social
arrangements
Indirect authorization
Willful ignorance

Social conditions
Cultural differences
Stereotypes

Digitization
Typecasting

Adapted from Bandura, A. (2016). Moral disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves. New
York, NY: Worth.
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Data validation. Threats to qualitative data include incoherence, lack of
representativeness, overgeneralization, confirmation bias, and researcher influences
(Miles et al., 2014). To ensure my dataset was solid, I quantitatively analyze the balance
of sampled discourse between individual policy actors, advocacy groups, government
agencies, media outlets, and researchers (i.e., in terms of word count and excerpt count).
This study design triangulated media coverage, political discourse, and policy documents.
Each of these constituencies is a separate entity, producing discourse for a variety of
audiences and purposes. All excerpts and texts were tagged by setting (time and space),
participant (identities and associations), action (i.e., type of communication), and aims.
These tags were based on the elements of van Dijk’s (2016) context model.
Analysis validation. The process of qualitative analysis is based on chunking
data by likeness and establishing categories and themes from those chunks. A risk of this
focus on likeness is inattention to outliers. I brought a framework of a priori codes to this
study. I included the codes surprising, counterintuitive, and contrary evidence in my
initial code bank, to identify these data from the beginning and to monitor where they
ended up in the ultimate analysis. I did identify some negative evidence (i.e., evidence of
moral engagement or of color-consciousness), but there were few cases. I address how
these affected my analysis below.
When the researcher is the instrument, bias threatens the findings that the
instrument yields. Besides the preconceived theoretical frameworks from which my
codes were drawn, there were political and racial considerations in a critical race policy
analysis of education reform conducted by a white researcher. My political orientation is
against neoliberalism, so many of the first premises of education reformists (e.g., market
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logic, standardization, evaluation) are anathema to my philosophy of education. This
stance is what motivates my critical scholarship. However, I do believe that the initial
concept of charter schools as innovation labs has merit. I was a teacher in a charter
school. I also believe in the nested centralization of education governance, particularly at
the federal level. I support the Common Core. I have a host of contradictory political
views that no doubt came into play when I analyze the political environment of
education. All I can do is make them known and press on with my analysis, with the
advice of experts and the guidance of critical peers. My whiteness, on the other hand, is
another issue entirely.
According to Richard Delgado (1984, 1992), with the proliferation of Critical
Race Theory has come the inevitable interest of white scholars in its tenets, methods, and
values. There is, I believe, a fine line between white critical race scholarship and white
colonization or cooptation of critical race scholarship. I intend to make every effort to
avoid the latter in this study, as well as in my career as a researcher of education and race.
Delgado (1992) offered several considerations for white scholars, based on a review of
legal literature on civil rights by the most popular and well-regarded civil rights legal
scholars (all white; 1984). He found that they tended to misrepresent scholarship from
scholars of color, coopt their conclusions, perfunctorily cite their work, simplify and
patronize their perspectives, and marginalize them in favor of later (often white) scholars
who drew from them. To avoid these acts of dominance, I will review both my analysis
and my writing with the following questions:
•

Have I over-simplified, caricatured, or romanticized the perspectives of
people of color?
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•

Do I assimilate or coopt the perspectives of people of color?

•

Have I cited previous theoretical and empirical works by scholars of color?

•

Have I drawn deeply from their work or only cited seminal texts, or from only
early sections of studies?

•

Have I over-relied on derivative scholars, instead of the canonical works from
whence their ideas came?

Accuracy and Trustworthiness of Analysis
In addition to extensive analytic memoing (Miles et al., 2014) during my analysis,
I utilized two post-analytical validation strategies to strengthen my findings: data
triangulation (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007) and expert review/peer debriefing (Spall,
1998). The distribution of examples of morally disengaging discourse from the individual
to the institutional levels suggests the depth of its hegemonic influence, from its utterance
in the discourse of policy actors to its instantiation in policy and law. I found that each of
the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement (justification, euphemism, comparison,
diffusion, displacement, dismissal, blame, and dehumanization) was evident at all three
levels of discourse. In addition, I presented my findings to experts on applied critical race
theory, on education politics in Little Rock, and on critical discourse analysis, for review.
In the sections that follow, I explain how these two validation strategies strengthen the
validity of my interpretations of individual-level discourse.
Data triangulation. At the micro-level, the discourse of individuals is most likely
to reveal ideology at the sub- or unconscious level, where Lawrence (1995) might claim
the purest manifestations of subconscious ideology can be found. Micro-level discourse
reveals the breadth of a particular ideology, as exhibited in a person’s speech, across the

70

policy actor population (van Dijk, 2008). I identified widespread use of the mechanisms
of moral disengagement in individual-level discourse. To strengthen this identification, I
also examined the extent to which individual-level discourse of moral disengagement
survived collective deliberation and institutional instantiation in both organizational-level
speech, law, and policy.
Organizational level. At the meso-level, the discourse of autonomous groups,
such as media, professional organizations, and advocacy groups reveals the nature of
ideology at the collective level, where speech is typically the result of cooperation and
negotiation between individuals (van Dijk, 1989). Because of the more deliberate nature
of organizational discourse, it may be considered more purposeful and less vulnerable to
misstatement. Because of this, it can potentially reveal the penetration or depth of a
particular ideology in the cognitive structures of individuals, since evidence of it may
survive deliberation and compromise with others before speech is “uttered” or published.
In this study, some groups were frequently represented by individuals in the news media
from which I sampled discourse. To avoid duplication, I did not include them at the
organizational level.
Institutional level. At the macro-level, the discourse of elected and appointed
bodies, including policies, laws, and legal opinions reveals the degree to which the
discourse of moral disengagement is instantiated in public institutions with palpable
control over the lives of people. Whereas organizations influence individuals and
institutions, institutions control individuals (van Dijk, 2006a). Laws and judicial opinions
emerge from highly deliberative bodies whose discourse either (a) responds to immense
pressure from the voting public and from interest groups, or (b) relies on judicial
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precedent and established legal logic (especially at the state and appellate levels, where
the cases in this study were decided). I did not identify examples of all eight mechanisms
in my sampled discourse at the institutional level, but the manifestations of moral
disengagement I did find substantiate the interpretations of individual-level discourse of
moral disengagement.
Expert review and peer debriefing. To further validate my interpretation of
policy actors’ discourse, I presented examples of my interpretations, along with
definitions of the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement, to peer debriefers for their
feedback and suggestions. These were (a) a practicing attorney in Little Rock with
experience in desegregation litigation and knowledge of critical race theory, (b) an elite
Black policy actor in Little Rock whose discourse was not included in the sampled
discourse in this study (because only white policy actors were included), and (c) a
qualitative researcher with a background in critical discourse analysis. As a result of their
feedback, I corrected biases in my own representations of Black families, selected
stronger and clearer excerpts to use in my illustrations, and identified connections
between the moral disengagement framework and the critical race theory of unconscious
racism that had not been initially apparent to me. I elaborate on these in Chapter 5.
The trustworthiness of my conclusion that moral disengagement mechanisms
were deployed by white policy actors in the takeover is strengthened by the breadth of
their manifestations across policy actor groups and at the individual, organizational, and
institutional levels of discourse. This was a study of individual-level discourse, so my
analysis of organizational- an institutional-level discourse was not as deep as that of the
individuals. Deeper consideration of the trustworthiness of meso- and macro-level
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discourse would require validation with a sample of individual-level discourse from more
contexts than just the LRSD. For instance, the organizations I sampled (Arkansas Learns,
Forward Arkansas, and the University of Arkansas Office for Education Policy) each
have a statewide audience. Analysis of their discourse on its own would ideally be
validated by sampled individual-level discourse from cities and counties across the state,
from more types of individuals than just white policy actors, and concerning more issues
than just state takeover.
In the next chapter, I discuss my findings. I preface these findings with two
sections whose purpose arose during the study: (a) a section outlining the specific harms
at the center of the takeover, and (b) a critical race analysis of Doe v. DOE. I discuss the
specific harms that accompanied the takeover with evidence from individual-level
discourse in Little Rock, and I connect these policy goals to research on the outcomes of
those policy goals in other similar contexts. This was necessary to warrant my initial
assumption that the takeover was, itself, a harmful act with respect to Black students and
families. The critical race analysis of the Doe opinion arose when, during my discourse
analysis of the opinion, I discovered the Court had cited as precedent the very cases on
which Charles Lawrence had based his theory of unconscious racism, Washington v.
Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights v. MHDC (1979), as well as the two decisions
concerning plausibility of discriminatory intent that have been a central focus in the legal
literature related to unconscious racism, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009). After these initial analyses, I discuss my findings from the
discourse.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Findings
Recall that this is a study of moral disengagement in the discourse of elite white
education policy actors in Little Rock, Arkansas, in the wake of the 2015 state takeover
of Little Rock School District (LRSD). In January of 2015, the majority white Arkansas
Board of Education voted 5-4 to dissolve the majority Black Little Rock School Board,
transferring control of the district to the state. The justification for this takeover was that
6 of 48 schools in Little Rock were classified by the state as in “academic distress,” a
designation codified by law for schools in which over 50% of students score below
proficiency on state-administered annual assessments. I analyzed the discourse of elite
white policy actors related to this takeover.
This study is also a conceptual inquiry of the fit of the theory of moral
disengagement (Bandura, 2016) with the critical race theory (CRT) of unconscious
racism (Lawrence, 1995). Critical race theorists in education assert that (a) race is
endemic to U.S. society but undertheorized in studies of education (Ladson-Billings &
Tate, 1995), and (b) critical race studies should cross epistemological boundaries to more
completely observe the social, cultural, and psychological extent of racism’s permeation
of education (Tate, 1997). To that end, the guiding question and two subsequent
supporting questions for this study were as follows:
RQ1. To what extent is Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement applicable in
cases implicated by Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism?
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RQ1a. How is the case of the state takeover of Little Rock School District
a case of unconscious racism?
RQ1b. What mechanisms of moral disengagement are evident in the
discourse of the takeover?
I will explore the two supporting questions in this chapter and will engage with
the primary question in the next.
What Harmful Acts Do These Discourses Concern?
I identified over two dozen different conversations, or discourse concerning
distinct and specific actions, in the sampled discourse related to state takeover. These
conversations ranged from discussions of specific bills before the General Assembly, to
actions of the state Board of Education, to individual school performance, to the state
takeover itself. Although all conversations were related to the state takeover (because the
word “takeover” was one of the search terms I used to arrive at a sample of newspaper
articles), through a process of emergent analysis, I identified within these conversations
four major themes: (a) improvement, which concerned system-wide and school-specific
improvement planning and initiatives; (b) school choice, which concerned charter schools
and vouchers; (c) community, which concerned zoning, school closure, and school
construction; and (d) administration, which concerned the takeover and subsequent
appointments and administrative decisions in its wake. The specific policy actions at the
core of each of these discourses are associated with an array of racially disparate,
marginalizing outcomes. These associated harms are not fixed or exclusive to a particular
order of discourse. Rather, I have used the predominant effects of the acts within an order
of discourse as an organizing element to discuss the varied harms of these policies. These
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outcomes are the reason morally disengaging rhetoric would be necessary among policy
actors—because approving of these policies requires not only self-exoneration on
Table 6
Orders of Discourse and Associated Harms
Order of discourse (conversations)
Improvement (academic performance)

School choice (charter schools, vouchers)

Community (zoning, closure, construction)

Administration (governance, representation)

Associated harms
Meritocracy (white norms as standard; asserted
objectivity of curriculum and processes)
Marketization (policy by supply and demand;
focus on efficiency)
Resegregation (increased concentration of Black
students in schools; separation of students
in district by race)
Privatization (transfer of public funds to private
school management organizations)
Discrimination (preference for whites in
construction; closure of schools in Black
communities; gerrymandered attendance
zones)
Disfranchisement (elimination of representation
for Black majority; denial of public input)

the part of the policy actors, but approval of the policies by the public, even in the face of
known negative consequences. In the sections that follow, I connect these four themes
with four associated types of negative impact: (a) meritocracy and marketization, (b)
resegregation and privatization of schools, (c) discrimination against Black students and
families, and (d) disfranchisement of the Black majority in the LRSD.
Discourse on improvement. Discourses on improvement concerned school
improvement strategies, broader system improvement approaches, responses to the
looming loss of state desegregation funding in 2017, and accountability mechanisms.
Specific actions discussed in reform conversations are as follows:
1. Creation of Forward Arkansas, a public-private partnership between the state
board and the Walton Family Foundation (WFF), to plan statewide reforms
[Howell, DG, Jan. 28, 2015]. The WFF is one of the nation’s leading funders
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of new charter schools, and their influence over Arkansas education
policymaking is substantial (Brantley, 2016a, 2016b). Through Forward
Arkansas, their policy agenda is legitimized by its association with state
officials and more progressive members of the partnership.
2. Reconstitution of staff, merit pay for teachers, and other data-driven
turnaround initiatives at schools in academic distress [Howell, DG, Jun. 24,
2015]. Performance-based pay for teachers and performance-based funding of
schools—even a proposal to tie Title I and other funds to performance—is
associated with curriculum narrowing and testing preparation to produce
greater gains on state assessments (Au, 2016; Berliner, 2011).
3. Cutting employee pay and benefits to save district money, and eliminating
collective bargaining for working conditions [Hardy, AT, Aug. 9, 2015]. The
disfranchisement of teachers and the destruction of protections cause effective
teachers to seek employment in other districts and both are associated with
lower performance and morale among those teachers who remain (Borman &
Dowling, 2008).
4. Hiring Teach For America (TFA) teachers in district schools [Howell, DG,
Jan. 28, 2016]. TFA teachers have not been associated with positive
achievement outcomes in schools to any greater degree than non-TFA
teachers (Darling-Hammond, Holtzman, Gatlin, & Heilig, 2005). Their
inexperience in the classroom and low cost to districts make them attractive
for schools in need of a compliant workforce (Brewer, Kretchmar, Sondel, &
Ishmael, 2016), but their tendency to remain in the job for two years or less
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creates instability and lower teacher morale in the schools they leave behind
(Heilig & Jez, 2014).
5. Changing statewide assessments three times in three years, from the longused ACTAAP in 2014, to PARCC in 2015, and the ACT Aspire for 2016
[Howell, DG, Jul. 30, 2015]. Results of the ACTAAP were used to rationalize
takeover, even after the state had begun teaching to the Common Core, with
which the ACTAAP did not align. In switching to two different tests in two
years, student performance reflected two consecutive years of implementation
dip associated with the first year of newly adopted programs (Herold, Fedor,
Caldwell, & Liu, 2008). Recall from Chapter 1 that these dips were more
extreme, and recovery was less robust, for Black students.
Meritocracy and marketization. The harm to Black students at the center of the
discourse on improvement is in the construction of an educational meritocracy and in the
marketization of aspects of public education. Meritocracy, or the rewarding of
performance by normed standards, is potentially detrimental to the education of Black
students because it subjects them, their teachers, and their schools to the curricular and
performance norms established for white, affluent students (Au, 2016). Marketization, or
the application of private sector logic (e.g., profit, efficiency, competition, ranking) to
public sector institutions and processes, is potentially marginalizing to students from
minoritized groups, even when they are in the majority. Efficiency and profits are more
difficult in urban schools that serve communities with high need, where costs of
operation are higher (Adamson & Darling-Hammond, 2012), the tax base is lower (Smith
& Stovall, 2008), and more services are needed in schools (Alemán, 2007); yet these
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schools are still held to funding and achievement standards set by suburban districts with
larger tax bases and where fewer targeted programs are needed.
Discourse on school choice. Discourses on school choice concerned the renewal
and expansion of charter schools, as well as the mandate for and funding of choice
transfer options for parents. Specific actions discussed in reform conversations included
the following:
1. Expansion of enrollment at LiSA Academy [Howell, DG, Sep. 28, 2015] and
eStem Public Charter School [Howell, DG, Oct. 7, 2015]. These expansions
eventually passed the state board over the objections of the state-appointed
superintendent of LRSD, creating openings for thousands more students from
the district to transfer to charter schools, taking with them the state per-pupil
funding that previously went to their schools and the LRSD. Additionally,
these two schools have disproportionately high numbers of white students and
disproportionately low numbers of students with special needs and who
qualify for free or reduced-price lunches compared to LRSD schools (i.e., the
state’s proxy for poverty in schools; Brantley, 2016a).
2. Construction of new eStem charter high school on the campus of UALR
[Hardy, AT, Oct. 22, 2015]. The state board approved the first partnership of
its kind between the city’s largest institution of higher education and a K-12
school. The university is a public institution, but such partnerships with the
public schools were never previously pursued.
3. Establishing education savings accounts (vouchers) with state money for
parents to pay tuition at private schools [Caputo, AT, Feb. 2, 2015]. This bill,
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HB 1222, failed in the House, but its intent was to provide parents with state
money to pay tuition at private schools.
4. Requiring public schools to sell or lease under-utilized buildings to charter
schools [Hardy, AT, Apr. 13, 2015]. A bill proposed to identify underenrolled schools that were not using all classrooms or other spaces in their
buildings. This bill passed and was signed into law by Governor Hutchinson.
It gave charter schools the power to compel public districts and schools to sell
or lease their facilities to charter schools, even if they were still in use.
5. Exempt charter management organizations from FOIA [Hardy, AT, Mar. 27,
2015]. A bill to require charter management organizations (CMOs) to comply
with FOIA requests, HB1605, failed a House vote in 2015, allowing charter
schools to continue to operate without transparency, specifically pertaining to
the consulting contracts and other services they paid for with state funds.
Resegregation and privatization. The harm to Black students at the center of the
discourse on school choice is in the resegregation of public schools and privatization of
schooling. Resegregation occurs as more affluent white families opt out of their zoned
schools and send their children to charter or private schools, increasing the
disproportionality at the district school. Privatization is the diversion of public funds to
private entities, such as CMOs, for education, and the contracting of private firms for
various educational services (e.g., counseling, tutoring, special education, transportation,
professional development)—per-pupil state funding leaves the public school and follows
the student to the charter school (Jabbar, 2015; Scott, 2009). The result is that public
schools are serving increasingly disproportionate numbers of high-need students with less
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state funding. Enrolling in a charter school requires an application, parent-provided
transportation (charters are not served by the LRSD bus system), and agreement to
academic and behavioral expectations (e.g., zero tolerance discipline, before- and afterschool tutoring, special education waivers). Factors such as these allow typical charters to
claim random enrollment by lottery while effectively skimming high-performing students
who have parents of means from the pool of students (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Buras,
2011; Waitoller, Super, & Super, 2017).
Discourse on community. Discourses on community concerned segregation of
schools, construction of new schools, and closing of schools. Specific actions discussed
in reform conversations included the following:
1. Use of state desegregation funds to finance construction of a new middle
school in a predominantly white, affluent neighborhood [Howell, DG, Feb. 6,
2016]. The zone for the school would draw, at least at first, a majority Black
student body, but attorneys for students in another decaying and majority
Black middle school requested they be rezoned for the new school as well;
this request was denied by Judge Price Marshall [Howell, DG, Mar. 24, 2016].
2. Combining LRSD and Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD)
[Musa, DG, May 14, 2015]. North of the Arkansas River, municipalities have
started breaking from the PCSSD to create their own smaller districts. South
of the river, PCSSD includes the predominantly (though not exclusively)
white and affluent West Little Rock, while LRSD includes the predominantly
lower-income Black and Brown communities of central and Southwest Little
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Rock. The boundaries between the two districts have been the focus of
desegregation litigation for several decades.
3. Broadening the base of parents and families drawn to LRSD to include whiter,
more affluent students [Musa, DG, May 14, 2015]. Dubbed broadening
“communities of interest” by state-appointed Superintendent Baker Kurrus,
policy actors tie the survival of the city and the growth of business to the
interest of affluent white families in moving to Little Rock, which is
dependent on school options for their children. This construal of the purpose
of the school district (i.e., to recruit new white families) neglects the
improvement and renewal needed for schools serving Black and Brown
families who already live in Little Rock.
4. Construction of new high school in predominantly Black and Brown
neighborhood in SWLR [Howell, DG, Aug. 14, 2015]. This topic has been
frequently mentioned in discussions of new constructions in predominantly
white and affluent West Little Rock. An illustration of the critical race
principle of interest convergence (i.e., advancement of Black and Brown
interests only in conjunction with advances in white interests), construction of
a new school in SWLR was approved at the same time as construction of a
new middle school in WLR in district-level discussions, and at the same time
as charter expansion in state-level discussions.
5. Closing schools in Black neighborhoods [Howell, DG, Apr. 14, 2015; Nov. 4,
2015]. In response to the loss of state desegregation funds, district leaders
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proposed consolidating smaller elementary schools that were under-enrolled
due to competition from charter schools located in other parts of the city.
6. Renewal of Covenant Keepers charter despite its being in academic distress
[Howell, DG, Apr. 16, 2015]. This decision by the state board extended
flexibility to a school in the same situation, and serving a similar
demographic, as the six LRSD schools the state board used as examples to
rationalize taking over LRSD.
Discrimination and white preference. The harm to Black students at the center of
the discourse on race and equity is in discrimination and racial preference embedded into
education policy. Discrimination, or the creation of separate options or systems based on
geographic boundaries, or ability to pay for transportation, is harmful to Black students
because the models through which those opportunities and systems are resourced (e.g.,
property tax revenue, standardized per-pupil funding rates) typically favor white students
and disfavor Black students to a disproportionate degree (Alemán, 2007; Glen, 2009).
White preference is the prioritizing of white students and families over Black and Brown
students and families. This occurs when, instead of improving existing schools, policy
actors opt to charter new privately-operated schools to provide choice options for white
parents (Buras, 2011). Such policies contribute to the crisis narrative and cycle of blame
in public schools, in which public school performance is blamed on teachers (Slater,
2015), in spite of other glaring disparities in facilities, funding, and student demographics
when compared with charter schools (Brantley, 2016a).
Discourse on administration and governance. The discourse on administration
and governance concerned the state Board of Education’s vote to dissolve the LRSD
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Board and transfer control of the district to the state commissioner, and the subsequent
series of related appointments, firings, and other administrative decisions and policies.
Specific actions discussed in takeover conversations were as follows:
1. Dissolution of the school board and transfer of district governance to the state
commissioner [Hardy, AT, Jan. 28, 2015]. This vote of a majority white Board
of Education nullified the elections in which the voters of Little Rock selected
the leadership of the majority Black school district, replacing a majority Black
school board with a single white commissioner appointed by the white
governor.
2. Appointment of Johnny Key as state commissioner by Governor Hutchinson
[Howell, DG, Mar. 26, 2015]. Hutchinson, a white Republican governor who
lost in Little Rock by 20,000 votes (Arkansas Election Results, 2014),
appointed Key, a white former Republican state senator from northern
Arkansas with no experience in public education. Key ran a private homeschooling firm.
3. Appointment and firing of Baker Kurrus as LRSD superintendent by
Commissioner Key, acting as the LRSD school board. [Brantley, AT, Apr. 18,
2016]. Key appointed Kurrus, a former white LRSD board member, to be
superintendent without consulting the public. Kurrus was an attorney with no
experience in education, and the General Assembly had to change state law to
allow someone with no education experience to serve as superintendent. After
winning broad support—including from his detractors—during his 10-month
tenure, he was fired after a presentation to the state board on how expansion
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of charter enrollment in Little Rock harms the district. His firing was met with
enormous public opposition.
4. Creation and dissolution of Civic Advisory Committee (CAC) by
Commissioner Key [Brantley, AT, Feb. 12, 2015]. Key appointed this
committee, and its membership was split evenly between Black and white
members, meaning Black residents held a disproportionately small number of
representatives. The CAC held no official power but was merely a sounding
board for the superintendent. It was disbanded shortly after issuing a statement
calling for Key’s resignation.
5. Creation of Achievement School District [Musa & Howell, DG, Mar. 10,
2015]. This bill, HB 1733, failed in the House due in large part to massive
demonstrations of teachers and community members inside the state capitol
building. It would have allowed the state commissioner to contract private
firms to operate schools and districts in state takeover, as well as granted those
firms waivers from compliance with teacher employment protections and
other state education policies.
6. Replacement of CAC with Community Advisory Board (CAB) [Howell, DG,
Jun. 22, 2016]. Key also appointed the members of this new advisory body,
which, like the CAC, was merely a consultative group with no official power.
Its makeup was also evenly divided between Black and white members, again
denying Blacks the majority.
7. Appointment of Michael Poore [Brantley, AT, Apr. 18, 2016]. Key’s
appointment of Poore, the white superintendent at Bentonville (international
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headquarters of Walmart), to the superintendency in Little Rock was, like his
appointment of Kurrus, carried out without consultation with the community.
Disfranchisement of Black majority. The harm to Black students at the center of
the discourse on takeover is in disfranchisement of the Black majority in Little Rock.
Disfranchisement is the removal of representation of groups or individuals and the
dismissal of the democratic processes through which individuals or groups exercise
control of the government. In Little Rock, despite having a Black majority for decades,
the school district did not elect its first Black majority school board until 2006 (LRSD
has first Black majority, 2006). In 2013, the General Assembly lowered the criteria for
state takeover to 50% proficiency. Disfranchisement is, prima facie, a harm to Black
communities, regardless of the outcomes that result (Stovall, 2013).
RQ1a: Is the CRT principle of unconscious racism invoked in or relevant to the case
of the state takeover of Little Rock School District?
Unconscious Racism and Discriminatory Intent
In order to investigate the applicability of Lawrence’s (1995) theory of
unconscious racism to the Little Rock case, I undertook a critical race analysis of the state
takeover, focused on the opinion in Doe (2016). Reporting the findings of such an
analysis is different from reporting the findings of a pure quantitative or qualitative study,
in which data are presented without commentary, and analysis is reserved for discussion
later. Critical race analyses are inherently interpretive undertakings that “impose order on
experience” (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995, p. 57), so there is enough discussion in this
section to make clear why a conceptual or theoretical finding is a finding. Further
discussion and consideration of implications is reserved for Chapter 5.
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After the takeover, two lawsuits were filed in opposition. First, displaced
members of the school board sued the State of Arkansas and the Department of Education
[Curry v. Key (No. cv-15-224, 2015 Ark. 392, Ark. 2015)] on the grounds that the state
overstepped its legal authority by dissolving the school board. Next, district parents sued
the Department of Education [Doe v. DOE (No. 4:15-cv-623, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis
135265, at *1, E.D. Ark. 2016)] for discrimination against Black students, teachers, and
families. Curry v. Key (2015) was dismissed by the Arkansas Supreme Court on the
grounds that in the case of takeover, which was a constitutionally permitted course of
action, the state possesses sovereign immunity and cannot be sued. Doe v. DOE (2016)
was also dismissed in U.S. District Court on the grounds that its discrimination claims
were not plausible. The plausibility standard cited in the opinion arose from (a) the
discriminatory intent requirement of Washington v. Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (1977), (b) the plausibility standard
of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007), and (c) the liability of public officials for the
discriminatory effects of policies and subordinates from Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009). It is the
Marshall opinion in Doe v. DOE (2016) that makes the takeover of LRSD a fruitful case
for consideration of Lawrence’s (1995) theory of unconscious racism, because it is
grounded in the same case law (i.e., Washington v. Davis [1976] and Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation [1977]) that Lawrence (1995b) invoked
in his seminal article on unconscious racism.
Discriminatory intent. The Doe (2016) opinion identified three specific actions
on the part of the State of Arkansas at the center of the Plaintiffs’ case: the expansion of
charter schools, the oversight of federal funding, and the takeover of the district. But the
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majority of the opinion is focused on the takeover itself. The precedent set by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Davis and Arlington decisions was that discriminatory impact or
disparate effects are necessary but not sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny by the court for
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. It is also necessary to
prove discriminatory intent. Judge Price Marshall, in the 2016 Doe v. DOE case,
acknowledged disparate impact:
And there’s no real question about disproportionate effect: more than 65% of
LRSD students are black; a majority of the dissolved Board was black; and the
students at the growing charter schools in Little Rock are (to generalize) whiter
and wealthier than LRSD’s students. But the settled precedent is clear;
discriminatory effects alone are insufficient to show discriminatory intentions.
(Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 4)
Marshall also acknowledged that intent is difficult to identify given the more implicit
nature of contemporary racism, and he proposed other ostensibly objective methods for
identifying discriminatory intent, taken from the Arlington decision:
How does this motivation appear, given that it’s now rarely explicit? Often in the
combined light of several circumstances: whether an action burdens one race
more than another; the history behind it; the specific events leading up to it,
including any break from normal procedure; and the action’s legislative or
administrative history. (Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 3)
Citing the Arlington decision, the Court directly quoted the definition of
discrimination from Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979):
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Discriminatory purpose…implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that [the Department and the State Board]
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon [black people]. (Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark.,
No. 3, ¶ 3)
This is an example of what Lawrence (1995a) calls a “false dichotomy” (p. 237), in
which there are only two kinds of discriminatory act: (a) intentional acts, which are
unconstitutional, and (b) unintentional acts, which are constitutional. From a critical race
perspective, the Court’s dependence in Doe on the Feeney definition of discrimination,
quoted above, does not acknowledge the potential for “unconscious racial motivation”
(Lawrence, 1995a, p. 237) to have played a role in the takeover of LRSD or in the pursuit
of other takeover-related reforms (e.g., school choice and charter schools). The Court
acknowledged the potential for less-than-explicit indications of discriminatory intent and
identified some possible places to look for such examples. Again, the Court looked to the
Arlington decision for guidance, and identified (a) the racial effects of takeover, (b) the
history of the district, and (c) administrative norms in the case, as potential clues.
Racial effect. The Court’s judgment of the Plaintiffs’ claim of disproportionate
impact is that any action taken in Little Rock would, because of Little Rock’s
disproportionately Black population, impact more Black people than white people:
The State’s actions affect Little Rock’s black population—students, teachers,
parents, former school board members—more than the city’s white population.
That’s math. Most of LRSD’s students are black, so if the State takes over the
District, runs it poorly, and allows more competing charters to siphon the white
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students and public money from LRSD schools, all that burdens blacks more
heavily than whites. But the racial effects here aren’t “unexplainable on grounds
other than race [discrimination].” Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
They’re explainable by the math: no matter what motivated the State to takeover
LRSD, the effect would be felt more by black citizens than white citizens,
because the District touches more blacks than whites. This isn’t one of those rare
cases, then, where racially unbalanced effects reveal racial discrimination. (Doe,
2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 5)
The Court invoked Arlington to claim that, as long as any other possible explanation for
disparate impact exists (the use of the double negative phrasing, “aren’t ‘unexplainable
on grounds other than race’” is confusing), discriminatory intent can be dismissed.
Interestingly, the opinion does not invoke the plausibility standard for these hypothetical
alternative explanations. Additionally, the Court’s aside that the existence of more
charters would “siphon white students and public money from LRSD schools”
contradicts the Court’s own logic that any action in LRSD would disproportionately
affect Black people. Should not a racially neutral charter sector siphon white and Black
students proportional to their makeup of the total district population? From a critical race
perspective, if charter schools are “siphoning” more white students than Black students
from the majority Black public district, then charter schools are a discriminating force
regardless of the impact on remaining district students. The Court appears to accidentally
acknowledge this yet concludes that racial discrimination in the case is only possible, not
plausible.
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History of the case. The Court concluded that, despite a history of racially
marginalizing education policy in Little Rock, discriminatory intent in the case of
takeover was only possible, not plausible:
The State Board seized the opportunity, Plaintiffs say, because its members
wanted to discriminate against the District’s black citizens—the implication is
that the State Board had no intention of improving LRSD and returning it to local
control. And here the charter angle matters. The State Board took over an
allegedly failing LRSD and then allowed charters to continue to deplete its white
students and public money. Charter proponents like Vicki Saviers, moreover,
were among those itching for a takeover. This history, though, suggests only
possible, rather than plausible, racial discrimination. It is equally consistent with a
group of citizens with strong policy views—less public involvement and more
private control—wanting a turn at putting their views into practice. (Doe, 2016, E.
D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 6)
Besides the arguably arbitrary distinction, in the mind of a Southern white judge, between
“possible” and “plausible,” the above assertion by the Court seeks explicit proof of
discriminatory intent in political discourse. A critical race reading of this expectation is
that it is futile: “There will be no evidence of self-conscious racism where the
actors…have learned racist attitudes and beliefs through tacit rather than explicit lessons”
(Lawrence, 1995a, p. 241). In other words, the language of racism in American politics is
often no longer explicit, but implicit. From Lawrence’s (1995a) perspective, the
expectation that discriminatory intent will be blatant enough to tip the scales from
possible to plausible is misguided.
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Departures from norms. The Arlington decision identified administrative
irregularities as a potential signal of discriminatory intent. In the Little Rock case, there
were several, including the hiring of a state Commissioner and district Superintendent
with no experience in educational administration, failure to follow through on standard
communication procedures with the legislature leading up to and after the takeover, and
others. The Court, however, granted significant leeway to the State’s unusual behavior:
The takeover wasn’t graceful or perfect. Bureaucracies always lumber along. But
the deviations Plaintiffs raise don’t make a racial motive plausible. The Board
seems to have followed the proper administrative course, for example, in passing
emergency regulations and following up with final ones. Who knows why the
Department issued two notices of academic distress and let one of them go. And
only time will tell whether Key and Kurrus were the right people for the
Commissioner’s and Superintendent’s slots notwithstanding the absence of usual
qualifications. But the State Board’s actions as alleged aren’t so outside the
ordinary course that they plausibly suggest an unconstitutional motive. (Doe,
2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 10)
Even after considering the above abnormalities in the case, the Court stated there were
not enough facts to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal discrimination” (Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 2).
Plausibility. The precedent in Twombly (2007) was that, in order to avoid costly
litigation involving major corporations, motions to dismiss could succeed if, judging
from the facts in the case, wrongdoing is only possible, not plausible. The accusation at
the center of Twombly was of collusion between business competitors, but its plausibility
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standard was applied in Iqbal (2009) to establish that public officials bore no culpability
for policies and actions that result in discriminatory impact if discriminatory intent is not
plausible. In the Little Rock case, the Court cited the costs of a trial in the Doe opinion:
The time-and-money point is powerful in this case; the Pulaski County school
desegregation case teaches that constitutional litigation involving LRSD and the
State can last decades and cost millions. It’s therefore important that this case
contain plausible claims against the State Defendants before we start down
another similar road. That’s among the reasons why a “mere possibility” of racial
discrimination isn’t enough. And it suggests what the Supreme Court has made
explicit: that the plausibility/possibility line is found in part through judicial
experience and common sense. (Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark., No. 3, ¶ 2)
With both the discriminatory intent requirement and the plausibility standard applied,
what the Court needs is proof. Lawrence (1995a) stated that such proof would not come
in the form of explicit language, but in the use of ostensibly benign language, the reliance
on tacit cultural stereotypes and assumptions, and the subconscious use of “selective
indifference” (p. 244). From a critical race standpoint, contemporary evidence of
plausible discriminatory intent is impossible to prove, because its implicit nature renders
it inadmissible. In other words, the evidentiary rigor for discrimination cases to survive a
motion to dismiss is too strong for all but the most extreme, blatant instances of
discrimination.
Importantly, the Court acknowledged evidence of discriminatory impact,
identified departures from administrative norms, pointed to links between members of the
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state board and reformist lobbyists, and alluded to the fraught history of race and
education policy in Little Rock. Still, it was not sufficient:
What’s missing are pleaded facts that show the intent to discriminate based on
race, facts that show foul thoughts becoming harmful actions…. Letting a
doubtful case proceed is often the better course, but not where the governing law
is clear and all the facts simply do not measure up. At the threshold, Plaintiffs
haven’t offered enough facts showing a plausible racial motivation behind any of
the challenged decisions. (Doe, 2016, E. D. Ark., No. 1, ¶ 5)
What Lawrence (1995a) proposed in his critical race theoretical approach to racist intent
was the existence of a psychological “defense mechanism against the guilt and anxiety of
those who hold power and privilege through means and with motives that they cannot
acknowledge” (p. 254). The above analyses demonstrate the applicability of Lawrence’s
(1995a) theory of unconscious racism to the Little Rock case. What remains to be
demonstrated is whether there is also evidence of the rhetoric of moral disengagement in
the policy discourse surrounding the case.
RQ1b: Are the mechanisms of moral disengagement evident in the takeover
discourse of white education policy actors in Little Rock?
Moral Disengagement
Bandura’s (2016) categories of moral disengagement strategies are aimed at four
levels of harm: (a) the behavioral locus, which concerns the harmful act itself; (b) the
agency locus, which concerns responsibility for the behavior; (c) the outcome locus,
which concerns the harm that resulted from the behavior; and (d) the victim locus, which
concerns the recipients of that harm. I explored examples of each of the eight moral
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disengagement strategies, in each of the four loci, in the takeover discourse among all
five policy actor groups (i.e., journalists, bureaucrats, politicians, advocates, educators).
Each mechanism is comprised of sub-mechanisms, which are identified in the tables I
have included within each section. Sub-mechanisms may be considered facets of a
mechanism, or the variety of ways in which a mechanism might be utilized. The submechanisms identified here are from Bandura’s (1999) previous work but are not
intended to be an exhaustive list of the myriad ways in which a moral disengagement
mechanism might be deployed. In the tables in each section, I report the number of
unique policy actors who utilized a given mechanism or sub-mechanism, at the
individual, organizational, and institutional levels. In most cases, the excerpts I discuss at
length below are from individual-level discourse, since that is the focus of my research
questions.
Behavior locus. Behaviors at the center of takeover discourse include the actual
taking over of the district, dissolving the school board, firing the superintendent,
expanding charter enrollment, closing schools, and building schools. Each of these
actions has either been associated with negative outcomes for, or is itself disfranchising
of, Black students, families, and communities. Recall from Chapter 2 that state takeover
of majority-Black or Brown districts is frequently disfranchising, especially when there is
no mechanism for community input in district-level decision making (Morel, 2016). In
the case of Little Rock, state board members specifically stated that the state-appointed
Civic Advisory Committee that took the place of the school board was not a decisionmaking body, but more of a “booster club or public relations group” [Zook, DG, Sep. 11,
2015]. School choice initiatives such as vouchers and charter schools also have a
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Table 7
Framework of Moral Disengagement
Locus
Behavior

Parent node
Moral, social, and economic
justification

Palliative comparison

Euphemistic labeling

Agency

Diffusion of responsibility

Displacement of responsibility

Sub-nodes

Borrowed jargon
Sanitizing or convoluted
language
Passive voice
Group decision making
Division of labor
Collective action
Direct authorization of another
agent
Obliging functionaries:
Surreptitious sanctioning:

Outcome

Denial
Distortion
Disregard

Victim

Victim blaming

Dehumanization

Sub-node details

Defense against an opposing
power
Response to humiliation or
violence
Appeals to “true believer”
ideologies
Uplifting comparison
Lesser-of-two-evils
Ends justify means
Alternatives ineffective

Disputing
Forgetting
Minimization of harm
Misconstrual of effects
Ignoring
Selective inattention
Distance from action
Defense presented as
instigation
Self as victim
Victim at fault:

Subhumanization
Demonization
Animalization
Depersonalization:

Duty to superior
Personal responsibility
Implicit agreements
Insulating social
arrangements
Indirect authorization
Willful ignorance

Social conditions
Cultural differences
Stereotypes

Digitization
Typecasting

Adapted from Bandura, A., 2016, Moral disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves, New
York, NY: Worth.
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disproportionately negative impact on Black communities; as more affluent, frequently
white, families move their children to charter schools or voucher-funded private schools,
public schools are drained of enrollment-based state funding and racial segregation
increases (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007). When affluent families (who are the minority),
whether white or Black, move their children to charter schools from the public school
system, which serves a majority Black and majority low- and lower middle-income
group, this has a disproportionately negative effect on Black communities, the vast
majority of whose children are in the public schools. Discussion of state takeover, school
choice and charter expansion, and school closure and construction in Little Rock,
therefore occurs with knowledge of the racially disparate impacts of such policies (or at
the very least, the opposition of the Black community in Little Rock to such policies).
Supposed equality-minded policy actors must find ways to reconcile that reality with
their support for the behaviors that accompany such policies. In sampled discourse from
Little Rock, it is evident that some of those reconciling strategies comport with Bandura’s
(2016) moral disengagement mechanisms at the behavior level: ideological justification
of the behavior, advantageous comparison of the behavior to alternative behaviors, and
description of the behavior in sanitized or euphemistic terms.
Justification. Justifications have the effect of aligning a behavior with a set of
situational or moral imperatives that negate arguments against the behavior. Policy actors
use economic logic, moral appeals, and ideological mandates to rationalize behaviors, in
effect abdicating their own agency to the circumstances that demand their action. Such
circumstances include situations that require a response to or recovery from violence,
humiliation, or disaster; instances of competition with opposing or threatening
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antagonists; or opportunities to apply a particular ideological solution. As demonstrated
in Table 8, I identified instances of this approach at all three levels of discourse (i.e.,
micro-, or individual-level; meso-, or organizational-level; and macro-, or institutionallevel), and across a range of different individual- and organizational-level actors.
Table 8
Moral Disengagement: Justification
Sub-mechanism
Recovery

Competition

True-believer

Individual (n)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (6)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (5)
Politicians (2)
Advocates (3)
Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (1)
Politicians (1)

Organizational

Institutional

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Arkansas Learns
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

-

Doe v. DOE

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group who utilized a
given mechanism at least once.

Eleven individual policy actors from four policy actor groups, as well as all three
organizational-level actors, utilized recovery justifications in support of the takeover. The
discourse of crisis common to education reform politics (Stovall, 2013) is rooted in
recovery-focused justification. Former school board member Jim Ross, an opponent of
takeover, made one of the most severe assessments of the education landscape in Little
Rock: “It’s far worse than the test scores show. It’s a horrific crisis. We have failed
generations and generations of poor people in this city” [Ross, DG, Jan. 27, 2015]. When
crisis language is deployed, more extreme solutions like takeover seem necessary. Baker
Kurrus, before his appointment as superintendent, made a similar appraisal:
I just think it is critical that we build public confidence, get our fiscal house in
order, and then figure out how we can improve the achievement of these students
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who aren’t doing as well as they could be doing. It’s urgent. [Kurrus, DG, Mar.
26, 2015]
Kurrus expanded the crisis beyond student outcomes, to financial matters and public
relations, and of course a bigger crisis calls for a bigger recovery. Weeks later, state
Commissioner of Education Johnny Key expanded the takeover mandate beyond the six
schools: “[LRSD] needs to embark on a comprehensive improvement process that…takes
a more holistic view of the district, its finances, its operations, and its academics with the
overarching concept of how to best educate students” [Key, AT, Apr. 10, 2015].
Thirteen policy actors from four policy actor groups appealed to the logic of
competition to justify state takeover and market-based reforms. Two organizational actors
and one institutional actor also used competition strategies. The antagonists addressed by
individual-level policy actors in takeover discussions were (a) charter school expansion,
and (b) the looming cessation of desegregation funding from the state. Former LRSD
school board president Greg Adams spoke in support of closing schools in Black
neighborhoods after the takeover, in order to stay financially competitive in the face of
declining state funding:
I find the argument that we are going to need fewer schools pretty compelling. It’s
hard to imagine that we are going to be a healthy school district five or 10 years
from now if we have the same amount of schools and the same amount of empty
seats. I don’t see that changing. I don’t think that in a few years we are going to
be able to fill those empty seats. [Adams, DG, Nov. 4, 2015]
This is similar to an estimate of future harm—a depiction of widespread underenrollment at the district’s elementary schools. Predictions of future harm are a type of
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advantageous comparison intended to increase the favorability of an action. However,
Adams is not tying the future empty seats to a behavior of the district or an
individual/group he can influence. The empty seats are the result of charter competition,
and the behavior at question in this instance is school closure. This defense of the policy
of school closure, and rationalization of the accompanying loss to the Black communities
affected by those closures, prioritizes financial solvency over the needs of Black families.
Only four individuals and one institutional-level policy actor made appeals to true
believers in this case. Columnist John Brummett invoked a robust strong-state liberal
notion of centralized control of all school districts:
I have a solution. It’s for the state, based on its plain and fully litigated
constitutional responsibility to provide an adequate and equitable education to all
kids statewide, to take over the ultimate responsibility for the administration of all
the state’s school districts. [Brummett, DG, Jan. 8, 2015]
This was cross-coded as a lesser-of-two-evils appeal (a type of advantageous comparison,
discussed in the next section; see Table 3), because it is aimed at two audiences. To
skeptical moderates, it proposes a more extreme option that makes takeover of a single
district seem less severe. But to true liberals, it makes takeover of a single district seem
like a step in the right direction to full centralized governance of all districts. In another
statement, liberal state board member Jay Barth (a Democratic appointee) made a similar
point on the night of the takeover vote: “To be blunt, it is crucial that the hammer of the
state be over the district” [Barth, AT, Jan. 28, 2015]. The imagery here is stark, despite
coming from an opponent of state takeover. His attempt was to generate a measure short
of takeover under which the Little Rock School Board would remain intact, while still
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facing significant compliance mandates. This deployment of state power highlights the
disfranchising nature of takeover and the threat it poses to local democratic control,
which is problematic when the locality is majority Black and left-leaning, but the state is
majority white and right-leaning. The discourse of justification was thus manifest in three
ways: takeover as a disaster recovery effort, takeover as a competitive economic
maneuver, and takeover as the fulfillment of market philosophy. Further rationalizations
were identified in the form of advantageous comparisons.
Table 9
Moral Disengagement: Comparison
Sub-mechanism
Historical parallel

Estimates of future harm

Uplifting company

Ends justify means

Lesser-of-two-evils
Alternatives failed

Individual (n)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (3)
Advocates (1)
Educators (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (3)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (1)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (7)
Advocates (1)
Educators (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (3)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (1)
Journalists (4)
Advocates (1)
Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (4)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (2)

Organizational

Institutional

-

-

Arkansas Learns
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

-

-

Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group who utilized a
given mechanism at least once.

Comparison. Comparisons are significant because of the aspects of the
comparison that their users either ignore or otherwise de-emphasize. To be relevant, a
comparison must have parallels to the current moment, but to be persuasive to opponents
it must also avoid the contradictions in the comparison. Bandura (2016) asserted that the
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“use of superficial similarities in the framing of issues can also distort the judgment of
the justification of violent means” (p. 57). Policy actors utilize supposed historical
parallels, predictions of future consequences, and association with positive movements to
increase the favorability of an action.
The use of historical parallels is intended to exonerate present action by likening
it to previous successful actions or actions that were supported by one’s opponents, or by
contrasting present actions with previous unsuccessful and/or unsupported actions. Nine
individuals from four different policy actor groups utilized historical parallels in this
case. John Brummett used historical comparisons to suggest that opposition to takeover
was in contradiction to liberals’ previous opposition to removing local control in the
district consolidation debates a decade earlier: “Little Rock liberals thus were arguing
local control in the way rural folks from consolidated tiny school districts had always
argued local control…to the disdain of Little Rock liberals” [Brummett, DG, Feb. 1,
2015]. There are superficial similarities between rural district consolidation and the Little
Rock takeover, such as the assertion of state power over local will. But the comparison is
overly simplistic because (a) most of the rural districts in question were white districts
consolidated with other white districts, and (b) in all cases local citizens retained control
over the election of their school boards. Neither of these are true for the Little Rock case,
in which Black board members were replaced by a singular white commissioner selected
by a statewide majority-white electorate at odds with the political leanings of the
majority-Black Little Rock district.
At the individual level, six policy actors from four policy actor groups employed
estimates of future harm in takeover discourses. Two at the organizational level also
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utilized estimates of future harm in the discourses of school choice and race. Some
predictions concern the harm that will continue to befall the children of Little Rock if the
district is not knocked off its present trajectory. State Director of School Improvement
Richard Wilde said, “If everything continues as it is going, the district will not see
stability in the staff, improved student results, or improved confidence in the district”
[Wilde, DG, Jan. 8, 2015]. The takeover is presented as a necessary interruption of
continued local control, necessary to stop future catastrophe. Wilde’s comparison is also
an example of the use of the agentless passive voice—the situation will continue and the
district will not see stability, and so forth. Here the lack of actors is not intended to
escape blame, but to illustrate the out-of-control nature of the present inertia of failure in
the district. To stave off this impending chaos, Wilde encouraged takeover.
In another more explicitly morally disengaging comparison, the district is drained
of its high-performing white students and left with only the poor, Black and Brown
students, and students with special needs: “[LRSD is] the place where kids go when their
parents don’t elect to send them to private schools, don’t elect to move them into other
communities, or don’t elect to send them to charter schools” [Kurrus, DG, Nov. 4, 2015].
The implication of this is that serving high-need students without means to go to nondistrict schools is undesirable, and that the district's problems are the fault of affluent
white families moving out of the district and leaving only the unteachable behind. Even
when the white families are blamed, the Black families are still the problem. There is an
element of victim-blaming here, which is a distinct mechanism of moral disengagement,
since “high-need” students’ merely showing up to school is cast as a harm to the district.
But in this particular comparison, the higher concentration of “high-need” students is the
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outcome, but the causal behavior is the exodus of affluent white students. The
implication, then, is that to stop the future harm of a district full of poor, Black, and
special education students, the district must act to attract whites back to public schools.
In the most frequently utilized type of advantageous comparison, nine individuals
from four different policy actor groups used uplifting company. Additionally, all three
sampled organizational level actors related their points to uplifting company in the
discourse of state takeover. Policy actors made comparisons to several other districts in
the state who were (a) attracting students from Little Rock, (b) of comparable size, or (c)
also going through a state takeover. Kurrus defended budget cuts by saying “other
districts do the same job with a whole lot less” [Kurrus, DG, Feb. 28, 2015]. He also
defended new school construction by pointing out the competition Little Rock faced from
the “communities that surround our school district…Northwest Arkansas, North Little
Rock, Benton, Cabot, Bryant” [Kurrus, DG, Oct. 2, 2015] who were attracting families
because Little Rock did not have adequate middle school and high school facilities. All of
these districts are majority white and higher-performing. Uplifting comparisons generally
appeal to a sense of morality and principle (Bandura, 2016). In this case the appeal is to
exemplars of success, and the suggestion is that if Little Rock closes some schools and
builds new schools elsewhere they, too, will be successful.
Seven policy actors from four policy actor groups utilized an ends-justify-means
comparison. Two organizations utilized this rationalization. On the day of the takeover,
the Editor said takeover was a necessary measure to take “so students want to attend its
schools, not leave” [Editor, DG, Jan. 28, 2015]. This paralleled Kurrus’s later warning—
10 months into the takeover—that “if we don’t change, this community is going to be like
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Detroit” [Kurrus, DG, Nov. 4, 2015]. The Editor’s appeal is more utilitarian, but Kurrus’s
is both utilitarian and a racist dog whistle. Both of these are examples of crisis recovery
and competition rhetoric, two types of justification discussed in previous sections. But the
explicit portrayal of outcomes in these examples—of preventing students from choosing
to leave the district en masse in the Editor’s example and of the city escaping devolution
into a blighted wasteland in Kurrus’s example—seem to necessitate a by-any-meansnecessary approach to reform.
Four policy actors from two policy actor groups employed a lesser-of-two-evils
comparison. The lesser-of-two-evils justification is a tacit admission that a particular
option is undesirable. However, when juxtaposed with other, even less favorable options,
it appears more palatable. Brummett offered two contradictory alternatives,
simultaneously arguing that it would only be for a short time (“bear in mind that no state
takeover is to be forever”) and that it should be forever and applied to all districts (“for
the state to take over the ultimate responsibility for the administration of all the state’s
school districts”) [Brummett, DG, Jan. 8, 2015]. These could also be considered
minimization of harm, which is a type of dismissal mechanism through which negative
outcomes are distorted to seem less severe or harmful. However, since they occurred
before the behavior (takeover) was actually performed, they are potential behavior
options.
Eight individuals from four policy actor groups pointed to better alternatives that
have failed in the past. Two organizations also utilized comparisons to failed alternatives.
In her letter to the state board, LRSD board member Leslie Fisken said, “As history tells,
over the past twenty-five years, the LRSD has had different superintendents every
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eighteen to twenty-four months. Our history shows that the LRSD school board cannot
support and retain superintendents” [Fisken, AT, Jan. 4, 2015]. Here, her point is that
replacing the superintendent has not worked in the past 25 years; thus, the board has been
the problem all along. State board member Vicki Saviers concurred:
We’ve seen Band-Aids and small steps in recent months, but only after…the
district was faced with serious sanctions. All of the folks we’ve seen today have
pledged to do better going forward…but this [poor school performance] has been
documented for 13 years. …Here we are in 2015. We have a long history of
academic distress in those schools. [Saviers, AT, Jan. 28, 2015]
These portrayals of takeover give it the appearance of a last resort measure, by
juxtaposing it with past failed efforts. By separating themselves from past boards, Fisken
and Saviers indicate their unwillingness to accept culpability for repeating the mistakes of
previous boards, and takeover amounts to both a break with previous leadership and a
change in direction from previous attempts.
Euphemism. The use of euphemism is more overtly manipulative than either
justification or advantageous comparison, since policy actors employ it to disguise a
behavior by (a) removing agency through the use of passive voice, (b) removing negative
connotations with sanitizing language, and (c) borrowing positive terminology from
uplifting social movements or positively regarded fields.
Twenty individual policy actors from four different policy actor groups used
passive voice to refer to state action or education policies related to the takeover (see
Table 10). All three organizational-level actors, as well as the court opinion in Doe v.
DOE, also used passive voice in takeover discourse. The effect of passive voice is to
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Table 10
Moral Disengagement: Euphemism
Sub-mechanism
Passive voice

Sanitizing language

Borrowed jargon

Individual (n)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (6)
Politicians (5)
Advocates (5)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (11)
Politicians (3)
Advocates (2)
Educators (2)
Journalists (1)
Bureaucrats (3)
Advocates (1)

Organizational

Institutional

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group who utilized a
given mechanism at least once.

communicate that the negative consequences of harmful behaviors are actually “the work
of nameless forces rather than of individuals” (Bandura, 2016, p. 55). As a former
English teacher and editor, I understand that the use of passive voice is common and may
not always indicate an attempt at self-exoneration. However, I believe the cases I
identified are instances of purposive passive voice, not just lazy phrasing.
Policy actors used passive voice to explain racial inequality in Little Rock without
attributing the inequality to any people or policies. Brummett said “the district has
become largely re-segregated, and majority black” [Brummett, DG, Jan. 8, 2015]. This
phrasing presents re-segregation as a naturally occurring event, instead of connecting it to
policies like school choice laws and charter schools that have known segregating effects
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Scott & Quinn, 2014). In these cases, it is the policymakers who
re-segregated the district. Ross said “[Black] children have unequal access to highly
qualified teachers and administrators” [Ross, AT, Jan. 26, 2015]. Access to these
educational opportunities is determined by policy (Donnor, 2011; Knoeppel, 2007), so it
is the policymakers who assigned un- or under-qualified teachers and administrators to
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the schools Black children attend. It is the policymakers who failed to take alternative
actions that could have attracted or retained qualified personnel. They were passive in
their approach to addressing the problem as well since they relied on external forces (the
state, charters) to solve the problems they had created.
Table 11
Amorphous Agents’ Actions
Excerpt
“[The deep division in the Little
Rock community]…probably
deepened since the Jan. 28 vote.
Those of us on the board from Little
Rock knew how divisive this
decision would be." [Barth, DG,
Mar. 20, 2015]
"I hate that race and class divide—
and in many ways define—Little
Rock and the division will only
grow worse because of the state
action." [Kopsky, ST, Deb. 5, 2015]

Subject
division

Action
deepened

Alternative wording
Policymakers divided the
Little Rock community…

race and
class

divide, define

division

grow worse

“I understand the feeling of
disfranchisement that exists.”
[Ledbetter, AT, Apr. May 9, 2015]
"The news of a leadership change
in the Little Rock School District—
from Baker Kurrus to Michael
Poore—sparked controversy this
week." [Ritter, DG, Apr. 22, 2016]
"There are high-performing schools
in every region, but access to such
schools varies significantly." [FA,
Vision 2015]
"In January 2015, public anger
flared in and around Little Rock
when the Little Rock School District
(LRSD) was taken over the same
month The State of Education in
Arkansas was released." [FA, How
We Built a Statewide Movement]

feeling

exists

Policymakers have
divided Little Rock by race
and class.
The state board further
divided Little Rock by
race…
The state board
disfranchised the people
of LRSD
Johnny Key sparked
controversy by firing
Kurrus…

news

sparked
controversy

access

varies

State policymakers
create unequal access to
high-performing schools

public anger

flared

The state board angered
the public when it took
over the Little Rock
School District.

Ross also defended the appointment of Baker Kurrus by saying that “he loves the
children in our city who find themselves oppressed” [Ross, AT, Feb. 16, 2015]. These are
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likely the same children who, for former LRSD school board president Greg Adams, “are
stuck with poor or lacking facilities” [Adams, AT, Apr. 18, 2015]. These children cannot
be the principal agents of their own oppression (Freire, 1970; Robinson, 2004).
Policymakers bear responsibility for marginalizing Black children in Little Rock. In these
general references to racial inequality in Little Rock, the only subjects of the sentences,
from a grammatical perspective, are Black children and families. The actual behaviors at
the root of such inequality are not mentioned, so no self-exoneration is even necessary.
Another method through which passive voice disguises the agents of
marginalization is when concepts or amorphous states of being are the subject of a
sentence, instead of people. In the excerpts in Table 11, concepts or ideas like “division,”
“race,” “class,” “access,” and “anger” are the objects of the verbs “deepened,” “divide,”
“varies,” and “flared,” respectively. Of course, this discourse acknowledges racial
inequality, but in the chosen phrasing there are no humans at the center of these states of
being. Situations like racial division, unequal access, and disfranchisement are caused by
other humans, not by natural forces (Au, 2016; Chapman, 2013; Gillborn, 2008). If such
circumstances are treated as independently occurring phenomena, then policy actors and
citizens do not believe they are culpable for those circumstances when they approve and
enact the policies that actually cause division, inequality, and disfranchisement.
Twenty-two individuals from all five policy actor groups, all three organizationallevel actors, and one institutional-level actor utilized sanitizing language (Bandura, 2016)
when referring to behaviors associated with the takeover (e.g., dissolution of the school
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Table 12
Glossary of Sanitized Terms
Sanitized term

Referent meaning

“certain uncomfortable factors” [Brummett, DG, Jan. 8,
2015]
“racial division” [Marshall, Doe v. DOE]

racial inequality; white supremacy

“state partnership” [Wilde, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]
“Achievement School District” [Cozart, DG, Mar. 10,
2015]
“the unsettling situation” [Koehler, DG, Apr. 7, 2015]

state takeover

“affords the possibility” [Newton, DG, Mar. 10, 2015]

forces

“nontraditional providers” [Newton, DG, Mar. 10, 2015]

private contractors, charter
management organizations

“maximum flexibility” [Newton, DG, Mar. 10, 2015]
“compliance activities” [FA, Vision 2015]

punitive accountability measures

“divisive” [Barth, DG, Mar. 20, 2015]

marginalizing, disfranchising toward
Black people

“serving a niche” [Wilde, DG, Apr. 16, 2015]

delivering below-proficiency
outcomes in a safe, racially
homogenous environment

“a concerning population” [Smith, DG, Apr. 16, 2015]
“students from low socioeconomic backgrounds who
may not be able to afford to live in higher-achieving
districts” [OEP, Impacts of the Public School
Choice Act of 2013]

Black students

“not a traditional choice” [Massanelli, DG, May 7, 2017]
“new faces” [FA, How We Built a Statewide Movement]
“people with different backgrounds who also have
certain skills” [Ledbetter, DG, Mar. 26, 2015]

person(s) without education
experience

“communities of interest” [Kurrus, DG, May 14, 2015]

white people

“simplifying the relationship between the [LREA] and the
district” [Kurrus, DG, Aug. 11, 2015]

cutting benefits from teacher
contract

“the unexpected change” [Ritter, DG, Apr. 22, 2016]

firing of superintendent

“does not have the resources in place” [FA, Vision
2015]

does not allocate funding equally

“traditional rules and regulations” [FA, How We Built a
Statewide Movement]

workplace protection, certification,
and accountability policies

“raked over the coals” [FA, How We Built a Statewide
Movement]

held accountable by voters

“open, honest dialog” [FA, How We Built a Statewide
Movement]

closed-to-the-public dialog

“unintended consequence” [OEP, Impacts of the Public
School Choice Act of 2013]

research-demonstrated predictable
consequence
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board, expansion of charter schools, hiring and firing of administrators) or to the people
involved (e.g., Black students, white families, administrators with no experience in
education). The effect of sanitizing language is that it “extracts every ounce of humanity”
(Bandura, 2016, p. 53) from a description of human interaction or human consequences.
References to the state takeover as a “partnership” [Wilde, DG, Feb. 1, 2015] or
to the proposed state administrative mechanism as an “Achievement School District”
[Cozart, DG, Mar. 10, 2015] disguise the disruptive nature of the dissolution of the
school board and the disfranchisement of Little Rock voters. Table 12 contains a glossary
of sanitized phrases utilized in the sampled discourse from a variety of
individual-, organizational-, and institutional-level actors. Repeated references to Black
marginalization as “racial division” [Barth, DG, Mar. 20, 2015; Marshall, Doe v. DOE],
as opposed to racial oppression or racial marginalization, assert a false equivalency in
which Black people bear at least some responsibility for their own marginalization.
Reticence to even address race at all, by referring to Black students and families as “a
niche” [Wilde, DG, Apr. 16, 2015], “a concerning population” [Smith, DG, Apr. 16,
2015], or “students from low socioeconomic backgrounds who may not be able to afford
to live in higher-achieving districts” [OEP, Impacts of the Public School Choice Act of
2013] could be read as policy actors’ avoidance of acknowledging the racist
consequences of policy actions. Similarly, portraying white business leaders like Key and
Kurrus as “people with different backgrounds who also have certain skills” [Ledbetter,
DG, Mar. 26, 2015] negates the importance of educational expertise. Referring to private,
for-profit contractors who propose to administer schools or districts taken over by the
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state as “nontraditional providers” [Newton, DG, Mar. 10, 2015] sidesteps important
information about these firms.
Five individuals from three policy actor groups co-opted jargon from other fields
and movements in their takeover discourse. Coopted jargon was also evident in the
discourse of three organizations and the Doe opinion. Bandura (2016) called this
approach using the “specialized jargon of a legitimate enterprise” (p. 55) in order to lend
legitimacy to a behavior that, discussed on its own terms, seems undesirable. In other
words, and primarily in this case, talking about education with the language of business
instead of the language of education. Policy actors in Little Rock frequently deployed (a)
the language of business, including efficiency, risk, and innovation; and (b) the language
of civil rights, although admittedly to a lesser degree than I expected. In discussing issues
such as teacher pay and benefits, school closure, and district governance, Kurrus said his
goal was to make the district “a lean organization” [DG, Apr. 2, 2015]. The impending
conclusion of state desegregation funding after the district was declared unitary (or fully
desegregated), meant an annual loss to the district of nearly $40 million. “It’s possible to
be nimble, lean, agile, efficient and energized in a small organization with dedicated
people” [Kurrus, DG, Apr. 10, 2015]. In addition to the health metaphors and the
obligation to fiscal austerity, the corollary of such an argument is that teacher benefits,
neighborhood schools, and building-level administrators are equivalent to fat and
lethargy, hindering the district’s agility at coping with the loss of desegregation funds.
This displaces responsibility for cuts onto the financial circumstances of the district,
because being in financial distress is not an option. From a moral disengagement
perspective, it is not the case that there were better metaphors to use, or more favorable
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alternatives to corporate rhetoric. The alternative is blunt honesty and mea culpa—that
Kurrus is choosing to make cuts (as opposed to, say, proposing a millage increase),
choosing where to make cuts, and choosing where not to make cuts. The situation may
not warrant symbolic language.
Organizational-level uses of business jargon included references to risk and
innovation. Forward Arkansas, a public-private partnership organization created to craft a
plan and platform for public education in Arkansas in the wake of the state takeover,
described their genesis as “a story of taking risks when the rewards are uncertain, of
challenging the status quo in innovative ways, and expanding networks to create a vision
for statewide change” [FA, How We Built a Statewide Movement]. In their first
publication, which announced their purpose to the public, they declared deregulation as
one of their goals: “Streamline the regulatory burden for educators at all levels (including
the Arkansas Department of Education) to reduce complexity [and] encourage a shift
from a compliance mindset to a performance-driven mindset” [FA, Vision 2015]. In this
discourse, education reform might be seen as a movement to throw off the shackles of
government regulation, many of which concern professional standards, education of
children with special needs, and protections for students of color and students from
families of low SES. The University of Arkansas Office for Education Policy advocated
for the creation of the Achievement School District with similar business-related
terminology: “The creation of the Achievement School District could allow for flexibility
at the school level to best meet student needs while leveraging the efficiency, expertise
and collaboration of centralized support” [OEP, Achievement School District].
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Other instances of coopting the jargon of legitimate enterprise (Bandura, 2016)
related to racial equality and civil rights are evident in the editorial page of the DemocratGazette:
Closing the racial gap in student achievement is a top priority in Little Rock.
Almost everyone agrees on that. The eStem [charter] school has proven its
academic excellence. Of the more than 6,000 students on the waiting list, almost
two-thirds are African Americans. Those who want a better educational
opportunity for minority students should want eStem to expand. [Editor, DG,
Mar. 10, 2016]
The history of the editorial page’s antagonism toward Black leaders in Little Rock,
including state Senator Joyce Elliott [Editor, DG, May 17, 2016] and attorney and State
Representative John Walker [Editor, DG, Feb. 1, 2015] as race-baiters and advocates of a
dismal status quo make this appeal a departure from its typical rhetoric. The persuasive
purpose of such language must be critically considered in light of this trend. The D-G
Editor also invoked the (omnipresent) legacy of the Little Rock Central High School
desegregation crisis in defense of expanding enrollment at a charter school that serves a
disproportionately large number of white students:
Imagine an African American leader and politician using the 1957 Little Rock
Crisis to keep black kids from going to better schools. Fact: There are waiting
lists to get into Little Rock’s very public charter schools, some of them thousands
of names long. One in particular stands out: the list to get into eStem, which is
6,000 names long. And two-thirds of them black kids. [Editor, DG, May 17,
2016]
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White policy actors thus deployed a range of rationalizations and representations of their
actions that fit the descriptive framework of moral disengagement at the behavior locus.
The supposed effect of these mechanisms is to make the behavior not only appear
necessary, but appear desirable and moral course of action (Bandura, 1999).
Agency locus. Policy actors who use mechanisms within the agency locus are
addressing responsibility for behaviors that have already occurred, not rationalizing
future behaviors. In addition to the contemporary behaviors of takeover, hiring/firing of
administrators, charter expansion, and school closure and construction, some enduring
circumstances addressed by policy actors include low student achievement levels in the
district, school board performance, funding decreases, and segregation in schools. Other
agents invoked include past school boards, financial mandates, the governor, the state
commissioner of education, the state board of education, the Arkansas Constitution,
Arkansas law, and the General Assembly.
Diffusion. Diffusion of responsibility distributes responsibility for a harmful act
among the larger group. To diffuse responsibility for harmful policies or actions, policy
actors use (a) group decision making, the refuge of the majority common in democratic
societies; (b) division of labor, the specialization of work and an appeal to the
determinism of organizational hierarchy; and (c) collective action, which is either a
behavior so widespread that blaming an individual is unfair, or a behavior in which
multiple people participated. When responsibility is dispersed among large groups or
throughout institutions, individuals ostensibly escape culpability. I identified instances of
this approach at all three levels of discourse (i.e., individual, organizational, and
institutional), and across a range of different individual- and organizational-level actors.
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Table 13
Moral Disengagement: Diffusion
Sub-mechanism
Group decision
Division of labor
Collective action

Individual (n)
Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (6)
Politicians (2)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (3)
Politicians (2)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (3)
Politicians (2)
Advocates (1)
Educators (1)

Organizational

Institutional

Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas

-

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE
Code (Choice)

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group
who utilized a given mechanism at least once.

Ten policy actors from three different policy actor groups, as well as two
organizational-level actors, pointed to group decision making to diffuse responsibility for
takeover-related actions (see Table 13). In contrast to a displacement of responsibility
onto a specific other group, diffusion by group decision making has the effect of clouding
who the real decision maker is. State board member Vicki Saviers appeals to two groups,
an informal group with an apparent consensus regarding the current state of affairs, and a
formal group with more thinking to do:
It seems that everyone we heard from agreed that the status quo is not acceptable.
Under the law, the state board has many options for addressing schools that are in
academic distress. I think it is appropriate that the full board be able to carefully
consider all those options. [Saviers, DG, Jan. 9, 2015]
This could be simply an appeal to democratic processes, but because Saviers selects
which decisions from the consensus she accepts and which decisions she assigns to the
state board, it is more artful than that. She accepts the group decision from “everyone”
that change is needed but does not mention the considerable public opposition to the
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takeover solution. That decision she leaves to the state board. The rhetorical effect is to
present whatever decision the state board makes as an endorsed action by the people at
large. Jim Ross made a similar appeal: “I think we need to get everyone at the table on
this” [Ross, DG, Jan. 9, 2015]. The effect of these mechanisms is to broaden the scope of
who has the franchise as it relates to governance of the LRSD. Such broadening amplifies
the voices of well-resourced interest groups and muffles the voices of the voting majority
(Morel, 2016).
Arkansas Times Editor Max Brantley, who supported takeover at the time of the
excerpt below, displaced responsibility onto those masses of white people who choose
not to live in a majority Black city:
The Little Rock School District (which is not allowed to share in westward city
growth) almost certainly has a majority black population. It has a majority black
school age population. They are majority impoverished. Fact: Many middle
income white people don’t want to live in geographic areas with majority poor
minority populations. [Brantley, AT, Jan. 8, 2015]
This point is made in criticism of white flight and the people who participate in it, but its
effect is still to diffuse responsibility for racial inequality in Little Rock onto unnamed
white individuals, instead of on policymakers.
For former LRSD board president Greg Adams, those who remain in the city
(“the business community,” a reliably white constituency) have deliberated and
concluded that the takeover is necessary:
I know many in the business community have spent long years in deep study of
the district and some of them even have entrusted their children to the schools.
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Many have concluded after long and fraught effort…that massive change is
necessary. [Adams, DG, Jan. 25, 2015, emphasis added]
Adams also invoked the diffuse consensus that the status quo in Little Rock is
unacceptable. On January 25, 2015 (the publication date of this quotation), Adams was
president of a still-extant school board, speaking in opposition to the board’s dissolution
and state takeover of the district. In this excerpt, though, he seems to concede to an
immutable force—the wishes of the business community. Additionally, he appears to
legitimize their position by applauding some of them for deigning to send their children
to public schools.
Nine individuals from three policy actor groups and two organizational-level
policy actors appealed to division of labor to avoid responsibility for takeover. Leading
up to the takeover vote, LRSD board member Jim Ross appeared to diffuse responsibility
for district performance further down the organizational chart: “These folks on the
ground know what needs to be done” [Ross, DG, Jan. 9, 2015]. His intent might have
been to democratize the improvement process by yielding to the professionals at the core
of teaching and learning. But his focus on classroom- and building-level decision making
neglected (a) the policy questions that led to inequity—in funding, staffing, resourcing,
and so forth—between schools (Lee, 2012), (b) the zoning decisions that determine
school attendance (McDermott, 2007; Mintrop & Trujillo, 2005), and (c) the
accountability mechanisms that put schools at risk for takeover in the first place. In other
words, by shifting talk of solutions to the voting public, and ignoring the policy actions
that created the problem, he reframed the problem as a collective failure, which is
diffusion of responsibility.
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The day before the takeover vote, in a defense of the teachers’ union, civil rights
litigators, and the LRSD board members, Arkansas Times Editor Max Brantley implied
further teacher-blaming for the state of the district: “Please remember that these staffing
decisions are NOT the work of the hated teachers’ union, John Walker, or the School
Board. They are administrative responsibilities. And state oversight failed, too”
[Brantley, AT, Jan. 27, 2015]. Brantley’s point here was not about policy; it was about
who is responsible for not firing bad teachers, with the implied solution of turning to a
governance structure in which teachers are held accountable. This diffused responsibility
for inequity among the teacher corps and exonerated policymakers.
After the takeover, once Baker Kurrus was appointed superintendent, he
attempted to realign expectations of the superintendent’s role: “I found out the hard way
that everybody thinks I’m the answer man, and that’s not the way an organization should
work” [Kurrus, DG, May 15, 2015]. In this instance, Kurrus diffused responsibility
among the district-level administrators and building leaders figuring out post-takeover
instruction and leadership plans. In another instance, he diffused responsibility up the
chain of command to his superiors:
I have a lot of front line experience and knowledge and access to facts that most
people don’t have, so I’ll have strong opinions—but I don’t act on those. It’s not
for me to decide things that are policy-related. The superintendent is an executive
role, not a policymaker, and there’s a huge difference. [Kurrus, AT, Aug. 20,
2015]
The district’s division of labor itself was diffuse in 2015. These appeals to the
organizational chart of district governance were made in a context in which the
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policymaking body—the school board—had been dissolved by the state. In place of the
board was a single individual—the state commissioner—and Kurrus was a newly
appointed superintendent whose immediate predecessor had been fired.
Ten different policy actors from all five policy actor groups, as well as all three
organizational-level actors, and both institutional-level source used collective action to
diffuse responsibility for harmful policies. LRSD board member Jim Ross made early
efforts at collaboration, even before the takeover vote occurred: “Together, we can fix
this.…There is no way the state is going to be able to do this alone. There’s no way we
can do this alone” [Ross, DG, Jan. 9, 2015]. His assertion was that, even if the state took
over the district, they would still need district-level cooperation to turn around the
district. This initial effort at district-state collaboration was considerably more positive
than later appeals from Ross, which focused on the collective misdeeds of others:
“Perhaps most importantly, the existing system has evolved to concentrate poor kids into
‘segregated academies’ that tend to lack highly qualified teachers and administrators,
creating ‘dysfunctional learning environments’” [Ross, AT, Jan. 26, 2015]. This version
of Little Rock’s history of inequity diffused responsibility throughout “the system,” with
no specific perpetrators at fault.
Former LRSD board president Greg Adams avoided diffusing responsibility for
the district’s history to an impersonal “system” by diffusing responsibility to every
person in the district except students:
The temptation regarding the state takeover is to tell a simple narrative with one
party being the “bad guy.” I suggest resisting a simple narrative. The district
would not have been at risk for takeover (a decision with which I disagree) if we
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had not underperformed. In various ways, we all underperformed—the Board,
superintendents (plural), administrators, teachers, the union, the business
community, and parents. [Adams, AT, Apr. 18, 2015]
The inclusion of parents in Adams’s narrative of past district performance is problematic,
because it implies he is blaming lack of parent engagement (which is a racist dog-whistle
because it places affluent white norms of parent involvement onto non-affluent and nonwhite parents; Cooper, 2009). Other diffusions of responsibility among parents are more
specific: “The proposed expansion is largely a response to the high demand for the
schools. …6,410 students submitted applications…to enroll in what is now a 1,462student eStem system school for the 2016-17 school year” [Bacon, DG, Feb. 20, 2016].
This explanation for the decline of district performance comes in the form of a plea for
expansion of eStem, from the head of the school, John Bacon. The collective action here
is mass parent choice to enroll in eStem, a charter school, placing responsibility for
declining enrollment and funding at LRSD schools onto the market, or parents, instead of
on policymakers.
The Editor of the Democrat-Gazette diffused responsibility among the same
constituency, but more explicitly than Bacon did:
Because those families know what’s good. They see other kids in these charter
schools, talk with other parents about how charters are changing public
education—for the much better—and see the excitement in the eyes of all
involved. And they want in. [Editor, DG, Mar. 10, 2016]
In the Editor’s narrative, parents were not only choosing charter schools, they were
choosing other districts. Importantly, however, these were not just any parents:
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Before the state took over, Little Rock’s district was losing families of means.
Parents looked around, saw the schools failing, and decided they could do
something about it, if only for their children. They chose private schools. Or they
sold the house and moved to Cabot or Bryant. At least those who could afford it
did. [Editor, DG, May 17, 2016, emphasis added]
Policy actors creatively dispersed agency for the takeover amongst the crowd, which is
easy in a democracy, but they also displaced it onto other specific actors and institutions,
which is more akin to blaming.
Displacement. Displacement of responsibility shifts responsibility for a harmful
act to another individual, group, or institution. To displace responsibility for harmful
policies or actions, policy actors use (a) obligation through a sense of duty or personal
responsibility; and (b) indirect permission through willful ignorance or distance from the
action. I identified instances of this approach in individual, organizational, and
institutional discourse.
Table 14
Moral Disengagement: Displacement
Sub-mechanism
Obligation

Indirect permission

Individual (n)
Journalists (4)
Bureaucrats (12)
Politicians (4)
Advocates (2)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (3)
Advocates (2)

Organizational

Institutional

Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Arkansas Learns

Code

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group
who utilized a given mechanism at least once.

Eighteen individuals from four policy groups, as well as two organizational-level
actors, utilized the appeal to obligation (see Table 14). Judge Marshall also used this
mechanism in his Doe opinion. Policy actors claimed obligation to the law and to
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precedent to displace responsibility for takeover-related actions. In these cases, policy
actors displaced responsibility for the takeover onto other lawmakers, policymakers, and
officeholders. For example, in state commissioner Johnny Key’s language, the takeover
seemed almost preordained: “The state takeover of the Little Rock School District was in
direct fulfillment of previous Arkansas Supreme Court decisions and a constitutional duty
to the district’s students” [Key, DG, Apr. 10, 2015].
Columnist Brummett wrote that in the case of Little Rock, state law not only
permitted district takeover, it compelled it: “A state law exists giving the state board the
authority, indeed the responsibility, to take control in such cases” [Brummett, DG, Jan. 8,
2015]. Brummett’s position went further than state takeover in cases of financial or
academic distress: “As written in the state Constitution and embraced by the Arkansas
Supreme Court … public education is the responsibility of state government—not the
collective local board members and the local voters who install them” [Brummett, DG,
Jan. 22, 2015]. Here Brummett noted the supremacy of state prerogative over that of local
school boards: “Local control is a bogus notion. The state Constitution makes adequate
and equitable educational opportunity the statewide responsibility of state government”
[Brummett, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]. After the state supreme court affirmed the
constitutionality of the takeover, in Curry v. Key (2015), the governor made the same
statement of state superiority in ensuring equity at the local level:
A decision to end local control is always a difficult one. But in the case of the
Little Rock district, the Supreme Court found that the state board operated within
its statutory authority. Now, you know I believe in local flexibility and local
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governance and responsibility, but the state has the responsibility—the Supreme
Court affirmed that today. [Hutchinson, DG, Oct. 30, 2015]
State law regarding takeover was not the only authority to which policy actors
claimed obligation. Policy actors also invoked commitment to precedent or to how others
acted in similar situations in their takeover discourse. State board chairman Sam
Ledbetter argued that the purpose of the LRSD school board was to support the
superintendent:
You’ve got to have a board that supports the leader. The board can’t be going in
eight different directions and second-guessing everything. At some point you
chart a course, and your leader executes that course…and the LRSD has struggled
in getting to that point. [Ledbetter, AT, Jan. 22, 2015]
This directly contradicts the division-of-labor interpretation of the superintendent’s
responsibility, excerpted above, in which the board makes policy and the superintendent
executes that policy. Ledbetter encouraged deference to appointed executives over local
representatives in the case of takeover, as well as in the unilateral appointment of a new
superintendent by the state commissioner: “State takeovers of other school districts—
such as in the Pulaski County Special School District—have proceeded in a similar
manner” [Ledbetter, AT, May 9, 2015].
Eight policy actors from three actor groups, one organizational-level actor, and
one institutional-level actor also pointed to indirect permission to displace responsibility
for takeover-related actions. Bandura (2016) referred to indirect authorization of harmful
acts as “surreptitious sanctioning,” (p. 59). There was suspicion among the liberal policy
actors that the public-private partnership Forward Arkansas was an example of such
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surreptitious activity, funded by the Walton Family Foundation to influence education
policy with the appearance of bipartisanship and consensus. Arkansas Times reporter
Benji Hardy explained,
After the state board took over the LRSD in January, many began looking closely
at ForwardAR, the partnership between the Walton Family Foundation and the
Winthrop Rockefeller Foundation to create a strategic plan for Arkansas public
education in contract with the state’s Education Department. Because the Walton
Foundation has supported efforts elsewhere to turn over public schools to private
charter management organizations, ForwardAR’s involvement with the state was
received with much suspicion by advocates of the LRSD—especially when it was
announced ForwardAR would contract with the Boston Consulting Group, an
organization that’s recommended privatization of public schools in Memphis,
Philadelphia, and elsewhere. [Hardy, AT, Mar. 27, 2015]
Bandura (2016) identified types of indirect authorization such as implicit agreements and
willful ignorance that are difficult to identify because they require divining the unstated
intentions of specific policy actors. Still they enable plausible deniability on the part of
those who employ them, and the influence of the Walton Family Foundation and Forward
Arkansas on education policy in Little Rock gives opponents of market-based reforms a
convenient villain on which to displace responsibility for those reforms.
The advocacy organization Arkansas Learns proposed a number of accompanying
policies that they claimed would make the takeover successful. Among them were the
following recommendations:
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Close, consolidate proximate schools which are significantly under capacity. Sell,
lease excess property. Convert, construct secondary schools where none exist to
retain, attract students back to district. Redraw attendance zones of each school,
correlating proximity equity and capacity of the school. [AL, Jan. 25, 2015]
One type of indirect authorization Bandura (2016) identified is the “insulating social
arrangement” (p. 61), in which policy actors maintain plausible deniability by displacing
responsibility onto subordinates through policies or other organizational processes. The
policy proposals from Arkansas Learns could be considered such policies, in which the
new concept of “proximity equity” is introduced as the motivation for school closures,
construction, and rezoning. Such a policy would mandate closure, construction, and
rezoning, which have traditionally favored affluent, white communities and marginalized
Black and Brown communities (T. L. Green, 2017; Siegel-Hawley, Bridges, & Shields,
2017), based on all children’s supposed right to have a school near their home, which is a
race-neutral factor.
There were other examples of surreptitious sanctioning more explicitly outlined in
state law: “Student’s transportation and the costs of the transportation shall be the
responsibility of the parent or guardian” [Arkansas Code Annotated §6-18-227]. In this
example from the state school choice law, transportation is deemed the responsibility of
the parent. Lack of transportation is a common reason families are unable to send their
children to charter schools, since access to private transportation, proximity to public
transportation, inflexible work schedules, and longer distance from school all
disproportionately affect Black and Brown families from low SES communities (Logan
& Burdick-Will, 2016). With this policy, charter schools benefit by skimming from the
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applicant pool only those students from families who can afford or manage their own
transportation, while claiming their enrollment is by random lottery.
The benefit of market-based reforms for those who wish to displace responsibility
for their effects is that the “invisible hand,” or consumer demand, is always the agent. In
the case of charter schools, outcomes like resegregation, depletion of public school
enrollment, and transfer of state funding to private entities, are not the result of policies,
but of the market. Gary Newton, a Walton-funded advocate for school choice claimed
exactly this in an op-ed in the Democrat-Gazette:
Messrs. Adams and Ledbetter claim to “know these charter schools have taken
achieving students out of the LRSD.” Charters do not take students from school
districts, as students do not belong to districts or charters. Taxpaying parents/
guardians of students choose where to send their students to school [Newton, DG,
Feb. 18, 2016].
If the students do not belong to the district, then it follows that the district has no
responsibility to serve them. Taxpaying parents is also an immigration dog-whistle, since
all parents are tax-payers except those who may be undocumented. And choosing where
to send your kid to school is an exercise of privilege. Not all parents are able to choose,
either because they cannot afford the uniforms, are not aware of the choices, cannot
transport their children to and from school because of work, or their children’s behavior
records do not comport with charter schools’ codes of conduct.
Outcome locus. Outcomes at play in the takeover discourse include disorder
among district leadership, disfranchisement of Black citizens, increased achievement
gaps, increased white enrollment in the district, and further segregation of schools. Each
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of these outcomes has a marginalizing effect on Black students, families, and
communities. Recall from Chapter 1 that in the case of Little Rock, school choice
initiatives such as vouchers and charter schools have resulted in the proliferation of
charter schools with enrollments disproportionate to the racial distribution of students in
the city. It is reasonable to expect that policy actors know this, as it was discussed in
meetings of the state board in consideration of charter renewals and expansions [Howell,
DG, Feb. 20, 2016], discussed in the news media [Brummett, DG, Jan. 5, 2015; Editor,
DG, Feb. 17, 2015], and cited as fact in Judge Marshall’s opinion in Doe v. DOE.
Therefore, in discourses related to these outcomes, from Bandura’s (2016) perspective it
is plausible that they would employ mechanisms of moral disengagement to distance
themselves from these outcomes. Where outcomes are concerned, disengagement takes
the form of dismissal of outcomes—through outright denial that the outcomes occurred;
distortion of their effects by minimizing or otherwise misconstruing their severity; or
disregard of the outcomes by ignoring or maintaining distance. I found examples of
denial, distortion, and disregard at all three levels of discourse in Little Rock.
Denial. Individuals from all five policy actor groups, all three organizational-level
actors, and one institutional-level actor issued denials of takeover-related outcomes such
as discrimination against Black students [Newton, DG, Aug. 14, 2015], intent to charterize the district post-takeover [Ledbetter, DG, Feb. 1, 2015], and increased segregation of
schools due to charters [Ritter, DG, Sep. 29, 2015]. When policy actors deny the
consequences of their actions, and believe the denial, self-exoneration appears
unnecessary.
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Table 15
Moral Disengagement: Dismissal
Sub-mechanism
Denial

Distortion

Disregard

Individual (n)
Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (3)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (3)
Educators (2)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (8)
Politicians (3)
Educators (2)
Journalists (8)
Bureaucrats (7)
Politicians (4)
Advocates (3)
Educators (2)

Organizational

Institutional

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Arkansas Learns
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE
Code (Choice)

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group who utilized
a given mechanism at least once.

Following the takeover vote, State Board Chair Sam Ledbetter (a Democratic
appointee with a liberal reputation) responded to accusations that the state intended to
charterize the entire district (i.e., convert all schools to charter schools managed by
independent firms), saying, “That's the very last thing I would support—my record there
is clear” [Ledbetter, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]. One month later, white Republican Bruce
Cozaart introduced HB 1755 in the General Assembly to do just that. Ledbetter (who, as
chair of the State Board, cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of takeover) said then, “My
thought process would have been different had this bill been pending at the time”
[Ledbetter, Mar. 12, 2015]. Essentially, had he suspected this would be the outcome, the
takeover would not have occurred. He continued, saying that from his vantage point in
the state Board, proceedings concerning the takeover of LRSD were not deliberated with
a plan to turn over distressed schools to charters.
This is not anything that I had in mind. It wasn’t anything that I wasn’t aware of,
it hadn’t been discussed with me. It wasn’t any…you know, a lot of people I think
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feel like there was this grand scheme all along. If there was a grand scheme to
takeover Little Rock so we could put in an achievement district, or whatever this
is, nobody let me in on it. [Ledbetter, AT, Mar. 12, 2015]
Whether Ledbetter’s initial denial arose from his own lack of familiarity with the
governor’s education agenda, from naiveté toward the ultimate aims of reformists in
Little Rock, or sincere belief that neither the governor nor the reformists intended a
district-wide charter-ization, his denial still served as a self-exoneration for the role his
tie-breaking vote for takeover played in the charter-ization effort.
Another common example of denial concerned the segregating effects of charter
schools on the district. The Democrat-Gazette’s editorial page Editor, as well as Gary
Newton of Arkansas Learns and John Ritter of the University of Arkansas Office for
Education Policy (both Walton-funded pro-charter organizations) issued the most direct
denials. “There is just no basis to allege that charters are causing racial segregation of the
Little Rock public schools. It’s just plain silly” [Ritter, DG, Sep. 29, 2015]. Ritter’s
certainty is striking, since there is evidence that charters have an effect on enrollment
proportionality by race in school districts (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Scott & Quinn, 2014).
Regardless of the effects of charter school enrollment, charter school proponents still
claimed any racially disparate effects were random: “Some claim eStem and other charter
schools skim the best students. But since admissions are done by random lottery, it is
impossible for the school to pick which students get accepted” [Editor, DG, Mar. 10,
2016]. This argument goes beyond diffusion and displacement of responsibility,
discussed previously, in which any racially disparate effects are attributed to the market
and/or the policy. By denying racially disparate effects of supposed “blind open
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enrollment” [Newton, DG, Feb. 18, 2016], policy actors render diffusing or displacing
responsibility unnecessary.
Distortion. Individuals from four policy actor groups, two organizational-level
actors, and both institutional-level actors distorted the outcomes of takeover-related
actions by either minimizing the extent of the harm caused by those actions or by
misconstruing the outcomes themselves.
Minimization. Tony Wood, who was the state commissioner of education at the
time of the takeover, attempted to soften the blow of the takeover vote just minutes after
it occurred: “The buses will run, lunch will be served, and children will learn. We can use
the semantics of state takeover or whatever, but fundamentally, this is about governance.
School will go on successfully” [Wood, AT, Jan. 28, 2015]. Wood’s statement referred to
the everyday functioning of schools, as if parent and community opposition to the
takeover was about daily operations and not democratic governance. Such minimization
of the disruptive nature of dissolving the school board makes opposition seem like an
overreaction. The D-G Editor made the same argument. The use of the word “just” in the
excerpt below is ironic, given the gravity of the situation:
It’s just that the school board has been disbanded. The superintendent, Dr. Dexter
Suggs, has been retained. The buses will still run in the mornings and afternoons.
Math classes and pop quizzes will still be a part of the regular school day. And
expect graduation ceremonies to be right on time. [Editor, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]
Even though the Editor had no authority announcing everything would be continuing as
normal, the immediate response in the aftermath of the vote was to calm fears, to
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minimize the harm done. This editorial impulse seems to run counter to the notion that
the purpose of the takeover was to prevent things from continuing as normal.
Displaced LRSD Board President Greg Adams employed similar minimization of
the gravity of the takeover by dismissing the importance of the lawsuits filed against it,
saying he “personally would not favor being part of a court battle that would take away
from the focus on students” [Adams, DG, Jan. 29, 2015]. Two lawsuits were filed, one by
Black families in the LRSD who claimed the takeover was discriminatory, and another by
former members of the school board claiming the state overstepped its authority. The
implication in Adams’s comment was that these lawsuits did not represent the interests of
students, a point State Commissioner Johnny Key made more explicit: “It is premature to
comment on the veracity of the claims made in the lawsuit. This we do know: Student
learning occurs in the classroom, not the courtroom” [Key, DG, Oct. 9, 2015]. Key’s
assertion connects back to Wood’s initial attempt to reassure parents at the time of the
takeover vote that everything at the school and classroom level would continue as
normal, unaffected by policymakers and the courts.
Misconstrual. Policy actors misconstrue outcomes by exaggerating them, partially
reporting them, or misrepresenting them altogether. Consider the following
representation of teacher quality in LRSD, from the D-G editor:
Hard as it is to believe, in the past 20 years, one (1) teacher has been fired by the
school board for poor performance, according to its superintendent. Over the past
twenty years. Sure, not all teachers might appeal their firing to the full school
board. But if you were the boss of a widget factory, and that factory was failing
and flailing at every turn, and for years at that, and you had fired one (1) widget-

132

maker over that time for poor performance, what kind of businessman would you
be? Answer: not a very good one. [Editor, DG, Jan. 28, 2015]
This accusation casts the board as unresponsive or negligent, since one might expect
many more teacher firings from a district in academic distress (“failing and flailing at
every turn”). However, with only six of 48 schools below the state threshold for academic
distress, the district is not in such dire straits as the Editor claims. More importantly,
however, is that the school board does not fire teachers; principals do.
The Editor alludes to this in an aside but proceeds to use the single firing as the
basis of the argument anyway. Only teachers who had appealed the decision of their
principal would have their dismissal placed before the school board, but the Editor does
not offer numbers of teachers who have been dismissed by principals, much less the
number who might have been encouraged to retire, switch to a school that is a better fit,
or voluntarily leave the district. The Editor’s exaggeration and partial reporting of data
makes the school board appear inept, and thus culpable for the takeover themselves.
In the past decade, the district has lost 1,599 white students. And more than 1,200
black students. …The district doesn’t have just White Flight, but now Black
Flight, and as families of other kids begin to learn how poorly their kids are being
educated, how long until Asian Flight, Hispanic Flight and Everybody Else
Flight? [Editor, DG, Jan. 28, 2015].
Importantly, the number of Black students who had left the district constituted 7.6% of
the total population of Black students in LRSD. The percentage of white students, on the
other hand, was 35.1% (Little Rock School District, 2015). This means that white
students had left the district—either for other districts, for charter schools, or for private
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schools—at five times the rate of Black students. To present them as parallel events is an
exaggeration that disguises the degree to which white enrollment in charters contributes
to resegregation.
Nathan Jensen, a faculty member at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,
made two contradictory claims in an op-ed about charter schools and integration. His
central assertion was that charters “are helping rather than hindering racial desegregation
efforts in traditional public schools” [Jensen, DG, Sep. 29, 2015], because white charter
enrollees come mostly from schools with disproportionately high white enrollment, and
Black and Brown charter enrollees come mostly from schools with disproportionately
high Black and Brown enrollment. But he also claimed that:
The number of students transferring to charter schools from schools in Pulaski
County is insignificant compared to the total number of students in Pulaski
County. …It seems unlikely that this small number [less than 7 percent] would
significantly impact racial integration. [Jensen, Sep. 29, 2015]
Either charter transfers help desegregation, as in Jensen’s first claim, or they have no
impact, as in his second claim. If one claim is true, to suggest both are true is
misconstrual of the other. Jensen continued:
Restrictions on charter school enrollment in Pulaski County would be detrimental
to minority students who are more likely to enroll in charter schools than their
white peers and who are more likely to come from families without the economic
means to attend private schools or those in more affluent settings. [Jensen, Sep.
29, 2015]
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This statement does not square with the earlier claim from the Democrat-Gazette Editor
that more white students than Black students have left the district for charters in the last
10 years.
Disregard. Individuals from all five policy actor groups, all three organizationallevel actors, and one institutional-level actor disregarded the outcomes of takeoverrelated reforms by either ignoring them, being selectively inattentive, or maintaining
plausible deniability through distance from the action itself.
Ignoring. Ignoring differs from denial in that a policy actor, rather than denying
an outcome, fails to address the outcome. The question of intent in the act of ignoring
(i.e., whether the policy actor deliberately failed to mention an outcome or take it into
account) is at the center of the concept of unconscious racism and the discriminatory
intent requirement in Washington v. Davis and subsequent rulings, including the Marshall
opinion in Doe v. DOE at the center of the Little Rock case. In light of my own critical
positionality and the critical race paradigm in which I have situated this study, I make no
distinction between intentional and unintentional omission of facts. Take, for instance,
columnist John Brummett’s comparison of the Little Rock takeover and the Pulaski
County takeover:
In the Pulaski County Special School District, state takeover has led to
improvements that would not have been made as expeditiously, if at all, under the
constraints of local board politics. The state-run county district has a plan for
dealing with the imminent loss of special state desegregation money. The Little
Rock district? Not so much. The school board keeps getting in the way.
[Brummett, DG, Jan. 22, 2015]
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This comparison ignores several important differences between the two districts. First,
PCSSD is majority white and LRSD is majority Black, so the racial disfranchisement of a
takeover by majority white state policy actors is not as pronounced. Second, PCSSD was
taken over due to fiscal distress, and LRSD was takeover due to academic distress. It
could be argued that the implications for leadership and instruction are less complex in
cases of district fiscal distress. Third, municipalities within the PCSSD have begun to
split from the district to create city districts of their own, and there is no such splintering
occurring in LRSD. Indeed, the current boundaries of PCSSD were the result of courtordered integration, and the impact of this boundary on the racial makeup of LRSD has
been the subject of litigation since the 1970s (Baer, 2008; Jordan, 2017; Shukur &
Walker, 2017). These are important differences that Brummett’s comparison ignores
when he advocates takeover as a panacea.
Selective inattention. The difference between ignoring and selective inattention is
that an ignored outcome may go unmentioned, but a selectively attended outcome may go
partially addressed such that the omission benefits the policy actor. Consider Attorney
General Leslie Rutledge’s argument about whether the takeover was discriminatory
against Black students and families: “The state Board’s assumption of the authority of the
LRSD board affected the entire district. Its action equally affected all students, parents
and members of the LRSD board, regardless of race or other classification” [Rutledge,
DG, Feb. 11, 2016]. Rutledge avoids saying there were no negative outcomes of the
takeover; her point is that whatever negative outcomes there might have been equally
affected all students and families in the district. This is acknowledgement that negative
impacts are possible, but selective inattention to the ways in which policies like takeover
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(Morel, 2016; Oluwole & Green, 2009), school choice (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Scott &
Quinn, 2014), and funding formulas (Adamson & Darling-Hammond, 2012; Alemán,
2007) have racially disparate negative impacts.
Not surprisingly, another policy area in which selective inattention to negative
outcomes is charter schools. In the debate over whether to increase the enrollment caps of
the two largest (and whitest) charter networks in Little Rock, Superintendent Baker
Kurrus and others noted that such continued expansions were creating parallel school
systems more akin to districts, not just singular schools, to compete with LRSD for
enrollment. The Editor of the Democrat-Gazette disagreed with the comparison:
Not a great analogy for somebody of Mr. Kurrus’ knowledge and experience.
Mostly because charter schools are all independent. They aren’t a part of a
system; eStem and, say, LISA Academy aren’t connected. There is no parallel
school system, as Joyce Elliott complains, because there’s only one system, and
another group of unconnected charter schools. Unlike a parallel school system,
these charter schools compete with each other for students. [Editor, DG, May 17,
2016]
The Editor’s argument is technically true, since most charters are single-school entities.
However, several charter organizations near LRSD offer K-8 or K-12 options for students
through a network of several schools. For example, Exalt Education has two elementary
schools and one middle school. LiSA and eStem are both K-12 systems with six and three
schools, respectively. And Quest middle and Premier high school are part of a national
network of dozens of schools. These networks are independent of each other, but they
also exist as parallel K-8/K-12 systems alongside each other and LRSD. Since this basic

137

knowledge about these charter organizations was not acknowledged by the Editor, it is
plausible that it was selectively ignored.
Distance from action. When policy actors claim to be so removed from an action
that they are unaware of its outcomes, they are able to rationalize ignorance of those
outcomes. Distance can have many meanings, such as the passage of time since an action
or the policy actor’s level of direct involvement in an action. This type of dismissal could
also be applied to many instances of diffusion and displacement of responsibility. For
example, displacement of responsibility further up or down the organizational hierarchy
also creates distance between the policy actor and the outcome. Displaced LRSD Board
President Greg Adams calls for calm in the aftermath of the takeover vote:
It has been a short time, less than three weeks, since the takeover and
disappointments and anger understandably continue to be fresh and felt deeply.
For the good of the students, however, I believe our efforts are best served by a
focus on where we are today and where we’re going. Clearly, there is much that is
uncertain and that is anxiety-producing for many, if not all, of us. I am certainly
anxiously waiting and watching for the directions that will be taken for the LRSD.
Patient engagement is not an easy task, but I believe it is the one we have.
[Adams, AT, Feb. 16, 2015]
This effort at reassurance and galvanization on Adams’s part could amount to a form of
presentism, or dismissal of past harms in order to “move forward” or “get beyond” the
negative outcomes (Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Despite his opposition to the takeover, this
effort to focus on moving forward also amounts to a dismissal of the takeover’s negative
impact, such as disfranchisement and proliferation of school choice policies, which
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continued to affect Black students, families, and leaders, despite Adams’s dismissal of
them. This is tantamount to presentism, a concept from Bonilla-Silva’s (2014) theory of
colorblind racism, in which an actor de-emphasizes the errors of the past in favor of
focusing on the present. The effect of presentism is that individuals’ condition in the
present is without context; without context, differences between people are more easily
assumed to be either inherent or the result of their own behavior.
Victim locus. The people most likely to bear the brunt of the negative impact of
the takeover and takeover-related policies include Black students and families, Black
residents whose interests were represented by their democratically elected school board,
and the members of the board themselves. Recall from Chapter 2 that Black and Brown
students, families, and communities are more negatively impacted by state takeovers
when there is no mechanism for representation in governance (Morel, 2016). Of all the
associated outcomes in the takeover, the most plainly visible and easily communicated is
that members of a majority Black representative body, representing a majority Black
district, were displaced and replaced by a single white commissioner. According to
Bandura (2016), policy actors aware of the optics, or appearance, of such a move could
be expected to blame and dehumanize the members of the board in order to make the
takeover seem as though they either (a) brought it upon themselves, or (b) would not be
as sensitive to its effects as some would expect.
Blame. Policy actors might blame those affected by a policy action by casting
their defense against its consequences as an instigation of the act itself, by painting
themselves as the actual victims of harms perpetrated by the marginalized group, or by
blaming the victims directly through appeals to stereotypes or rationalizations due to
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cultural differences or social conditions (Bandura, 2016). I found examples of victimblaming across four individual-level policy actor groups, and all organizational- and
institutional-level actors (see Table 16).
Table 16
Moral Disengagement: Victim Blaming
Sub-mechanism
Defense as instigation

Self as victim
Victim at fault
Stereotypes
Cultural differences
Social conditions

Individual (n)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (2)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (2)
Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (3)
Advocates (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (5)
Politicians (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (7)
Politicians (1)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (2)
Politicians (2)
Advocates (3)

Organizational

Institutional

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

-

Forward Arkansas

Code (Choice)

Forward Arkansas

Doe v. DOE
Code (Choice)

Forward Arkansas

Code (Choice)

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group
who utilized a given mechanism at least once.

Defense as instigation. Policy actors portray victims as the agents of their own
oppression by presenting their defense against oppression as the cause of the harm. Black
people in Little Rock have faced marginalization and disfranchisement for decades, yet
white policy actors equate Black leaders’ defense against white supremacy as partisan
bickering between two equal sides: “The usual societal, racial and cultural stresses are in
play. Some local blacks see state takeover as an insult contemplated only after the district
became majority black with a majority black school board. Litigation is threatened, of
course” [Brummett, DG, Jan. 22, 2015]. Recall from the beginning of this chapter that
Brummett identified the threat of lawsuits from civil rights attorney John Walker as a
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reason not to take over the district. Here, he again presented civil rights litigation as part
of a suite of “stresses” on politics in Little Rock, which he called “divisive” and
“destructive” [Brummett, DG, Jan. 22, 2015]. Similarly, in conflating Black resistance to
disfranchisement with the academic distress of schools, the Democrat-Gazette Editor
accused Senator Joyce Elliott, a former teacher and prominent Black leader in Little Rock
of defending “the sorry status ever quo in public education” [Editor, DG, Jan. 12, 2015].
After the takeover, the man who cast the deciding takeover vote attributed the
political turmoil to takeover opponents:
The essential challenge is not to lose the local passion that the takeover issue
generated. It is to convince local patrons that the state takeover is not their enemy,
but can become their much more effective friend. That will take political repair. A
lot of times people get so emotional they prefer fiery and destructive rhetoric to
common ground. [Ledbetter, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]
Months later, the state-appointed superintendent compared local opposition to people in a
boat “[paddling] against each other or even [poking] holes in the boat” [Kurrus, DG, Jun.
24, 2015]. His solution: “Get in the boat and paddle in the same direction” [Kurrus, DG,
Jun. 24, 2015]. These portrayals of Black resistance as disagreeableness, instigation, or
sabotage disguise the power imbalance inherent in racial politics in Little Rock, and—by
casting self-defense as provocation—make the marginalized appear to have caused their
own victimization. The Editor of the Democrat-Gazette put this in stark terms: “It seems
the louder opposition to education reform in Little Rock comes prominently from one
corner: the corner of those who no longer call the shots” [Editor, DG, May 17, 2016].
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Self as victim. Another way in which policy actors may blame victims is by
playing the victim themselves. Then the victim becomes the agent, and the harmful
policy appears to be a defense against aggression. For example, school choice advocate
Gary Newton claimed more charter schools were necessary to make up for the work the
district was not doing: “Little Rock School District educates the lowest percentage of its
school-age population of any district in Arkansas” [Newton, DG, Aug. 13, 2015].
Newton suggested LRSD was not doing its fair share, but he failed to mention that there
were more charter schools within the boundaries of LRSD than any other district in the
state (Brantley, 2016a). He also, curiously, made this point while advocating for more
charter schools. This circular logic blames the district for leaving policymakers with no
other choice but to create more seats in charter schools to serve the kids LRSD will not
serve.
Policy actors also claimed that students themselves were the aggressors, either by
having special needs or by simply not caring about school:
In a city like ours where you have wide disparities in income—and income
correlates to student achievement at the earliest grades—we have to deal with
that. That’s a huge reality in our world. …Some private or charter schools don’t
deal with that, but we do. And we don’t run from the challenge. …We feel like
that’s the work that’s calling us every day. [Kurrus, AT, Aug. 20, 2015]
Kurrus’s argument is that school choice results in the district serving a higher proportion
of special needs students, which is true of choice policies nationally (Waitoller et al.,
2017). However, to make this plea is arguably to walk a fine line between advocating for
public schools and blaming students for the district’s performance. Explaining why
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parents leave the district, Kurrus later said, “Parents want their kids to be around other
kids who are on fire to learn” [Kurrus, DG, Nov. 4, 2015]. Here the implication is that
parents suffer because their kids go to school with other kids who do not want to be there
as much as their kids do. Such framing blames other students for forcing parents to leave
the district.
Victim as perpetrator. Victim-as-perpetrator arguments are similar to self-asvictim arguments, in that the victim is the perpetrator in both. However, the policy actor
using the victim-as-perpetrator argument is not the recipient of the harm; the victim is
both perpetrator and perpetrated upon. This mechanism can take three forms. Policy
actors either (a) appeal to stereotypes as the cause of the harm, (b) blame social
conditions for predetermining the self-harm, or (c) claim the behaviors that caused the
harm are the result of cultural differences between the victims and the policy actors.
Stereotypes utilized in this case included that of Black students as at-risk and of
Black families as broken. The morning after the takeover vote, the Democrat-Gazette
Editor attempted a lighthearted inspirational call to arms: “It’s going to take work, caring,
work, late nights, work, uncomfortable meetings and work. And that’s just for the
students. The adults running the show will have to toil even harder” [Editor, DG, Jan. 29,
2015]. The they-brought-it-on-themselves perspective here is understated, but present,
since the Editor appears to be saying that whatever pre-takeover effort students were
putting in will not be sufficient post-takeover. A few days later, however, the Editor was
more explicit:
No doubt a lot of kids do great in Little Rock’s schools, even in the schools the
state labeled as Academically Distressed, especially when those kids have a
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couple of caring parents at home. The problem is that far too many other kids
have done so poorly. [Editor, DG, Feb. 1, 2015]
Now it is students’ parents, who are apparently either single or apathetic, who have
necessitated the takeover.
The Editor of the Arkansas Times, Max Brantley, in criticizing the pro-reform,
pro-charter, pro-takeover bias of the Democrat-Gazette editorial page, nonetheless
appealed to similar tropes:
The page is dictated philosophically by its publisher, school “reform” advocate
Walter Hussman, whose family has darkened the doors of few schools public or
private in Little Rock. But he’s expert enough to be sure that killing teacher
unions, killing the Little Rock School District and otherwise blowing up the
egalitarian public school system with privately run charter schools are the
solutions to education woes. Never mind addressing the root problem—
impoverished, dysfunctional families who’ve yet to be lifted systematically by any
school yet devised, be it KIPP, eStem or a utopian Waltonia. [Brantley, AT, Sep.
17, 2015, emphasis added]
Brantley’s diagnosis also relied on familiar stereotypes to blame families. By describing
the families as impoverished and dysfunctional—as part of a progressive argument
against a conservative editorial page—Brantley failed to identify the policies that have
created poverty and “broken up” families (also a deficit-based assumption, not a fact). He
alluded to a need for systematic lifting up, but his critique still rests on a description of
the families, not the system.
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The use of cultural differences is similar to the use of stereotypes, although they
are somewhat distinct. The distinction I used in my analysis is that while stereotypes are
qualities attributed to whole groups of people, they are presented as surmountable
obstacles for individuals. Cultural differences, however, are presented as characteristics
more essential to a group’s identity. There are not hard and fast differences, and there
was some overlap (i.e., many excerpts were cross-coded as appeals to both stereotypes
and cultural differences). Sometimes, the cultural argument was explicit, as when
columnist John Brummett wrote in opposition to the establishment of the Achievement
School District: “But essentially privatizing an entire urban school district because
culturally challenged enrollments in six of 48 schools are not producing decent test
scores—that is too much” [Brummett, DG, Apr. 23, 2015]. Brummett identified the
culture of the students at the six identified schools as the cause of their performance.
Importantly, he described their culture as not only different, but challenged. Similarly, the
Editor of the Democrat-Gazette implicitly compared the culture of students and families
in Little Rock to the students and families of European immigrants at the turn of the 20th
century: “How ever could that have happened? It happened, in great and decisive part,
because of the American public school system, which accepted no excuses, and refused
to lower its standards for anybody” [Editor, DG, Jan. 12, 2015]. The corollary of this
assertion is that the school system now does accept excuses and lower its standards for
some students.
Appeals to social conditions may be the softest form of victim-blaming, but also
the most patronizing. At its core, an appeal to social conditions is an acknowledgement
that there are systemic causes (i.e., policies) of factors like poverty and test score gaps
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between white and Black students. But such appeals also risk stripping agency from
students from low-SES households or from marginalized groups, rendering their
performance in school as a mechanistic outcome of social policy. The Democrat-Gazette
Editor expressed doubt that social policy would ever be able to correct the ills of society:
[Elliott’s] prescription for the schools adds up to: Wait-indefinitely. Because if the
schools have to wait for the perfect society to take shape before trying to perfect
the schools, we’ll all be waiting forever. Once again we’re told that people’s
social and economic backgrounds preclude any real progress in public education.
[Editor, DG, Jan. 12, 2015]
This paints the victims of social policy, apparently trapped in hopeless structural
oppression, as still weighing down the performance of their schools and thus
necessitating state takeover.
Once again, Arkansas Times Editor Max Brantley took issue with the DemocratGazette perspective while still relying on the same deficit-based assumptions: “Too many
blame the Little Rock School District for societal ills. The schools in distress are allminority and all-poor, a demographic that has proven resistant to dramatic education
advancement just about everywhere in America” [Brantley, AT, Jan. 25, 2015]. Brantley
later referred to LRSD students as an “overwhelming population of at-risk poor minority
kids” [Brantley, AT, Mar. 17, 2015]. His defense against the takeover is to not hold the
school district accountable for student performances caused by bad social policy. But
again, he does not identify the policies at fault; he identifies the “demographic” at fault.
Dehumanization. By portraying the victims of negative outcomes of policies as
less than human, policy actors suggest that they do not experience those negative
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outcomes as others would. Dehumanization can occur through (a) subhumanization, or
painting a group of people as lower than human, or as a lower class of person; (b)
demonization, or portrayal of people as animalistic in their behaviors or evil in their
intentions; or (c) depersonalization, or presenting people as abstract stereotypes
(typecasting) or as mere manifestations of data (digitization). I found examples of
dehumanization in four policy actor groups, and among every organizational- and
institutional-level actor (see Table 17).
Table 17
Moral Disengagement: Dehumanization
Sub-mechanism
Subhumanization

Demonization
Depersonalization

Individual (n)
Journalists (3)
Bureaucrats (2)
Politicians (1)
Advocates (1)

Organizational

Institutional

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Code (Choice)

Journalists (2)

-

-

Journalists (2)
Bureaucrats (2)
Politicians (2)

Arkansas Learns
Forward Arkansas
Office for Ed. Policy

Doe v. DOE
Code (Choice)

Note. Individual-level frequencies (n) are the number of distinct individuals from each policy actor group
who utilized a given mechanism at least once.

Subhumanization. Policy actors attribute subhuman qualities to their opposition in
order to lessen the contrast between a victim’s actions and the harm inflicted upon them
by a policy. A letter from LRSD board member Leslie Fisken to the state board of
education complaining about her fellow board members initiated the takeover of LRSD.
The portrayal of board members in the letter was consistent with other portrayals of board
members and their allies as race hustlers, demagogues, and Boo Radley [AL, Apr. 16,
2016]. In the letter, Fisken listed numerous grievances she had with the board majority’s
treatment of then-Superintendent Dexter Suggs, as well as their general behavior during
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meetings. She described those board members as duplicitous, incapable, irrational, and
hysterical obstacles to the superintendent’s improvement agenda.
Fisken referred to the board majority’s feedback to the superintendent and
questions about district initiatives as “nonsensical commentary” [Fisken, AT, Jan. 4,
2015], which is dismissive of the legitimacy and coherence of their perspective. She
portrayed board members’ opposition to Suggs’s agenda as “rude, inconsiderate,
patronizing, and insulting” [Fisken, AT, Jan. 4, 2015], portraying them more like petulant
children than community leaders. Nevertheless she speculated that, because they monitor
cell phones and social media in board meetings, “some of their opinions and motions
made during the meetings come from outside sources” [Fisken, AT, Jan. 4, 2015],
implying that they are incapable of thinking for themselves. Finally, she said she felt
from them a “tone of arrogance, power, and control” in executive session, when others
were not present and proceedings were not made public, which she deemed “hostile,
degrading, and unconscionable” [Fisken, AT, Jan. 4, 2015]. Fisken’s rhetoric is severe,
and its effect is to debase the elected members of the Board who happen to be her
opposition, which is additionally problematic given both Fisken’s youth and whiteness, in
contrast to the more senior members of the Black majority. It was a racial
microaggression for a young white board member to question the reasoning of more
experienced, longer-serving public officials who are Black (Bonilla-Silva, 2012). By
asserting her whiteness, she expanded her own history of antagonism on the local board
into a state-level political controversy, the terms of which she herself was able to define
from the beginning.
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Demonization. By demonizing those harmed by a particular policy, policy actors
are able to portray their opponents as villains, not victims. The starkest examples of this
were from the Editor of the Democrat-Gazette, whose editorials are anonymous. Overall,
the editorials in the Democrat-Gazette were the least diplomatic, nuanced discourse in the
sample. For example, the Editor claimed previous district leaders had simply ignored
failure, and published an editorial that sarcastically opposed Baker Kurrus’s proposal to
address it directly:
How old-fashioned. How retrograde. Not at all fashionable. Where’s the
educanto, the pseudo-scientific jargon that mod educators employ to cover their
lack of solid ideas? Where is the psychobabble, the pretentious formulations that
educationists fall back on when somebody notices that the kids are failing tests
and falling further and further behind? [Editor, DG, Jul. 28, 2015]
This description of district administrators is a list of insults that casts educators as
malicious quacks. In contrast, Kurrus and other state-level reformers appear not only well
meaning, but on the defensive against the demonized educators.
Little by little, as in two steps forward for one backward, both state law and local
education in Little Rock are beginning to serve the needs of our kids—instead of
the lawyers, politicians, race-hustlers, and patronage-dispensers who for too long
have used the Little Rock School District for their own self-interested purposes.
[Editor, DG, Nov. 4, 2015]
Here the Editor described educators as a selfish and corrupt lot whose influence over
district policy is decreasing as a result of the takeover. The attachment of ulterior motives
to district leaders is a kind of advantageous comparison between the state’s approach to
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improvement and the dissolved board’s approach. But the comparison is not between
favorable and unfavorable policy actions; it is between good people and bad people.
Depersonalization. Depersonalization is slightly different from dehumanization.
Rather than stripping a person of his or her humanity (dehumanization), depersonalizing
removes a person’s sense of individuality. Depersonalization occurs in helping
professions as an emotional distancing mechanism for those who work with many people
with diverse and sometimes serious needs. One common method is typecasting of
individuals, placing them in fixed categories based on superficial or obvious
characteristics. In the discourse of takeover, the most common instance of typecasting
was placing an organizational designation like Academic Distress onto students. LRSD
board member Jim Ross, a vocal opponent of takeover even long after it occurred,
argued: “This board’s going to move some teachers around. We’re going to find teachers
who want to work with these populations specifically. We’re going to incentivize
buildings where these distressed kids are” [Ross, AT, Jan. 26, 2015]. The language error
in his statement, referring to students as distressed when it is actually the school that is
distressed, applied an organizational designation to a group of people. This is an example
of how supposedly objective statistical categories become labels of deficiency stamped
on actual human beings. Displaced board member Greg Adams made the same conflating
error in imploring the state board to prevent charter expansion in Little Rock: “I ask you
again to keep the priority needs of the academically distressed students in the Little Rock
district as the top priority and not compromise that value” [Adams, DG, Feb. 12, 2016].
But former chairman of the state board Sam Ledbetter also used the same
organizational terminology to refer to students:
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The LRSD was taken over by the state out of a concern for the students in
academic distress. History tells us that most academically distressed and highneed students will remain in the LRSD no matter how large these charter schools
become. These remaining students require significantly more resources to reach
proficiency in math and literacy. [Ledbetter, DG, Feb. 14, 2016]
In this excerpt, Ledbetter was advocating against charter expansion as a citizen, since his
tenure as chair and member of the board had expired. Ledbetter cast the deciding vote for
takeover thinking that increased charter enrollment would not be on the state’s agenda,
but within months found himself advocating against charter-ization of the entire district,
as well as expansion of enrollment caps for two disproportionately white charter
networks. Yet, in his critique of those policies, he still used language that typecast
students based on the state performance classification of their schools.
When policy actors depersonalize students and communities by reducing them to
data points or digital representation, it becomes easier to discuss policies in terms of how
they affect data instead of how they affect people. For instance, Arkansas Times Editor
Max Brantley said, “Find me a school district with 80 percent impoverished students
scoring in the top quartile and hire their superintendent” [Brantley, AT, Jan. 8, 2015].
Brantley’s admonishment of takeover proponents furthers the misconception that schools
alone can correct for inequalities caused by bad social policy. The reduction of students
and communities to percentages and quartiles, while quite common in education
discourse in the age of accountability, is nonetheless a digitization of people into data
points, or impersonal blocs of normed categories.
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Organizational- and institutional-level actors used depersonalization through
digitization extensively, perhaps due to their reliance upon data in their communications.
This is not to suggest that these actors are more likely than individual actors to
depersonalize or digitize, but Bandura (2016) would argue the cumulative effect of such
continual digitization is depersonalization. As policies are increasingly discussed in terms
of numbers, the people affected by those policies become numbers, too.
Forward Arkansas, the public-private partnership for statewide education
planning funded largely by the Walton Family Foundation, suggested that federal equity
funds be withheld from schools if they are not performing: “Tie a portion of English
Language Learner and National School Lunch program funding to evidence of district
effectiveness in supporting ELL and NSL students” [FA, Full Report, Jan. 26, 2015].
English Language Learners and students from low-SES households require more
resources, not fewer, yet this policy proposes to withdraw funding from the schools that
educate them. These students then become a funding liability for schools. The same
report acknowledged this fact: “Regional differences are especially challenging for
minority and lower-income students who—in disproportionate numbers—attend school
in the lower-performing regions” [FA, Full Report, Jan. 26, 2015]. Taken together, these
two assertions present a cycle of funding depletion sustained by achievement gaps
produced by current approaches to testing (Au, 2016; Gillborn, 2017; Stewart, 2015).
Conclusion
This study was an investigation of the extent to which the critical race theory’s
(CRT) legal principle of unconscious racism was relevant to the takeover of LRSD, as
well as a conceptual inquiry into the fit of Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism with
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Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement. I believe the answers to the research questions
at the center of this study are clear. To summarize the above findings:
1. The U.S. District Court opinion in Doe—in which the attorneys for a group of
Black families claimed that the takeover amounted to racial discrimination
against Black students and families—asserted the discriminatory intent
requirement of Arlington, a parallel case to Davis, on which Lawrence (1995)
based his critical race theory of unconscious racism. The Court’s decision to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ case in Doe rested on the denial of unconscious racism.
2. In the sampled discourse of individual white policy actors in Little Rock, I
identified a substantial number of instances of morally disengaging discourse
at each of Bandura’s (2016) four loci (i.e., behavior, agency, outcome,
victim); of each of the eight mechanisms (i.e., justification, euphemism,
comparison, diffusion, displacement, dismissal, blame, dehumanization); and
of various subtypes within each of those mechanisms.
In light of these two summary findings, I assert that (a) the CRT tenet of unconscious
racism is applicable in the case of the state takeover of LRSD, which makes the takeover
itself a relevant subject for a study of CRT in education policy; and (b) the rhetoric of
moral disengagement was evident in the takeover discourse of white policy actors in
Little Rock at the time of the takeover and in the subsequent months.
My central research question concerning the extent to which moral disengagement
is compatible with or complementary to CRT in education policy, must be answered with
a conceptual argument. My discussion of this argument appears in Chapter 5, but in brief,
I believe my findings demonstrate that the social psychological concept of moral
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disengagement (Bandura, 2016) does complement the CRT tenet of unconscious racism
(Lawrence, 1995a), potentially describing the role of discourse—and of legal and policy
discourse specifically—in the continual reconstruction of white supremacy in the present.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion
I am rooting for Arkansas because when I look at Coach [Nolan] Richardson, he
reminds me of my Dad and Justice [Thurgood] Marshall. He is a serious, dignified
man who has risen to the top of his profession by virtue of his genius and his
humanity. He cares deeply for the young men he teaches. He has high expectations
for them and demands much of them. Richardson is a brilliant coach. He has one of
the best win/loss records of any coach currently coaching in Division I basketball—
but you don’t hear his name mentioned when people talk about great basketball
minds. Sports writers call him a “good recruiter” and a “motivator.” The kids on his
teams are “great natural athletes.” The T.V. commentators don’t use words like
“discipline” and “execution” when they talk about Richardson’s team. Arkansas
plays “street ball.” …Nolan Richardson knows that there is racial meaning in these
words. This is why I am rooting for Arkansas. (Charles Lawrence, The Epidemiology
of Colorblindness, 1995b)

The above excerpt is from one of several essays Lawrence wrote after the
publication of his original The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection (1995a). In it he
discussed several instances in which a person used language that, for Lawrence, had clear
racial meaning but that the speaker likely did not realize. Such language was, he
explained, the rhetorical manifestation of a racial ideology built on psychological
dissociation from the racist impacts of one’s actions. Nonetheless, the effects of such
language were still marginalizing to him and to the recipients, or victims, of such
rhetoric. White listeners also consumed common racial and racist understandings via such
implicit rhetoric, themselves learning how to express these implicit beliefs and biases in
such covert ways. This study should not be construed as an indictment of the motives of
individual policy actors; the methods I used were not appropriate for identifying specific
policy actors’ beliefs. Rather, this was a study of how individuals’ policy talk came
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together to comprise a morally disengaging policy arena. There is the potential, with the
framework of moral disengagement, to identify the agents of moral disengagement. I
discuss what this would take in the Implications section of this chapter.
This study of the education policy discourse of white policy actors in the wake of
the state takeover of Little Rock School District (LRSD) was undertaken to investigate
the compatibility of two paradigmatically distinct theories: (a) unconscious racism, which
arose from critical race theory in legal scholarship, a critical and interpretive
methodology; and (b) moral disengagement, which came from social psychology and is
studied through more positivistic, quantitative research approaches. Charles Lawrence
(1995a) introduced the theory of unconscious racism to explain the futility of
requirements from the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis (1976) for explicit
evidence of racist intent in discrimination suits. Albert Bandura (1999) introduced the
theory of moral disengagement to explain how people rationalize behaviors they know to
be immoral, such as genocide and war. As a critical scholar, I conducted this study from a
specific standpoint (Au, 2012), or a set of first premises that motivate critical scholarship.
These first premises come from critical race theory (Bell, 1995), and the most relevant of
them are that (a) racism is a feature, not a bug, of the American political and educational
systems and values (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012); (b) institutional racism is not a
passively inherited state of being determined by abstract forces, but the result of
individual actions in the present that continually reconstruct white supremacy (Leonardo,
2016); and (c) it is the well-intentioned policies and values of ostensibly antiracist
liberals and progressives that require the most scrutiny for the ways in which they
reconstruct white supremacy (Gillborn, 2016).
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The overarching research question at the center of this study was a conceptual
one, but the two sub-questions it implied were empirical:
RQ1: To what extent is Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement applicable in
cases implicated by Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism?
RQ1a: How is the case of the state takeover of Little Rock School District
a case of unconscious racism?
RQ1b: What mechanisms of moral disengagement are evident in the
discourse of the takeover?
Recall from Chapter 4 that, in Doe v. Arkansas Department of Education (2016),
the U.S. District Court asserted precedent from the Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation (1977), a sister decision of Davis, that explicit
discriminatory intent of policymakers must be demonstrated for Black families in Little
Rock to prove that the takeover discriminated against Black families. In this opinion, in
which the Court dismissed the discrimination claims of Black families in the state
takeover of the school district, the critical race tenet of unconscious racism was invoked.
So the answer to RQ1a is that yes, the theory of unconscious racism is applicable to the
LRSD case. Recall additionally from Chapter 4 that a wide variety of examples of
morally disengaging rhetoric were identified in the discourse of white individuals from
all five categories of symbolic policy elites (van Dijk, 1995b), from both liberals and
conservatives. So the answer to RQ1b is that yes, the mechanisms of moral
disengagement were evident in the takeover discourse of white policy actors in this case.
In this chapter, in order to answer RQ1, I connect the theory of unconscious
racism and the framework of moral disengagement to show that Lawrence’s theory of
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racism beyond the realm of the explicit, combined with Bandura’s theory of moral
rationalization of otherwise deplorable conduct, together are a better explanation of
discriminatory intent than theories of implicit bias (Kang et al., 2012) and aversive
racism (Dovidio et al., 2016). Implicit bias is a behavioral-level reflex studied via
reaction times to pictures and words (Kang, 2010). It is ill-equipped as a framework to
explain the persistence of generational white supremacy in a culture in which racism is
frowned upon and, in many cases, illegal (Selmi, 2018). Aversive racism is a preemptive
abdication of moral decision-making responsibility, also situational and reflexive
(Murrell et al., 1994). It is also ill-equipped as a framework to explain the reproduction of
white supremacy (Selmi, 2018). Moral disengagement concerns the propping up of an
ideology of difference, in which some people are protected by social institutions like
morality and law and others are not. Not all speakers are aware of their use of these
mechanisms of moral disengagement; some are aware, though they may not understand
that moral disengagement is the reason they use the mechanisms. Most listeners are likely
unaware of the collective effect of such language, of the influence it has on their own
beliefs and opinions. That is why this study was important, to point to how policy
discourse influences the way we think about others without our being aware of it.
Moral Disengagement as Intent
First, moral disengagement is not just one individual getting out of a sticky
situation. It is a group endeavor dependent on mass buy-in. Second, moral disengagement
itself is not a general characteristic or state of being. It is context-specific, and that
context is comprised of the agents, outcomes, and victims of a specific behavior. When
people use these mechanisms, it is because they know they need forgiveness for the
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impact of their actions (Bandura, 2016). Their primary goal is self-exoneration. But in a
democratic social system ostensibly built on popular consent, what they also do is
provide rationale for others to self-exonerate. At the social systems level, “collective
moral disengagement is not simply the aggregation of the moral exonerations of its
individual members operating in isolation” (Bandura, 2016, p. 100). It is instead a group
characteristic sustained by social interactions and institutions. So, ideology is important
to reproducing moral disengagement, and the nature of the behavior at the center of the
moral disengagement determines what kind of ideology. In this study, the ideology is
white supremacy.
Lawrence (1995a) asserted that the discriminatory effects of laws and policies can
be, and usually are, the result of “unconscious racial motivation” to discriminate (p. 237).
I propose there are two parts to unconscious racism: (a) the motivation to act, and (b) the
justification for having acted. The motivation is transmitted through cultural institutions
like the media, and through social relations like “parents, peers, and authority figures” (p.
238). Through acculturation and socialization, discriminatory values and perspectives
become ingrained into the way an individual orders the world in his or her mind. In the
contemporary era, acts with overtly discriminatory impacts are generally in contrast with
the widely accepted “societal ethic that condemns [racist] ideas” (p. 238). Therefore
justification works to “exclude [one’s] racism from consciousness” (p. 238). Thus, a
morally disengaging justification of an act with known negative effects for Black children
and communities betrays the speaker’s awareness of discriminatory impact. But the
judicial requirement is that actors act because of, not merely in spite of, discriminatory
impact. In order to theorize moral disengagement as a complementary framework for
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Lawrence’s unconscious racism, it must explain both motivation and justification, as well
as reproduction. Racist ideology is transmitted culturally and institutionally (Lawrence,
1995a), so psychological theories of unconscious racism must account for that
transmission.
Ideological justifications of racist acts may have a social, economic, moral, or
political base; but they only hold sway if the policy actor and the public believe the
ideology to be legitimate. This does not mean they must agree with the ideology being
used to justify a racist act, just that they believe it is a legitimate position to hold. The
Doe opinion asserted just such an argument, presenting such a racially disfranchising
state action as dissolution of a majority Black school board in a district with an
international historical reputation for marginalization of Black students as merely another
democratic political outcome. To make such an argument is not a case of implicit bias, or
reflexive in-group preference, as some contemporary theories of racism hold. It is an
ideological case for white dominance constructed through legal precedent and judicial
logic.
Ideology may be understood as “a defense mechanism against the anxiety felt by
those who hold power through means and with motives that they cannot comfortably
acknowledge” (Lawrence, 1995a, p. 239). Advocates of takeover deployed a range of
justifications in order to shift the takeover discussion to one of economic necessity in
order to evade having to defend its clear antidemocratic effects. For example, by
advocating for takeover of the district and expansion of charter enrollment caps, takeover
proponents and school choice reformists encouraged the disfranchisement of Black
people in LRSD and justified that action by saying economic growth, indeed community
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survival, demanded it. Such justifications are neither novel or unusual, but the application
of a social psychological perspective like moral disengagement to these justifications is.
The benefit of this perspective is the application of interdisciplinary theories of
knowledge production to racial realism, long identified by critical race theorists. Both
CRT and social psychological perspectives can benefit from interdisciplinary approaches
(Carbado & Roithmayr, 2014). The particular benefit of moral disengagement as a
theoretical framework for the study of white policy narratives is that it can be
operationalized as an instrument (i.e., a survey) to observe not only the beliefs of those
white policy actors but also the beliefs of their audiences.
For example, pro-charter advocates claimed that attracting new residents and
employers to the city required having high-quality schooling alternatives to the majority
Black LRSD. This is an example of moral disengagement by economic justification, but
it is also an appeal to unconscious racism, since it advocates not for boosting the public
school district but for boosting its competitors, which, unlike the LRSD, serve a majority
white student population (Brantley, 2016a). Others compared the future of Little Rock
itself, if under-enrolled schools were not consolidated, to the postindustrial blight of
Detroit, a thinly veiled racist dog-whistle (Bonilla-Silva, 2002). Critical social scientific
methods can potentially provide greater detail on the underlying beliefs and perspectives
of the pro-charter advocates who utilize moral disengagement mechanisms and dogwhistles, as well as the degree to which they may influence the beliefs and perspectives
of voters.
Policy actors who compared takeover to other seemingly parallel situations, in an
effort to make takeover appear more favorable, betray the irrational nature of the takeover
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argument. Through these arguments, takeover proponents deemphasized race as an
element of the debate. Comparisons to the impact of recent school consolidations on local
control in several rural Arkansas districts, in addition to ignoring the absence of racial
power dynamic in those districts relative to LRSD, failed to note that the rural districts
retained local boards and were not handed over to state control. Comparisons to the
takeover in PCSSD, which is not a majority Black district, also ignored the racial
differences between the districts and the reasons for which they were taken over; PCSSD
was taken over for district-wide financial distress, and LRSD for academic distress of six
schools. Comparisons to other urban districts under state control or to “achievement
districts” in other states ignored overwhelming evidence of racially stratified outcomes.
These strategies—justification, euphemism, and comparison—constitute approaches to a
policy action that rely on institutions with biases of their own. To the degree that an
ideology, moral system, or social institution may be invoked to justify white supremacy
and racism, that ideology, system, or institution contributes to the fabric of white
supremacy.
The focus on individual responsibility initially asserted in Davis and in Arlington,
later applied specifically to government officials in Iqbal, and integral to market
ideology, is itself an example of diffusion of responsibility. Because in law and policy
there is rarely a single culpable individual policy actor, responsibility for the outcomes is
diffused amongst an amorphous crowd (e.g., voters, legislators) and not admissible as
evidence in a discrimination suit. To diffuse responsibility amongst an amorphous
populous or to displace it onto specific other actors, especially when using other moral
disengagement strategies, is a tacit admission of negative impact. To deny, distort, or
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disregard negative outcomes is both a tacit admission of negative impact and a
manipulation of its severity.
All types of moral disengagement through dismissal of outcomes are not
necessarily intentional distortions (i.e., lies, manipulation). Policy actors may
unintentionally ignore or disregard an outcome, or minimize the harmful effects of an
outcome. Lawrence (1995a) says this can occur because of underlying, perhaps
unconscious, bias against a particular group:
Prejudice causes governmental decision makers to misapprehend the costs and
benefits of their actions, because they seize upon positive myths about the group
to which they belong and negative myths about those groups to which they do not.
(p. 242)
Ideology may also lead to “selective inattention” (Lawrence, 1995a, p. 243) to the
consequences of an action for a minority group or any group different from that of a
policy actor. Lawrence (1995a) gives the example of environmentalists in Arlington
arguing for red-lining to preserve an ecosystem adjacent to the area proposed for
development. Their support for red-lining arose from their environmentalist views, not
because of how it would adversely impact the Black community there. Since
discrimination against Black neighborhoods was not an explicit purpose of the red-lining
from the environmentalists’ perspective, the Court would say there was no
discrimination.
Policy actors may also communicate racist intent through cultural tropes with
implied racial meanings (Lawrence, 1995a).Takeover proponents may have blamed
victims by calling takeover opponents race-hustlers and demagogues, but the opponents
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of takeover also blamed victims by continually referring to students (instead of schools)
as academically distressed or at risk, identifying lack of parental involvement as an
impediment to achievement, and treating high-need children as costly leftovers from
charter schools’ pickings. Through this rhetoric policy actors shift the focus from their
own behavior to the behaviors of marginalized students and families. As a moral
disengagement mechanism, the use of this strategy belies at least subconscious awareness
of the speaker’s own culpability for student achievement outcomes. Such rhetoric is the
discursive equivalent of prematurely hanging up the phone before the Black man on the
other end asks for help with his car (Aberson & Ettlin, 2004).
The requirement for individual intent is also rooted in victim blaming. Lawrence
claims that, since discriminatory effects can be described as arising from
nondiscriminatory actions, any policy outcomes that differ by race can only be explained
by inherent group differences. “If there is no discrimination, there is no need for a
remedy; if Blacks are being treated fairly yet remain at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder, only their own inferiority can explain their subordinate position” (Lawrence,
1995, p. 239). The implicit assertion of a court decision in which no individual intent was
identified is that no unconstitutional discrimination occurred. This interpretation of the
law supports moral disengagement by victim blaming.
In the use of justification, euphemism, and comparison (which concern the
behavior itself), and in the use of diffusion and displacement of responsibility (which
concern the agency of the actors), it is plausible that actors may act in spite of
discriminatory impact. However, where actors dismiss and distort the consequences of
their actions, blame victims, and dehumanize students and families, they are more baldly
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manipulating their audience. In these cases, it is more plausible that the actors have acted
because of the supposed culpability of Black students and families and/or due to the
subhuman status that white policy actors have projected onto them. In the morally
disengaging case for state takeover, the actions and characteristics of Black students and
families have warranted a discriminatory response. This is discriminatory intent. Moral
disengagement by dismissal, blame, and dehumanization is intent to discriminate.
Limitations of the Study
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, as a critical race study it
began with some assumptions about racial dominance that were not the focus of the
research questions. These assumptions were not empirically investigated in this study, but
are supported by research. Second, my sympathies with some of the arguments put
forward by a few of the policy actors likely affected my analysis. I took measures to
minimize this. Third, my personal relationships with some of the sampled policy actors
also likely affected my analysis, but I was vigilant of this possibility throughout my
study. In the next three subsections, I discuss these limitations and my response to each.
Assumptions. As a critical study, this project began with a set of first premises.
Some of these are quite universal, and for these the literature base is quite extensive.
Others of these are more local. Consumers of critical research should not expect the
assumptions of the critical paradigm to be the focus of a critical investigation (Diem &
Young, 2015; Fischer, Torgerson, Durnová, & Orsini, 2015; Gulson, Leonardo, &
Gillborn, 2013). The focus of a critical investigation, such as the current study, is to
observe a setting from a perspective in which the experiences and assumptions of people
from marginalized groups are granted, instead of from a perspective in which
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majoritarian assumptions are granted. There were five important assumptions I brought to
this study:
1. School choice policies re-segregate school systems (Buras, 2011; Scott,
Lubienski, & DeBray, 2015; Winters, 2012). The net effect of choice policies
is white flight from public school districts. Even in situations where more
Black students leave the district for charter schools, the proportion of whites is
greater, meaning Black enrollment in the public district is more concentrated.
Additionally, charters themselves are more segregated. Some charters are
nearly 100% Black and Brown, while others have disproportionately high
numbers of white students (Logan & Burdick-Will, 2016).
2. State takeover of school districts disfranchises Black and Brown people
(Morel, 2016; Oluwole & Green, 2009). When majority Black and Brown
districts are taken over by the state, and local representative bodies are
dissolved, Black and Brown people report greater alienation. This is especially
true when state leaders fail to take great measures to seek community input
and participation in decision making during the takeover period (Morel,
2016).
3. The money and support behind charter schools is predominantly white. Black
support for charter schools is waning nationally (Henry & Dixson, 2016).
Even the NAACP, a centrist organization politically, has called for a
moratorium on charter schools, citing negative effects on Black children and
communities (Camera, 2018). In Arkansas, the Walton Family Foundation,
Walter E. Hussman, Jr., and the Chamber of Commerce are the leading
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proponents of charter schools (Brantley, 2016a). These are powerful groups of
pro-charter white people with outsized influence on education policy in
Arkansas and in Little Rock.
4. The statewide electorate of Arkansas is majority white and right-leaning. The
population of Arkansas is 77% white and 15% Black (United States Census
Bureau, 2016). With the exception of the elections of 1992 and 1996, when
Arkansas’s Bill Clinton was on the presidential ballot, Arkansas has voted
Republican for president since the 1970s. The state’s congressional delegation
has been all-Republican since 2010, and both senators have been Republican
since 2015. There has never been a Black congressperson or statewide official
elected in Arkansas.
5. The electorate within LRSD is majority Black and left-leaning. The population
of Little Rock is 67% Black and 19% white (Arkansas Department of
Education, 2016e). Until the 2010 redistricting in Arkansas, the Little Rock
metropolitan area was represented by the only Democrat in Arkansas’s
delegation to the U.S. House. The city’s state representatives and senators are
Democrats; three of seven representatives are Black, and two of three senators
are Black. The mayor is a white Democrat, and most of the city board of
directors are Democrats; three of seven district board members are Black, and
three additional at-large board members are white. City boundaries are larger
than the LRSD boundaries, which do not include much of the western
expansion.
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Empirical investigation of the above assumptions was beyond the scope of this
study. The conclusions about white supremacy that are implied by the above assumptions
arise from the central tenet of CRT: that racism is endemic to American life and a feature
of American political ideology. This is supported by research that shows that school
choice and takeover laws negatively impact Black communities and positively benefit
white communities (Scott et al., 2015; Stovall, 2013; Waitoller et al., 2017). The political
and racial differences between the statewide electorate and the Little Rock electorate are
important, since (a) approaches to public education differ between conservatives and
progressives, and (b) the racial domination that occurs when statewide white majority
trumps local self-determination is problematic.
Sympathies with actors. Some of the arguments made by a few actors struck me
as reasonable. When this occurred, I included my thoughts in my analytical memos.
Some of these impressions stuck with me throughout the study, and others faded as I
came across more examples of an individual’s discourse. I admit that Baker Kurrus
sounded better and better the more I learned from him. He was not a typical reformist. He
was race-conscious, though artful at times and clumsy at other times. He seemed to be a
plain-spoken pragmatic individual. He was pro-teacher. He was anti-charter. I was
baffled at why conservatives liked him so much. I found myself reflexively agreeing with
a lot of what Kurrus said, and I was open to the suggestion by a peer reviewer that my
whiteness affected my view of Kurrus. Additionally, John Brummett's idea about
centralized state control of all schools appealed to me, as a democratic-socialist. I
recognize the importance of local control, however, especially when the statewide
majority of rural white conservatives would marginalize even large majority Black
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districts. Discourse from both Kurrus and Brummett is well represented in my analysis,
and I am confident my identification of the moral disengagement strategies they use is
rigorous.
Relationships with actors. State board member Jay Barth was a professor and
personal mentor of mine at Hendrix College, where I was an undergraduate from 1998 to
2002. I also worked at Little Rock Preparatory Academy (LRPA) as a teacher, and I
know Tina Long, who is white and the current superintendent of Exalt Education, the
CMO that operates LRPA. This study was bounded by the letter from LRSD board
member Leslie Fisken in early January of 2015, and the firing of LRSD superintendent
Baker Kurrus in April of 2016. LRPA started making the news later in 2016 when it
applied to the state board for an enrollment expansion and permission to move its
location from a predominantly Black and Brown section of town to a predominantly
white section of town. Therefore neither the school nor its superintendent appeared in the
sampled discourse in this study. Additionally, I am personal friends with Benji Hardy,
who covered education for the Arkansas Times during the time period of this study. He
also advised me at an earlier point in the design of my study, when I was constructing a
list of people to interview. Eventually I decided not to use personal interviews. Finally, I
have written music reviews for the Arkansas Times in the past, and I know Lindsey
Millar, the current editor, though we are not in close contact anymore. Two of my peer
debriefers knew of these connections and were instructed to consider them in their
feedback. Neither reported any issues in my analysis related to these relationships.
Transferability. The transferability of my conclusions is limited by both the
context of this study and the types of individuals I sampled. Moral disengagement may
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exist at the level of policy elites, but it must also be studied amongst other discourse
groups. Bandura (2016) says moral disengagement in a social system is not a collection
of individual choices, but a group characteristic comprised of “interactive, coordinative,
synergistic group dynamics” (p. 100). So while additional study is required to generalize
these findings for others in Little Rock, it is very likely that similar policies in other
similar contexts will also be built around a similar framework of morally disengaging
politics.
Implications
There are important implications of these findings for policymakers, education
leaders, and education researchers. If discursive evidence of moral disengagement is
evidence of discriminatory purpose—and I believe it is—then education policies that rely
on such rationalization warrant strict scrutiny by voters as well as the justice system.
Moral disengagement is potentially a mechanism through which unconscious racism is
converted into public policy, and this should be a concern for policymakers, education
leaders, and education researchers. The conceptual framework of discourse, ideology, and
policy in which I situated this study shows how individual biases and beliefs are
communicated and instantiated in public policy, such as state takeover and charter school
authorization, and law.
Discourse both reveals and influences the mental models people use to make
meaning of their environments (van Dijk, 2016). In this case, the discourse was rife with
examples of moral disengagement mechanisms—not just some, but all eight mechanisms,
as well as each of their sub-mechanisms. This preponderance, combined with the District
Court’s appeals to precedent from the case history upon which Lawrence based the
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theory of unconscious racism, strongly suggests an underlying structure to the
coappearance of both moral disengagement and unconscious racism in this policy arena.
At the very least, policy actors and the consumers of political rhetoric in an arena where
usage of the mechanisms of moral disengagement is as common as it was in the takeover
of LRSD are likely highly aware of the discriminatory effects of their policies. In the
following section, I discuss important next steps for policymakers, education leaders, and
education researchers.
For policy. There is a substantial body of research showing that state takeover of
urban schools districts and school choice policies have disproportionately negative
impacts on communities of color. Previously, the discourse leading to the adoption of
these policies has appeared to situate takeover and school choice within a social justice
agenda for education (Bertrand et al., 2015; Hernández, 2016). However, a closer
analysis of the same discourse will likely reveal, as it has in the case of Little Rock,
widespread deployment of moral disengagement strategies by policy actors in support of
such reforms. It follows that, if education reforms must be accompanied by moral
disengagement mechanisms that rationalize their expected discriminatory outcomes, this
should be identified by reform (i.e., takeover and choice) opponents, taken into account
by the voting public, and defended by reform proponents. If adoption of a policy requires
moral disengagement, should it be adopted in the first place?
The difference between aversive racism and the kind of unconscious racism that
Lawrence has theorized is that aversive racism may explain decision-making behaviors of
individuals, it does not explain how they convey and cultivate their system of
justifications (i.e., their ideology) to others. For elite policy actors, this is an important
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element for two reasons: (1) They have the ear of the general public, whose social values
develop in interaction with public political discourse (Ferrare, 2014; Liu, Lindquist,
Vedlitz, & Vincent, 2010; van Dijk, 1995b); and (2) If discriminatory intent is to be
found, even implicitly, it will be found in the discourse of public policy actors. The
public, including parents and students, but most importantly district- and school-level
policy actors, must be attentive to policy rhetoric for the ways in which policy actors may
be promoting self-exoneration for expected discriminatory effects of their policies.
Consumption of political discourse requires looking beyond the face-value meanings of
policy actors’ rhetoric, toward discernment of the actual outcomes policy actors are
anticipating with their discourse.
For education leaders. We have to understand unconscious motivation in order
to resist the “seductive ideology” (Lawrence, 1995a, p. 238) of something like moral
disengagement. Education leaders must be vigilant consumers of political rhetoric,
cultural assumptions, and racial attitudes. Accepting the idea of unconscious racism as a
cultural value means acknowledging collective responsibility for its effects. The notion of
collective responsibility may sound itself like diffusion of responsibility, but it is not.
Lawrence (1995a) directly addresses such an interpretation:
Understanding the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as
traditionally conceived, without denying our collective responsibility for racism’s
eradication. We cannot be individually blamed for unconsciously harboring
attitudes that are inescapable in a culture permeated with racism…. Without the
necessity for blame, our resistance to accepting the need and responsibility for
remedy will be lessened. Understanding unconscious motivation will also help us
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comprehend and combat the hegemony of the ideology of equal opportunity. (p.
239)
Therefore, any notion of unconscious racism equipped to dismantle the legal and political
institutions that protect white supremacy must not abdicate individual responsibility for
collective racism. Behaviorist notions of racism built on concepts like implicit bias and
aversive racism do not provide for agency, instead describing racism as a behavioral
response acquired during childhood based on associations within the subconscious.
Moral disengagement, on the other hand, is an agentic conception of human
morality and behavior, even in social systems:
People are contributors to their activities, not merely onlooking hosts of
subpersonal networks autonomously creating and regulating their performances.
People conceive of ends and work purposefully to achieve them. They are agents
of experiences, not just passive undergoers of experiences. In their transactions
with the environment, as mindful agents they are generative, creative, proactive,
and reflective, not simply reactive to external input. (Bandura, 2016, p. 42-3)
Moral disengagement from racist activity is a component of racist ideology. It is how
beliefs are converted into material reality. For education leaders, then, it is a call to
understand that process and the rhetoric that catalyzes it. Lawrence (1995b) says we have
to “cease denying the reality of racism” (p. 18), echoing Chief Justice Blackmun’s raceconscious exhortation that, in order to move beyond racism we must first acknowledge
race (Schraub, 2016) and contradicting Chief Justice Roberts’s colorblind assertion that
“the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race” (p. 600). Education leaders must be advocates of race-conscious education
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reforms that benefit Black and Brown students and communities, not of blanket reforms
that apply one-size-fits-all logic to specialized problems.
For research. Researchers must begin connecting the discriminatory effects of
education reforms and policies with the ideological rhetoric that preceded their adoption,
in order to establish a theory of action that connects the morally disengaging rhetoric in
the inputs and processes of policymaking with the discriminatory outcomes of those
policies. Historian and critical race scholar Marie Matsuda (2008) said, “If American
innocence is about truth deflection, then its opposite is truth itself. Accepting the truth of
our racism is not a call to self-flagellating guilt, but a call to action” (p. 1042). That
action is research.
Further investigation of moral disengagement and unconscious racism should
include quantitative research on the moral disengagement of specific policy actors and of
a random sample of the general population within a policy arena. Since moral
disengagement is not a general characteristic, measures must be “tailored to specific
activity domains” (Bandura, 2016, p. 26). This would require the construction and
validation of instruments specific to top-down imposition of market-based education
reforms (i.e., state takeover).
I recommend additional qualitative study of moral disengagement by actor
affiliation: How does the discourse of Republican appointees and Democratic appointees
differ? How does discourse differ between takeover/reform proponents and opponents? A
more detailed study could be undertaken specifically of the Democrat-Gazette Editor’s
discourse on education and race. It was the least nuanced and most overtly racist of any
sampled discourse in this study, and besides this, also seemed to talk down to its audience
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(i.e., writing at times in some kind of Ozark white dialect) and assert an identifiably
Arkansas identity that is race-specific. Interviews with a range of policy actors, both elite
and non-elite, would be useful to discern the discursive structure or moral disengagement
in the context of Little Rock and the takeover. A theory of action that locates
discriminatory intent within a morally disengaging ideology should identify not only the
breadth of such discourse across a range of actors, but also the depths to which moral
disengagement mechanisms permeate the political motivations of education reformists
and their supporters.
Conclusion
It is important to note that what the theory of moral disengagement itself receives
from this study is critical race-conscious directionality. There is a universal morality
implied by Bandura’s theory in which violence is seen as morally wrong. However,
critical researchers conceive of violence as a much broader and more nuanced
phenomenon than just murder or war. State violence can be physical, but it need not be
only physical (Toshalis, 2010, 2012). In his writings on moral disengagement, Bandura
(2016) not only fails to consider racism as a troublesome "true believer" ideology, but he
also uses the example of civil rights protesters as a group analogous to Islamist terrorists
who justified extreme civil disobedience and revolutionary violence (p. 51). This is quite
problematic, especially since this perspective seems to accept the asserted perspective of
"those in power" (p. 51), whom he criticizes for construing events in such a way that their
own power is preserved. In this illustration, Bandura presents the victims of oppression
defending themselves against state violence as instigators of immoral violence,
themselves. This is victim blaming, one of Bandura’s own mechanisms of moral
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disengagement and possibly an indication of the degree to which he perceives racism as
something other than a moral disengagement phenomenon. The current study corrects
this notion.
What this argument contributes to studies of education reform narratives is more
than a descriptive analysis of deficit mindset, stereotyping, and in-group favoritism. It
proposes a theory of the resilience of white supremacist ideology. Selmi (2018) argues
that the devotion of antiracist legal scholars to implicit bias as a critique of the intent
requirement has instead bolstered it. Implicit bias studies are, themselves, moral
disengagement. Implicit bias is diffusion of responsibility among the cultural and
evolutionary forces that have shaped human behavior, and displacement of responsibility
onto the reptilian brain, itself somehow a separate actor beyond our control. Previous
studies of both moral disengagement and unconscious racism have not yielded the kind of
insights into the persistence of white supremacy in education policy that direct
connection between the frameworks of moral disengagement and unconscious racism
enables. Almost no studies of either framework have been conducted in the context of
education policy. This study provides a framework for the analysis of education policy
discourse that is more than descriptive; it has the potential to be explanatory of the
popularity of racist education policies and reforms amongst a supposedly post-racist,
social justice-minded culture.
Finally, from a critical race perspective, the requirement that intent be “because
of” and not just “in spite of” is practically insurmountable, as Lawrence (1995a)
identified three decades ago. Notwithstanding the impossibly rigorous intent standard, the
extent to which moral disengagement is used in the case of the takeover of LRSD should
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meet the plausibility standard needed to at least move a discrimination suit to discovery
and trial. Lawrence called for more rigorous legal standards that accounted for the results
of scientific studies of unconscious racism. Some legal scholars (Aberson & Ettlin, 2004;
Mentovich & Jost, 2008) have claimed that work on implicit bias and aversive racism has
answered Lawrence’s call. I reject that idea. Ideology is not measurable through studies
of reflex.
By positing the effects of racism as the proof of racism, and by explaining the role
of the collective, unconscious practices in producing these effects, [Lawrence]
stole our innocence. The reason his theory, though influential, has not become
Constitutional doctrine, is that its full implications would require us to become a
nation of open-eyed justice seekers. (Matsuda, 2008, p. 1040)
In Little Rock, elite white policy actors undertook a dissolution of the locally elected and
majority Black school board in a majority Black district with an internationally notorious
reputation for racial inequity. To justify this action, they claimed the city’s survival
demanded it. They claimed economic growth would elude the city unless takeover
occurred. They deployed a range of creative language and comparisons to disguise the
severity of the takeover and the potential disadvantages it would unleash on Black
students and families. As they acted, they shifted responsibility for the takeover onto state
law, legislatures, courts, bureaucrats, and their predecessors. This misrepresented the
consequences of their decision and denied its discriminatory impact. To the extent that
they acknowledged the negative effects of their actions, they blamed Black teachers,
leaders, students, and families for those effects.
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Education is nothing if not moral engagement with students (Noddings, 2010).
Bandura’s (2016) theory suggests that these rationalizations and justifications would not
have been necessary had the policy actors who utilized them not already understood their
actions to be discriminatory. Educators, parents, students, and citizens should be
concerned when policy actors think public approval of an education policy will demand
less moral engagement, not more.
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Editor (anonymous)
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Arkansas Democrat-Gazette columnist
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette editorial page
Arkansas Times journalist, blogger

Politicians

Adams, Gary
Cozart, Bruce
Dotson, Jim
Fisken, Leslie
Hutchinson, Asa
Ross, Jim
Rutledge, Leslie
Stodola, Mark

LRSD board president
State representative (Republican)
State representative (Republican)
LRSD board member
Governor
LRSD board member
Attorney general (Republican)
Little Rock mayor

Educators

Bacon, John
Jensen, Eric
Ritter, John

Charter school CEO (eStem)
UA, Fayetteville, professor
UA, Fayetteville, professor

Bureaucrats

Barth, Jay
Chambers, Susan
Key, Johnny
Kurrus, Baker
Ledbetter, Sam
Pfeffer, Ivy
Poore, Michael
Saviers, Vicki
Saunders, Eric
Smith, Scott
Wilde, Richard
Wood, Tony
Zook, Diane

State Board of Education member
State Board of Education member
Commissioner of Education (Hutchinson appointee)
LRSD superintendent
State Board of Education chair
Charter Authorizing Panel member
LRSD superintendent (Kurrus successor)
State Board of Education member
Charter Authorizing Panel member
Charter Authorizing Panel member
Department of Education
Commissioner of Education (predecessor to Key)
State Board of Education member

Advocates

Hussman, Walter
Johnson, Marla
Key, Barclay
Koehler, Cathy
Kopsky, Bill
McDonald, Hugh
Nelson, Rex
Newton, Gary
Riggs, John
Smith, Gary
Tilbury, Van

Democrat-Gazette publisher, philanthropist
Business leader
Education advocate, organizer
Little Rock Education Association president
Education advocate, organizer
Business leader
Republican political strategist
Walton Family Foundation, Arkansas Learns
Former LRSD board member; business leader
Business leader
Business leader
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